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INTRODUCTION
During the tenure of President Barack Obama, scholars and
advocates viewed the best route for federal court review of police
practices to be consent decrees negotiated between municipal police departments and the Special Litigation Section in the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to
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28 U.S.C. § 14141.1 DOJ fact-finding reports and settlements,
like the one in Ferguson, Missouri,2 exposed egregious practices
and sought a culture shift by decrees in police departments
across the country. The DOJ Process sometimes also bolstered
mobilization to achieve police reform already underway outside
the court.3 Today, the current Administration has taken an official position against using 28 U.S.C. § 14141 authority in favor
of potentially unconstitutional exercises of police discretion.4
Although the federal executive branch is no longer a driving
force behind police reform litigation, the institution of policing is
no less harmful to Black and Brown communities. Thus, the
questions motivating this Article are: “What can legal advocates
do now? How can communities and their lawyers mobilize within
the legal process?” Without the DOJ’s involvement, injured communities interested in court intervention may turn to section
19835 impact litigation, and what legal scholarship terms public
1. 28 U.S.C. § 14141 (2018); see, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Organizational
Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 527 (2004); Kami
Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507–15 (2008); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58–64 (2009); Jonathan
M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police
Use of Force Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 337–44 (2016).
2. Sunita Patel, Towards Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
793, 856–67 (2016) (discussing the death of Michael Brown, the investigation,
and resulting settlement).
3. I have explored the unstudied connection between police reform mobilizing and DOJ consent decrees elsewhere. See generally id.
4. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL
CONSENT DECREES AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/
file/1109681/download [https://perma.cc/6YCC-LB7R]; see also Stephen Rushin,
Police Reform During the Trump Administration, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr.
29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/police-reform
-during-the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/H854-QNVU].
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”). It lay dormant until 1961, when the Supreme Court resurrected the provision to allow tort liability against individual officers. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), partially overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (ruling that municipalities are “persons” for
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law, public interest, or structural reform litigation.6 Rather than
seek monetary damages against particular officers for abusive
conduct against individual plaintiffs, structural reform litigation
seeks redress from police departments and municipalities for
their law enforcement practices and policies.7 Its goal is to
achieve an injunction against, or change in the policies or practices of, a governmental entity. These are cases typically brought
as class actions.8
Legal scholars have pointed to conservative judicial appointments and Supreme Court doctrine as causes for the shrinking
of liberal structural reform litigation.9 Scholars’ views range
from “[t]he courthouse door is closed,”10 to “[p]rocedure and doctrine make it really difficult to obtain substantive review of civil
rights and constitutional harms.”11
purposes of section 1983 liability).
6. Some variation exists in the literature with regard to definitions. For
purposes of this Article, these terms carry enough overlap to fit within my description. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288–89 (1976).
7. See Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015).
8. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd III), 861 F. Supp. 2d 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
9. E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1384, 1393–95 (2000) (“By the mid-1970s and early 1980s, however, a number
of events signaled the demise of the structural reform revolution, including
the appointment of a number of conservative Justices to the Supreme Court.”);
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1416 (2007) (“[T]he increasing conservatism of the federal
bench—the usual explanation for the supposed retrenchment in structural reform litigation—is reinforced by specific doctrinal obstacles.”).
10. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Closing the Courthouse Door: How Your Constitutional Rights Became Unenforceable 47 (2017) (criticizing the Court’s treatment of litigants suing police as closing opportunities for review of harmful and
unconstitutional practices).
11. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “increasing hostility
to constitutional tort claims” and arguing an ideal regime would expand entity
liability for constitutional violations); accord Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions
and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 187
(2017) (“Given these barriers to securing and defending systemic relief, it is not
surprising that institutional reform litigation is commonly understood to be in
retreat.”); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 346 (1989) (“[M]any courts have enforced numerous rules in ways that adversely affect public interest litigant.”); cf. SARAH
STASZACK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
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Scholars and litigators cite standing, municipal liability,
and class certification as concerning doctrinal hurdles when
plaintiffs aim to achieve government accountability for constitutional norms. Frequently discussed is the doctrinal hurdle associated with demonstrating standing for injunctive relief under
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.12 This case often allows police departments to use standing to evade court review of abusive practices. The Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York
line of cases presents another doctrinal barrier to court reform
of municipal agency practices, including police practices.13 While
Monell opened the door to holding a municipality liable for governmental harm, subsequent decisions required plaintiffs show
the municipality displayed deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.14 A variety of theories developed over
time.15 Particularly relevant to this Article, Monell’s progeny established that where plaintiffs challenge an unofficial policy,
plaintiffs must prove the employees’ illegal actions were authorized by the municipality or that the practices were “so persistent
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015) (arguing that certain classes of litigants and
types of litigation were foreclosed from bringing suits prior to the Warren Court
era and discussing progressive arguments in favor of limited review during the
New Deal); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on
Civil Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 897–904 (2016) (reviewing STASZACK, supra) (discussing the role of liberal law makers and Justices in efforts to close
the courthouse doors while pointing to the limits for civil rights plaintiffs that
follow cases such as Lyons, Iqbal, and Monell).
12. E.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1334 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce
a Legal Duty, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277 (2013); Harmon, supra note 1, at 11–12 (noting that structural reform litigation is a weaker tool to force police department
change as a result of Lyons and Rizzo); Michael J. Schmidtberger, No Holds
Barred in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Standing to Seek Injunctions in Federal
Court Against Municipalities, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 183 (1984).
13. Although Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), allowed plaintiffs to proceed with
claims against a local municipality for unlawful discriminatory conduct, it
struck down the plaintiffs’ theory of respondeat superior for an official’s supervisory liability. Id. at 690; see also Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701
(1989); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986);
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986); City of Okla. City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (“Policy . . . implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.”).
14. See infra Part I.B; see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 379.
15. See infra Part I.B.
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and widespread” that persons with decision-making authority
possessed actual or constructive knowledge of wrongdoing.16
More recently, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, confirmed a
higher “significant proof” standard for Rule 23(a)17 class certification requirements and specifically tightened the basis for
showing commonality for class members challenging policies or
practices.18 Scholars view Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as part of
mounting attacks on aggregate litigation itself, undermining key
processes in civil rights cases.19 These doctrines seem to erect
hard barriers to achieving substantive review for governmental
harm.
Some have pointed to the particular difficulties facing litigants suing police.20 Other scholars look to the district courts to
bring into focus what options remain available and offer a
broader view of structural reform litigation.21 Charles Sabel and
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
18. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
19. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility
to Class Certification, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (2010); Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (arguing many courts now require plaintiffs
prove substantial portions of their cases on the merits during class certification); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013); cf. Robert H. Klonoff, Class
Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017) (examining a more recent trend resisting additional restraints on class actions). On
policing specifically, see Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional
Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2012) (arguing the move towards individuation in constitutional rights adjudication, including the Fourth Amendment
context, presents a challenge for class certification).
20. E.g., Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416 (“Of all the areas in
which structural reform is generally accounted a failure, by far the most important is [local police] law enforcement.”); David Rudovsky, Running in Place:
The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1199, 1233 (2005) (“Over the years, however, [the Court] has insisted that liability be imposed only upon a high level of proof of culpability . . . . Moreover,
the Court has ruled that a plaintiff seeking to prove liability where the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury . . . [must meet] rigorous standards of
culpability and causation . . . .”).
21. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation
and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809,
827–45 (2010) (examining federal litigation against government employees using Bivens in five districts); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over
Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550,
602–04 (2006) (arguing prison litigation continues in the district court despite
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Bill Simon’s path-setting article focused on injunctions in many
contexts, but focused comparatively little attention on policing
or the legal mobilization that led to liability findings.22 Prominent scholars have meaningfully reviewed district court cases
and undermined the assumption that prison litigation “died” in
the face of Supreme Court doctrine and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.23 In reality, how many police structural reform cases
have failed as a result of the doctrinal and evidentiary hurdles
the Supreme Court erected is unknown.24
This Article fills the gap between Supreme Court determinations and district court practices in police structural reform
litigation.25 This Article argues the nature and quality of information gathered—informally and formally through discovery—
is a critical factor in the success of racial profiling litigation.
When litigators succeed as they did in the three case examples
presented in this Article, the tactical and strategic details of information-production deserves close attention from scholars. As
the case examples demonstrate, litigators take the law seriously
and attempt to meet the difficult standards, but do not presume
doctrine is fixed or formal. This is not to say evidence is the only
mounting doctrinal obstacles and federal litigation creating additional procedures); see also Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction . . . Oops, It’s Still Moving!, 58 MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003); Susan P. Sturm,
A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1361–62 (1991).
For a similar perspective for structural reform remedies, see Charles Sabel &
William Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1029–52 (2004).
22. Sabel & Simon, supra note 21.
23. See Schlanger, supra note 21.
24. The total number of section 1983 police misconduct claims brought each
year is not reflected in available data, let alone data reflecting cases brought for
purposes of equitable relief or structural reform. See Katheryn E. Scarborough
& Craig Hemmens, Section 1983 Suits Against Law Enforcement in the Circuit
Courts of Appeal, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1999). However, the results
of Joanna Schwartz’s multiple studies give some insight. Joanna Schwartz, How
Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How
Qualified Immunity Fails]. She recently studied section 1983 litigation brought
by civilians against police defendants in five district courts in five circuits. Id.
She found 99 (8.4%) out of 1,183 cases were brought solely against municipalities and/or sought only equitable relief (injunctive or declaratory). Id. at 27. Although we cannot assume the 99 cases were all structural reform cases—that is,
class actions seeking an injunction against a particular police practice—this is
a larger proportion and raw number than scholars would likely predict.
25. See Rudovsky, supra note 20; Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments
Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016);
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 24.
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consideration. Indeed, judicial management, opposing counsel,
local politics, plaintiffs’ resources, media attention, and grassroots mobilizing play roles in the outcomes of such structural reform litigation. This Article does not paint a rosy picture for litigators, but any fair examination of public law litigation needs
to account for those cases that win.
This Article presents three significant examples of litigation
that managed to overcome the Supreme Court’s demands and
achieve class-wide injunctive orders. The cases are against large,
urban police departments and involve Equal Protection challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unreasonable
stop and seizure claims under the Fourth Amendment.26 That is
to say, the litigants center race and ethnicity in their claims
though they understand that racial profiling class actions are
extremely difficult to win. The case studies are part of a growing
archive of section 1983 structural reform litigation against police
departments.27 The case studies are also relevant to larger debates about access to justice, the role of federal courts, the growing study of district courts (providing a different focus than
solely on the Supreme Court), and the salience of race in challenges to police department practices.
26. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV, § 1.
27. In the category of cases where race and/or national origin claims are
included, see Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 1:17-cv-04467, 2018 WL 1989767
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2019); Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, No.
1:18-cv-00719, 2019 WL 6907294 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019); Raza v. City of New
York, No. 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JMA, 2013 WL 3079393 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013).
First Amendment and Eighth Amendment challenges in circumstances of policing protesters and policing homelessness are likewise another category of successful litigation. To date, those cases have not included race as a basis for challenging the police practices. See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616–17
(9th Cir. 2019) (finding it unconstitutional to prosecute homeless individuals for
sleeping on streets when no shelter is available), amending and superseding on
denial of reh’g 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 19-247, 2019 WL
6833408 (Dec. 16, 2019); Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 7921
(RJS)(JCF), 2012 WL 4513352 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012) (granting, in part,
plaintiff protestors’ motions for summary judgment); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:03-cv-01142 ER, 2004 WL 7321250 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2004) (challenging statute criminalizing sitting, lying, or sleeping on any street, sidewalk, or
public way because it effectively criminalizes homelessness), rev’d, 444 F.3d
1118, vacated pursuant to settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (2006); Service Employee
Intern. Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (holding the city’s restrictions on the protestors prior to Democratic National Convention unconstitutional and granting a preliminary injunction). Further study is needed to understand more generally the opportunities and challenges with class action litigation against police.
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The three district court cases show that in racial profiling
litigation plaintiffs must at least gather extensive hard data on
police practices and convincing anecdotal evidence of discriminatory conduct. District courts managing (1) Floyd v. City of New
York, (2) Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, and (3) Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia issued decisions within the span of a year.
These victories provide an opportunity for further inquiry
into the range of possibilities for litigants, at least at the trial
court level. From the lens of doctrinal barriers to successful police structural reform litigation this Article asks, “How did the
litigators overcome doctrinal hurdles?” At a time when scholars
and advocates view public law litigation in policing as a weak
tool, I argue district court structural reform litigation is a viable
option for police reform worthy of invigoration.28 Secondarily,
the information-production of the litigation served a valuable
purpose, as does the process by which information is gathered.
The case studies reveal important information gathering avenues available through media, advocates, and prior litigation.
The Article focuses on these three cases for specific reasons.
While Floyd has received scholarly attention, the academic
treatment of Floyd has primarily focused on its statistical analysis and proof for its Fourth Amendment claims.29 Less attention
has been paid to the procedural lessons from the case or the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment race claims for the subclass of Black and Latino stops. Ortega-Melendres is now recognized as the underlying case that led President Trump to pardon
Sherriff Joe Arpaio’s criminal contempt of court.30 The litigation
is well-known among immigration scholars, but it has not been
mined by proceduralists to date. Bailey v. City of Philadelphia is

28. Different questions should be explored to discern the circumstances
when police structural reform litigation should be pursued (beyond merely
availability of evidence to prove allegations of unlawful police practices), the
relationship to advocacy outside the courtroom with litigation, and the structural reform remedies process. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10; Bagenstos,
supra note 11; Fallon, supra note 11; Parkin, supra note 11; Tobias, supra note
11. I plan to take up some of these questions in another project.
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV.
1495 (2014).
30. Julie H. Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who
Became the Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump
-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/3P96-JMK7].
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significant as the first of the three to achieve a class-wide remedial order,31 and for its influence on reform litigation in New
York. As litigation that settled,32 its inclusion may seem odd because the doctrinal concerns were not formally overcome
through motion practice. Nonetheless, the parties’ proposed orders made the expected outcome concrete, and even delineated
specific elements of class certification and Monell liability.33 Bailey provides a fair example of statistical information used in the
section 1983 context to achieve police reform, comparable to the
Civil Rights Division, but on a smaller scale.34 Finally, the Bailey
example juxtaposes the demanding motion practice in Floyd and
Ortega-Melendres, with a primarily behind-the-scenes strategy
of achieving a class-wide injunction, remarkably, in the racial
profiling context.35
To the extent police litigation to obtain damages for unconstitutional actions is unavailable due to qualified immunity, it
puts pressure on access to injunctive and equitable relief as the
only alternative method to deter police misconduct. This makes
the question of how to succeed in equity all the more salient. An
important boundary for this Article is that these cases did not
pursue damages for the class of harmed individuals; therefore,
qualified immunity was not available to the municipal defendants. Other challenges beyond the scope of this Article include
heightened pleadings,36 strict standards for equitable relief in

31. See infra notes 567–73 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 568–73 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part. IV.B.
34. See infra Part. IV.B.
35. Of course, it is hard to know the precise representativeness of the cases
studied. The point is that they tell a story about overcoming various litigation
hurdles that is not fully a part of the scholarly literature.
36. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) to claims of discrimination). Scholarship on
heightened pleadings abound. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849
(2010); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights
Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517
(2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS
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civil rights cases,37 broadly construed doctrines of qualified immunity38 and sovereign immunity.39
Part I examines the standing, municipal liability, and class
certification doctrines that make structural reform litigation
against police practices very difficult. For purposes of this Article, the Lyons standing hurdle is presented as the “future injury,” “speculative harm,” and “innocence” impediments. Where
no official policy is challenged, the Monell line of cases hurdles
are labeled the “widespread practice” and “factual parallel” barriers for proving municipal liability. And the Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. class action commonality hurdle is described as the “early
merits inquiry” obstacle. These categorizations provide a way to
understand the litigation process and evidence marshalled in the
case examples, but undoubtedly there are other thematic clusters or categorizations embedded in the Supreme Court cases.40
This Article focuses on structural reform where equitable relief is at stake. Parts II, III, and IV provide comprehensive case
studies of Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey. The case studies
are a window into moves lawyers have made and evidence they
have mobilized to overcome the doctrinal hurdles faced when suing police. Each case study is based on interviews with former
& CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010).
37. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1990); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 281 (1977).
38. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982), prescribed a qualified immunity test that protects governmental officers from liability if the law
on the particular rights violation was not “clearly established” at the time of the
violation. To defeat qualified immunity, the court must determine, in light of
the facts of the case, that the contours of the right were so clearly established
that a reasonable officer would know that his conduct violated the Constitution.
Id. The Court has extended the doctrine to immunize conduct that violates
plainly foreseeable decisions, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207–08 (2001), and
has ruled that qualified immunity protects all but the “plainly incompetent” or
those who intentionally violate rights. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986). For a comprehensive study of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation, see Schwartz, supra note 24.
39. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01
(1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
for violations of state law). For an overview of the Court’s jurisprudence related
to state sovereign immunity, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
40. The point is that the themes I prescribe offer new ways of understanding how those cases potentially—underscoring potentially—bear on other structural reform litigation, particularly class actions against police department
practices.
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and current plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys and staff, review of the docket sheets to identify relevant pre-trial motions
for analysis, examination of motions and the exhibits submitted
to support each motion, and the evidence submitted at trial. Informed by these primary sources, I examined media coverage,
advocate reports, press releases, and websites for the organizations and municipalities that litigated the cases, served as organizational plaintiffs, or were otherwise implicated in the cases’
histories. Parts II, III, and IV largely demonstrate how, in these
cases, litigators were able to navigate the doctrine, even if the
requirements were challenging.
Based on the three case studies, Part V collects the lessons
learned for police structural reform litigation. As a group of successful litigation, these case studies are noteworthy for what
they teach us about how police structural reform litigators, taking doctrine seriously, might approach information gathering
and data collection in innovative and new ways to build evidentiary bases for possible success. The case studies show that a
court ordered injunction is very difficult to achieve in these types
of cases, even with the “right” data and information, and requires other sorts of subterranean factors. Yet, certain kinds of
evidence can assist plaintiffs in overcoming the standing, municipal liability, and class certification barriers: hard data and statistical evidence, discriminatory statements by supervisors and
central decision-makers, and/or proof of a history of notice and
failure to remedy constitutional violations. Layering the evidence presented in the three case studies over the doctrinal requirements reveals that a type of convergence operates in overcoming the hurdles. That is, the same or similar evidence can be
used to overcome interlocking aspects of the doctrine. The Article
also discusses other mechanisms to obtain information, such as
relationships with advocates and community organizations; publicity that creates leads and opportunities for further fact gathering; and court orders requiring data tracking and disclosures
following prior litigation. These means are outside the traditional discovery process, but also allow plaintiffs to satisfy the
doctrinal standards.41

41. One could ask for stronger takeaways or suggest the Article make
strong claims on the prospects of police structural reform litigation. I am not in
a position to do so because of the representativeness of these case studies.
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I. POLICE STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION
The modern Supreme Court has made it very difficult for
those asking federal courts to intervene in the business of another branch of government. For civil rights plaintiffs seeking to
reach trial, the Court’s requirements are even more demanding.
The Court’s reluctance to substantively review rights-based
claims most often manifests itself in related bodies of law sometimes categorized together as “justiciability.” On the basis of interpreting procedural rules and justiciability doctrine, the Supreme Court has made decisions that narrow access to
substantive federal court review.42 When it comes to regulating
the government’s interference with constitutional or civil rights,
the Supreme Court uses varied justiciability doctrines—standing, political question, ripeness, mootness, and immunity—to
avoid disposition of substantive rights.43 Scholarship points primarily to a conservative Supreme Court limiting access to
courts, resulting in harms to society’s notions of due process,
fairness, democracy, and the legitimacy of courts.44 Justiciability
42. Extensive bodies of literature examine growing limits on substantive
federal court review. The literature critical of the Supreme Court’s opinions in
this regard following the Warren Court era is too voluminous to recount and
frames the move as backlash, retrenchment, and restricting access to justice,
among others. I generally agree with the view that the Court’s justiciability and
procedural case law has moved merits questions into the pre-trial arena, altering the cost-benefit analysis of litigation and settlement; and creating a potential chilling effect for meritorious civil rights actions. For some examples of
scholarship analyzing the doctrinal limitations for civil litigants, particularly
civil rights plaintiffs, in the context of multiple areas of procedure, see generally
STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) (analyzing the conservative reaction to the enablement of private plaintiffs by Democratic Congresses); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10 (arguing a combination of justiciability
and remedial doctrine has nearly completely foreclosed federal court review for
civil rights plaintiffs); ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017)
(pointing to the Supreme Court’s procedural decisions cutting off substantive
review of civil rights and discrimination claims as a failure in democratic values
due to its result in limiting access to justice, due process, and fairness);
STASZACK, supra note 11 (criticizing the Court’s judicial retrenchment through
the subterranean context of procedure to limit the gains of the rights revolution
by restricting access to the courts); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. The Linkage Between
Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92
VA. L. REV. 633 (2006); Thomas, supra note 36. The purpose of this Article is to
examine what has succeeded at the trial court level in the face of specific doctrinal hurdles in police structural reform cases.
43. Fallon, supra note 42, at 637.
44. See id.; Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416.
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ultimately serves as the government’s shield, as the Court’s procedural decisions sanction violence and harm against marginalized communities by limiting court review.
Section 1983 litigators and police scholars, among others,
have long understood that the Supreme Court has made it difficult to reach substantive review of police practices or orders that
affect the culture of a police department. Prominent scholars
worry that the Supreme Court deploys certain doctrines to avoid
review when plaintiffs ask federal courts to closely examine the
structure and culture of police departments or to intervene to
reform police practices.45 Legal scholars have viewed Supreme
Court doctrine as narrowing the scope of review for police litigants who want systemic change rather than damages.46 Most
commenters have largely focused on police use-of-force or brutality claims. This Article’s focus on three successful challenges
brings to light room within the doctrine for challenges to car or
pedestrian stops.
This Part turns to three pivotal Supreme Court cases and
doctrines that create roadblocks to achieving police structural
reform injunctions. Scholars concerned with the viability of police structural reform litigation point primarily to the barriers
associated with demonstrating standing to seek an injunction
under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. The evidentiary burden associated with proving deliberate indifference through a widespread unconstitutional police practice, required by the Monell
v. Department of Social Services of New York line of cases, is another barrier to reform.47 More recently, following Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, scholars focus on the mounting attacks
against class certification and aggregate litigation for civil rights
causes.

45. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 11; see also Bandes, supra note 12, at 1278–80; Jeffries
& Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1403.
47. E.g., Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1402–03 (“In time . . . the
Court so narrowed the threshold requirement of ‘official policy or custom’ that
the door once thought open is now nearly closed. The Court also defeated the
ingenious stratagem of depicting individual misconduct as evidence of a governmental policy or failure to train. As a result, direct governmental liability is
quite exceptional.”); Christina Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 230–48 (1986) (analyzing the Monell line
of cases and the challenge of demonstrating a municipality caused “its own violation” of constitutional norms).
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A. STANDING TO OBTAIN POLICE INJUNCTIONS: LYONS
Today, standing is a particularly difficult hurdle when
plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent constitutional harm resulting from an unwritten policy or to require departmental reform to prevent future injury.48 With regard to criminal enforcement, challenges to an allegedly unconstitutional or unlawful
statute or regulation are considered distinct from structural reform litigation based on a pattern of events. Pattern, practice,
and custom cases are typically viewed with a deep skepticism for
several reasons.49 First, courts often view them as requiring a
court to infer future government conduct based on past events.50
Second, the class of individuals who will be harmed in the future
may be difficult to identify.51 Third, such challenges involve
structural remedies—court injunctions that require a government agency or a set of government actors to modify their actions
through institutional reforms.52
To satisfy standing for such an injunction, injured plaintiffs
must show, with some degree of certainty, that they will be subjected to exactly the same police practice in the future.53 In
48. Permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by a district
court. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 310 (1982). A plaintiff
must demonstrate: (1) irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that a remedy in equity is warranted when considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant; and (4) that the public interest counsels a
permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987);
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 311–13.
49. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Make Sense of Supreme Court
Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 105, 116–18 (2014); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9.
50. See Fallon, supra note 49, 117–18.
51. See id.
52. See id. (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 211–12, 217 (6th ed. 2009)).
Scholars define structural reform injunctions in different ways, but the element
of institutional reform is foundational. See Jefferies, supra note 9, at 1387
(“‘[I]nstitutional decrees’ [were structural reform] injunctions issued by federal
courts ordering comprehensive changes in state and local institutions, such as
prisons, mental hospitals, and schools, and resulting in pervasive and ongoing
judicial supervision.”); Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative
Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L.
REV. 301, 316–17 (2004) (“A structural injunction alters the organizational
structure, rather than behavioral aspects . . . .”).
53. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983).
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Lyons, law enforcement officers in Los Angeles stopped twentyfour-year-old, African American Adolph Lyons for a burned out
taillight.54 Guns drawn, they instructed Mr. Lyons to exit the
car.55 In the course of the stop, an officer applied either a “bar
arm control” and/or the “carotid-artery control” chokehold until
Mr. Lyons passed out.56 When he regained consciousness, he had
defecated and urinated and was spitting blood.57 He suffered
permanent damage to his larynx.58 Mr. Lyons subsequently
brought suit against the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),
for damages and equitable relief.59 He argued that an injunction
was necessary to prevent the LAPD from further harming him
and other members of the public pursuant to application of the
LAPD’s chokehold policy “where [officers] are not threatened by
the use of any deadly force whatsoever.”60 On remand from the
Ninth Circuit, the district court enjoined the Los Angeles police
from using chokeholds under circumstances in which there was
not a threat of death or serious bodily injury.61 However, the Supreme Court reversed and held that Mr. Lyons did not have
standing to seek injunctive relief, because he had not demonstrated one of the required factors for an injunction: “a likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.”62 Showing an
irreparable injury required a “real” and “sufficient likelihood
that he will again be wronged in a similar way.”63
Justice White’s standing rationale erects three barriers to
structural reform injunctions: the repeated harm, speculative
harm, and innocence barriers. The Court refused to acknowledge
that the number of chokeholds used by LAPD officers constituted
a pattern of repeated harm. Even though the record included evidence of nine illegal chokeholds in the department’s history,64
54. Id. at 114 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 97–98 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 115 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 98 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 97.
60. Id. (quoting Count V of Mr. Lyons’s amended complaint).
61. Id. at 98–99.
62. Id. at 111 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
63. Id.
64. But see id. at 115–16 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the city
instructs its officers that use of a chokehold does not constitute deadly force,
since 1975 no less than 16 persons have died following the use of a chokehold . . . .”). For an excellent detailed review of the Lyons decision, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in
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the 5–4 Lyons majority concluded that the history of past illegal
conduct was simply insufficient to rise to a level requiring injunctive relief against the entire police department.65 As a result,
Justice White found that the mere possibility that Mr. Lyons
“may again be subject to an illegal chokehold [did] not create the
actual controversy that must exist” to continue the case.66 No
“repeated harm” had been shown sufficiently to establish a policy, practice, or custom of illegal chokeholds.
In addition, the Court’s holding requires that many claims
of future injury based on police misconduct be dismissed as
“speculative,” unless the plaintiffs establish that a particular
chain of events will lead to the same injury. According to the
Court’s logic, to establish “a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,” Mr. Lyons would have to “violate the
law” (e.g., drive with a broken tail light) such that the police
would then stop Mr. Lyons and, only after Mr. Lyons acted in a
way to provoke a chokehold (e.g., resist arrest, attempt to escape,
threaten deadly force), finally, illegally use its chokehold policy.67 Alternatively, Mr. Lyons’s actions would have to lead officers confronting him to use the chokehold in a manner that, contrary to their training, renders him unconscious again.68 Thus,
the “odds” of LAPD officers subjecting Mr. Lyons to the illegal
chokehold again was “conjecture” and just as likely as any other
resident of Los Angeles being subjected to the same treatment.69
It is this simultaneous requirement of some probability of future
injury and the dismissal of Mr. Lyons’s claim of a future injury

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127 (2014).
65. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104. The Court specifically relied on Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976), to refute Mr. Lyons’s claim that the number of incidents
showed an unlawful policy by the LAPD. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104. The Court in
Lyons summarized the “bad apple” sentiment of police culture baked into Rizzo:
“the Court also held that plaintiffs’ showing at trial of a relatively few instances
of violations by individual police officers, without any showing of a deliberate
policy on behalf of the named defendants, did not provide a basis for equitable
relief.” Id. (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372).
66. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104.
67. Id. at 102–03 (“[I]f [plaintiffs] proceed to violate an unchallenged law
and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners
are alleged to have followed.” (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497) (emphasis in
original)).
68. Id. at 106.
69. Id. at 108.
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that has blocked many prospective police abuse cases for lack of
a case or controversy.70
Finally, the Court in Lyons also imputed an “innocence” factor into the standing test. The Court found significant LAPD’s
policy of only allowing the use of chokeholds “to gain control of a
suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to escape.”71 Mr. Lyons had not established that, contrary to this policy, LAPD officers used chokeholds “without any provocation or
resistance.”72 Subsequent courts have interpreted this reasoning
as requiring plaintiffs to be blameless in provoking officers in
order to have standing to enforce injunctions against police.73
The entrenchment of the innocence barrier is visible when
viewed from the defendants’ side. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the same obstacle to standing does not apply
in circumstances where the plaintiff is “unable to control or prevent the behavior that prompted the [police officer’s] alleged misconduct.”74 Meaning, plaintiffs must not do anything that could
be construed as provoking an officer’s misconduct. In light of the
police officers’ control over their own documentation of civilian
encounters, such an innocence requirement is difficult to overcome. This formal notion of innocence in Lyons restricts plaintiffs and protects defendants: when a plaintiff actually or allegedly violates the law, the doctrine punishes him and others
similarly situated by denying future relief from police violence;
when a defendant actually violates the law, the doctrine treats
him as an anomaly within the system.
70. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416–17; see JW v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2018); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2d
Cir. 2004); Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1984); Whitfield v.
City of Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779 (S.D. Miss. 2012); MacIssac v. Town of
Poughkeepsie, 770 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Alvarez v. City of Chicago,
649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
568 U.S. 398, 399 (2013) (“Respondents’ standing theory also rests on a speculative chain of possibilities that does not establish that their potential injury is
certainly impending or is fairly traceable to § 1881a.”).
71. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 105.
73. E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988) (“[W]e generally have been
unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury.”); see also
Bray v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Roe v.
City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Weiser v. Koch, 632
F. Supp. 1369, 1373–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318,
1327–28 (D. Conn. 1984).
74. JW, 904 F.3d at 1265.
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As one example of the Lyons barriers in operation, in JW v.
Birmingham Board of Education, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
a judgment, following a twelve-day bench trial that found six
school resource officers personally liable for failing to decontaminate students subjected to chemical spraying.75 It also reversed
the district court’s class-wide injunction ordering the parties to
devise a plan to improve training and the policies related to the
use of chemical spray in Birmingham schools.76 The district
court had determined the plaintiffs showed that the future injury was not speculative: children were at risk of concrete future
harm because school was mandatory for the class of plaintiff children, and they continued to be exposed to the same officers.77
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, evoking the innocence barrier,
stating that the misbehavior that resulted in being peppersprayed was not mandatory.78 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that without an official policy of pepper-spraying
students, all future incidences would be essentially random,
making the odds of harm “speculative.” Assessing the actual
numbers, the Eleventh Circuit calculated there was only a 1.77%
chance of being exposed to spray and improperly decontaminated, rendering the plaintiffs’ injury too speculative.79 Therefore, the plaintiff students could not overcome the Lyons hurdle
to injunctive relief.
Civil rights scholars are critical of Lyons for narrowing injunction-driven policing reform.80 According to the traditional
view, following City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, structural police reform litigation challenging unofficial policies became a dead letter.81 In Lyons, the Supreme Court incorporated the already
75. Id. at 1253, 1273.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1269.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1270.
80. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1417–18 (stating that Lyons
remedial standing “preclude[s] the use of systemic remedies for what are, at
bottom, institutional and systemic problems”); David Rudovsky, Running in
Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Limiting Remedies, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1199, 1233, 1236–37 (2005). On broader concerns regarding the review
limiting role of standing doctrine, including Lyons, see Gillian E. Metzger, The
Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1859–62 (2015).
81. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 1; Schmidtberger, supra note 12, at 183–
84; cf. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 215–24 (1983) (explaining the Lyons holding and what it means for standing and equitable relief
doctrines).
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heightened standards for obtaining injunctive relief into standing doctrine itself.82 Thus, by creating a “precondition,”83 or an
additional high threshold before even substantive review of the
merits, the Court limited future plaintiffs’ abilities to seek injunctions against police departments. Lyons gives credence to
the pessimistic view that standing to obtain injunctive relief in
cases without a formal policy presents a formidable barrier to
police reform litigation.84 Despite this obstacle, however, some
commentators still urge litigation, while acknowledging its difficulty.85
B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: MONELL
Municipal liability under section 1983 is a key component of
structural reform police litigation and mirrors other sectors of
public law litigation. Illegal and violent police conduct often indicates and directly flows from an infirm organizational culture
in police departments.86 Thus, to effectively address harmful policing practices through litigation, the entire police department,
and the municipality with authority over its decision-making,
must be party to the action. Municipal liability under section
1983, established in Monell, allows exactly that: a municipal
82. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 5–7; cf. William A. Fletcher, Standing:
Who Can Sue To Enforce a Legal Duty, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277 (2013) (discussing
his 1988 article on standing and what has changed since then); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (criticizing the
current state of standing doctrine and offering a less-stringent alternative);
Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477
(2018) (describing how the phenomenon of narrowing remedies against police
misconduct creates tension in the doctrine and removes oversight and accountability in practice).
83. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he issue
here is not whether that claim has become moot but whether Lyons meets the
preconditions for asserting an injunctive claim in a federal forum.”); see also id.
at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority’s decision to make
entitlement to relief an issue in standing).
84. Cf. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322–23 (1988) (distinguishing the probability of a future unconstitutional injury in Lyons from the probability of a future violation of a statute prohibiting the stay-put provision of a statute meant
to protect children with disabilities).
85. See Gilles, supra note 9, at 1384, 1398–99, 1453; see also Jeffries &
Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1418–19 (discussing benefits of 42 U.S.C. § 14141
DOJ structural reform litigation).
86. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Such failures [to train, supervise, monitor, and discipline adequately] . . . have caused the patterns of widespread Fourth Amendment violations and widespread Fourteenth Amendment violations.”).
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body can be held liable for its employees’ unconstitutional actions when taken pursuant to “a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers” or “governmental ‘custom.’”87
In 1978, the Supreme Court formally recognized municipal
liability under section 1983 in a sometimes-celebrated opinion,
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York.88 Monell
took the doctrine two steps forward, but one step back. Reversing
a prior opinion on section 1983’s legislative history,89 the Court
extended liability, in certain circumstances, to municipalities
and cities for civil rights violations by their employees.90 Following Monell, a city and police department employing a police officer engaged in unlawful conduct could face monetary consequences under section 1983.
The Court, however, rejected a respondeat superior theory.91
Instead municipalities would be liable for their employees’ actions only where the municipality itself was responsible for the
plaintiff’s injuries, upon a showing that harm resulted from a
“government’s policy or custom” as created by “lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy.”92 Meaning, the Court viewed acts of employees as dis87. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
88. See id. at 695.
89. Monell, 436 U.S. at 659 (overturning Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)). Erwin Chemerinsky discusses the lower courts’ work-around of Justice
Douglas’s reading of section 1983. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 46. Lower
courts circumvented Monroe and even created municipal liability based on other
civil rights laws or inferred rights of action directly from the Constitution. Id.
(citing Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (using section 1981 to
create liability for racial discrimination by police officers), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
904 (1978)); see, e.g., Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975).
90. 436 U.S. at 664–65.
91. Id. at 701 n.66.
92. Id. at 694 (“[A] local government may not be sued under [Section] 1983
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible . . . .”); cf. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that section 1983 supports respondeat superior liability). As even early commentators noted, the Court’s rejection of respondeat superior liability imposed
a substantial limitation for litigants. See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over
Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2187, 2192–95 (2005); Karen
Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Fed-
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tinct from acts of the municipality.93 In subsequent cases, the
Supreme Court has elaborated that a government “policy” or
“custom” is an official or unofficial action traceable to persons
with “final authority” to create policy.94 Three types of “policies
or customs” have been identified by the Court: official policies
“on the books” (directly implicating the person with final authority); individual actions authorized by persons who possess “final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action
ordered”;95 and unofficial custom, defined to mean “practices so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law”
(where actual or constructive knowledge is attributed to persons
with policy making authority).96 Examples include when formal
governmental policy or custom violates the Constitution, or
where a sufficiently widespread pattern of official conduct
amounts to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons.”97
This standard of proof has been extended to all suits, whether
for monetary or equitable relief.98
For cases without a formal governmental policy or custom,
the Monell line of cases establishes what this Article calls the
“widespread practice” and the “factual parallel” requirements.
The “widespread practice” requirement encompasses the deliberate indifference standard. In City of Canton v. Harris, the
Court established that failure to train police officers could create
municipal liability, where that failure reasonably caused the
rights violation at issue.99 In the same decision, however, the
Court determined a government entity is liable for damages only
eral Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 438–39 (1978); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 236 n.43
(1986). Critics also cite the “doctrinal mess” the Court created by rejecting respondeat superior liability, as courts have delivered alternative holdings regarding municipal liability and muddled the standard. Lisa D. Hawke, Note,
Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 831, 845 (2005).
93. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986).
94. Id. at 480–81.
95. Id. at 481.
96. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
97. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see Bd. of the Cty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1997). Regardless of one’s view on the
logic of the Court’s limits to municipal liability, Monell and its progeny established a high evidentiary standard in circumstances relevant to this Article. See
Susan Bandes, Introduction: The Emperor’s New Clothes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
619, 620–21 (1999).
98. Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 29 (2010).
99. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390.
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for “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons” upon a showing of a widespread practice of constitutional harm, not for all
employee wrongdoing or negligence on the part of the entity.100
To succeed, plaintiffs must show that, considering “the duties
assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”101 The “failure to” theory has been
expanded beyond training to include supervising, hiring, disciplining, and monitoring officer activities.102
Subsequent decisions in cases brought under a Monell “failure to” theory demonstrate the “factual parallel” concept this Article utilizes. In the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Connick v.
Thompson, the Court further explained that in claims that plaintiffs’ injuries stem from a municipality’s failure to train its employees, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate
deliberate indifference.”103 The Court required the constitutional
violations in an alleged pattern be similar enough in their facts
to show deliberate indifference.104 In the criminal prosecution of
Mr. Thompson, prosecutors from the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office failed to disclose a crime lab report, blood evidence, and physical and scientific evidence—clear Brady violations.105 Citing four other reversals based on Brady violations,
Mr. Thompson alleged that his Brady violation stemmed from
“[District Attorney] Connick’s deliberate indifference to an obvious need to train the prosecutors in his office in order to avoid
such constitutional violations.”106 In a 5–4 opinion, written by
Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court overturned Mr. Thompson’s

100. Id. at 388.
101. Id.; accord Johnson v. City of Vallejo, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1220–21
(E.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that the number of police shootings in the city over an
approximately two-year period did not show that the city had a policy or practice
of violating citizens’ rights against use of excessive force); see Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1403.
102. Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in Police Failure To Train Liability,
23 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 169, 172–73 (2000).
103. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
104. Id. at 72.
105. Id. at 55.
106. Id. at 57.
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favorable verdict and monetary award.107 The four other reversals were deemed inadequate proof because none involved failure to disclose the same evidence (e.g. blood, crime lab reports).108 The Court found no obvious need for training, since
prosecutors presumably received appropriate training in law
school to prevent Brady violations.109 Despite the rigorous evidentiary requirements to establish liability for a pattern or practice of constitutional harm, Connick left intact the basic principle
that municipal liability can “be imposed for a failure to train,
supervise, or discipline.”110
Monell, Harris, and Connick show the high burden to establish municipal liability for unlawful practices under section
1983, particularly where no official policy is at issue.111 Lower
court decisions further define the “widespread practice” and “factual parallel” requirements and commenters note the unworkable nature of precedent that has emerged from decisions interpreting Monell’s requirements.112 Because municipalities
typically do not write or enforce policies that are explicitly unconstitutional, plaintiffs bear the burden of “meeting ‘rigorous
standards of culpability and causation’” imposed by the Court.113
Yet, as I reveal through the case studies presented in Parts II,
107. Id. at 72.
108. Id. at 62–63.
109. Id. at 64. In the Court’s view, merely showing “that additional training
would have been helpful [for prosecutors] in making difficult decisions” was not
sufficient to establish municipal liability under a failure to train theory. Id. at
68.
110. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in
A Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 309 (2012).
111. See Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 Independent of Employee Liability, 17 TOURO L. REV. 551, 573 (2001) (opposing the high
burden for showing municipal liability); Matthew J. Cron et al., Municipal Liability: Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway Toward Effective Enforcement of
Civil Rights, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2014); Fallon, supra note 11, at 995–
96 (calling for an expansion of municipal liability under section 1983); Levinson,
supra note 110; Metzger, supra note 80, at 1866–69 (“[A]pplication of the deliberate indifference standard has significantly limited the viability of failure-totrain and failure-to-supervise challenges.”).
112. Cf. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (describing widespread practices as “action[s] for which the municipality is actually responsible”).
113. Cron, supra note 111, at 584 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical
Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1920–21
(2007) (discussing the disadvantages that individual plaintiffs have against municipal governments).
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III, and IV, courts can still find deliberate indifference to an unwritten discriminatory police practice, for certain claims, if the
right evidence is presented.
C. CLASS CERTIFICATION: WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES
Class action status is a common feature in structural reform
litigation. The modern class action is viewed as a mechanism for
remedying violations of law, particularly for those who face challenges in seeking legal redress due to lack of knowledge of legal
mechanisms and/or burdensome legal costs.114 For smaller injuries affecting a large number of individuals, many understand
that the class action is an essential tool for vindicating their
rights.115 Most individuals will forgo the trouble of filing a case
with small monetary damages (e.g., challenging a short, but unlawful, Terry stop), and attorneys are typically not willing to
take such cases.116 But as a large group, and with the goal of
preventing future harm, the calculus sometimes changes in favor of litigation.117
Class-wide relief is particularly helpful for the police litigation in Parts II, III, and IV, where aggregating the harms more
clearly expresses the extent of state-imposed harm on Black and
Brown communities. This Section proceeds with a textual, or
rule-based, view of the certification requirements followed by a
discussion of the aspect of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. raised for police
litigants: the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of commonality. It characterizes the challenge for class action commonality as an “early
merits inquiry” barrier. This Section also explains the Rule
23(b)(2) requirements for obtaining class-wide injunctions.118

114. See Judith Resnick, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 142–
43 (2011).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The defendants in the case studies in Parts II, III, and IV raised other
arguments typically associated with Rule 23(b)(3) class actions that wish to obtain damages for members of the class. These arguments, while addressed by
the district courts, are inapposite to class-wide injunctive relief and are not discussed in this Part. I address these other concerns—necessity and opt-out provisions—briefly in Part V in the context of how the class certification doctrine
may limit the availability of other systemic litigation against police department
practices.
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1. Class Certification Requirements Under Rule 23
As with standing for injunctive relief, class certification imposes a barrier even before courts review the substantive merits
of plaintiffs’ claims. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirements for federal class action suits.
Plaintiffs must first meet the four prerequisites in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity (too numerous for joinder),
commonality (there must be common questions of law or fact),
typicality (the named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses are typical of
the class), and adequacy of representation (the named plaintiffs
and their attorneys are able to fairly represent the interests of
the entire class).119 Although plaintiffs must meet all four Rule
23 requirements, commonality presents an across-the-board
class certification problem and is the focus within the case studies.
In addition to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, plaintiffs must also
satisfy Rule 23(b), which provides for three types of class actions.120 For this Article, it is important to distinguish between
class actions filed under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3)
requires that common issues of law and fact “predominate” over
questions affecting individuals, along with a determination that
the class action tool is superior to other methods of adjudication.121 This predominance issue proved a sticking point for the
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class.122 In contrast, the actions in the case
studies were filed as (b)(2) class actions. Traditionally, under
(b)(2) plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the defendant acted
in the same manner towards the class.123 This is usually satisfied where class members “complain of a pattern or practice that
is generally applicable to the class as a whole.”124
Rule 23(b)(2) reflects the class action’s social justice roots
and provides textual support for my argument that class action
status has proven the most difficult hurdle for police structural
reform litigants. Amended in 1966 during the Civil Rights movement, Rule 23 effectively encouraged aggregation of individual
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
120. Id. 23(b).
121. Id.
122. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363–64 (2011).
123. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
124. Id.; see also Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that although “the claims of individual class members may differ factually,” certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is a proper vehicle for challenging “a
common policy”).
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claims brought during this period.125 The text of Rule 23(b)(2)
permits courts to utilize the class action tool where defendants
“acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”126 The Advisory Committee’s Notes for the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 explain that,
at the time of its revision, (b)(2) was created to curb discrimination and foster institutional reform by facilitating challenges to
widespread rights violations for certain class actions: “usually
one[s] whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”127
Indeed, the class tool was essential in major public institution
reforms of segregated schools, segregated neighborhoods, and juvenile justice systems, among others.128 It created access to court
review for entire communities of harmed litigants seeking injunctive relief to end discrimination or other civil rights violations.129 To offset the potential for abuse by litigants, decertification is available at the trial stage if class status is incorrectly
granted.130
2. Commonality Under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Over the several decades following Rule 23’s amendment in
1966, as the number of civil rights class action suits grew, and
with the Court’s conservative turn, the Supreme Court began
imposing constraints on the ability to bring class action suits in
federal courts.131 These cases set the groundwork for its seminal
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.132
125. See Francisco Valdes, Procedure, Policy, and Power: Class Actions and
Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
627, 642 (2008).
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
127. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights
Roots and Relevance Today, 66 KAN. L. REV. 325, 332–33 (2017); see also David
Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011) (explaining how desegregation litigation affected the origins of Rule 23(b)).
128. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 21, at 1021–53.
129. See id. at 1016–21.
130. Marcus, supra note 127, at 715.
131. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In the mass tort class action context (asbestos litigation), see generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
132. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. has been the subject of much civil rights scholarship. E.g., Maureen Carroll,
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In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia—who was notoriously hostile to civil rights class actions133—the Court solidified
a heightened standard to meet the commonality requirement.
What I am calling an “early merits inquiry” marks a shift in
line with other procedural requirements, where plaintiffs are required to show an indicia of success based on facts and information prior to substantive review of the parties’ evidence. In
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court pronounced that
“some proof” of common questions of law and fact was not
enough. Instead, Justice Scalia demanded a “common contention” that “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
one of the claims in one stroke.”134 Applying General Telephone
Co. v. Falcon,135 the Court was unconvinced that plaintiffs put
forward “significant proof” of “a general policy of discrimination”
in employment promotion decisions.136 While acknowledging
Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843 (2016); Tristin K. Green, On Employment Discrimination and Police Misconduct: Title VII and the Mirage of the “Monell Analogue,” 95 B.U. L. REV. 1077 (2015); Malveaux, supra note 127; David
Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 828–33 (2016).
133. Justice Scalia expressed this hostility in decisions over the previous
decade. In Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), the Court reviewed decisions
related to two class actions—Coleman v. Brown, sub. nom Coleman v. Wilson,
912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (dealing with a class of mentally ill
persons in prison) and Plata v. Brown, sub. nom Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No.
CIV S–90–520 LKK, JFM P, 2010 WL 99000 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (dealing
with a class of prisoners with serious medical conditions)—where both classes
alleged that overcrowding in California prisons was the primary cause of constitutional violations of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment and due process under Fourteenth Amendment. In a dissenting
opinion, Scalia expressed concerns with a plaintiff class being able to allege a
claim of a constitutional violation based on systemwide deficiencies. Plata, 563
U.S. at 550–54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view, the plaintiff should not qualify as a class member unless he or she could make an individualized showing of
mistreatment. Id. at 554. His reasoning here was similar to that articulated in
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), a class action in Arizona filed on behalf of
adult prisoners who alleged they had been deprived of access to the courts by
not being able to access the prison law library. There, Scalia noted, “[named
plaintiffs who represent a class] must allege and show that they personally have
been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members
of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Id. at
357 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights, Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
134. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
135. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
136. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 353.
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that Rule 23 does not establish a pleading standard, the Court
applied a “rigorous analysis” of Rule 23’s requirements for class
certification.137 It surmised that such a review “will entail some
overlap with the . . . plaintiffs’ underlying claim,” and that this
“cannot be helped.”138 Plaintiffs, he wrote, “must be prepared to
prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” at the pleading stage.139 It reiterates the Court’s preference to avoid discovery and limit substantive review for liberal civil rights claims.
The Court justified its commonality determination by rejecting and minimizing testimony from plaintiffs’ experts. Up front,
Justice Scalia determined the only evidence of a general policy
of discrimination was presented through sociological expert witness testimony that linked Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and
personnel practices to its employees’ discriminatory supervisory
decision-making.140 One of the most significant barriers to Title
VII gender and race discrimination for plaintiffs today is the
Court’s rejection of evidence pointing to a corporate culture vulnerable to gender bias. Plaintiffs’ sociological expert was unable
to determine with sufficient specificity how regularly stereotypes
and gender-biased culture in the workplace played a meaningful
role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart.141 Justice Scalia
stated that without demonstrating uniformity in stereotyping
and gender bias and decision-making, plaintiffs had not shown
a centralized policy: “Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say
that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will
produce a common answer to the crucial question.”142 Because
the expert could not answer the question of how prevalent gender discrimination at Wal-Mart was, the Court disregarded the
testimony completely.143
Second, Justice Scalia rejected plaintiffs’ statistical expert’s
showing of disparities in the number of women promoted to management positions as proof of a discriminatory policy. Data was
137. Id. at 351.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 350.
140. Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 43 (2011).
141. 564 U.S. at 354 (the expert was asked, and unable to provide an opinion,
whether gender bias played a role in .05% or 95% of instances).
142. Id. at 352.
143. Id.
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collected at the regional and national level, and therefore, Justice Scalia found, could not establish the existence of disparities
at individual stores or even at the district level.144 Justice Scalia
theorized that the data presented may merely indicate the availability of women who are qualified or interested in the position,
rather than discriminatory employment practices.145 Ultimately,
he determined that at most, plaintiffs established a policy of discretionary decision-making at the regional or store level that did
not rise to the level of a policy of discrimination common to the
class. In short, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes created a regime
where “overly aggregated” statistics cannot establish commonality when the decisions at issue are made at a local level.146
The primary concern for future structural reform litigation
rests on Justice Scalia’s use of the concept of “indivisibility.” He
wrote that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) applies “only when a
single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to
each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification
when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.”147 This portion of the decision related to Rule 23(b)(2) class
members is generally viewed as an issue of class cohesion, but
has led to some confusion and lack of uniformity in lower
courts.148 Most recently, following remand of Jennings v. Rodriguez,149 a class action based on the blanket policy to refuse bond
hearings to non-citizen class members detained by the government, the Court invited a Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. level of scrutiny
for the purely Rule 23(b)(2) class action on the theory that each
non-citizen seeking a bond hearing would require an individualized determination. This reasoning evokes the concern that class
members’ claims are divisible due to the requirements of procedural due process. For purposes of the racial profiling cases in
this Article, where plaintiffs raised no procedural due process

144. Id. at 356.
145. Id. at 357.
146. Mary Dunn Baker, Class Certification Statistical Analyses Post-Dukes,
27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 471, 475 (2012).
147. 564 U.S. at 360.
148. Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99
B.U. L. REV. 59 (2019); cf. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104
GEO. L.J. 777, 828–33 (2016) (arguing that while there is some confusion, counterweight function provides guidance for determining a plaintiff ’s evidentiary
burden at class certification).
149. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
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allegations, the effect on future certification decisions is likely
minimal.150
Civil rights scholars express concern that Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes limits access to the courts and undermines the purpose of Rule 23.151 Indeed, the decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s other procedural decisions that also created significant barriers for civil rights plaintiffs, including rulings
addressing sufficiency of pleadings, standing, government immunities, jurisdiction, and summary judgment.
In summary, this Part examined the specific procedural
roadblocks civil rights plaintiffs often face in police structural
reform litigation. It named the Lyons standing hurdle as the future injury, speculative harm, and innocence requirements. The
Article presents the Monell line of cases as the widespread practice and factual parallel barriers for municipal liability. And the
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class action commonality hurdle is framed
as the early merits inquiry barrier. As the next Parts show, cases
at the district court level offer a rich understanding of how litigants prevail in the face of the challenging procedural and justiciability doctrines discussed in this Part. Focusing on the Supreme Court often hides these on-the-ground moves. By
analyzing the evidence and litigation processes in the trial court
for three significant cases, this Article reveals what has been obscured by the popular view that racial profiling structural reform
injunctions are very difficult to achieve.
Parts II, III, and IV endeavor to show how plaintiffs succeeded in jumping each doctrinal hurdle discussed in this Part
in three racial-profiling police-structural-reform cases: (1) Floyd
v. City of New York, (2) Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, and (3) Bailey v. City of Philadelphia. Each case involves racial profiling in
a stop context. Filed as class actions for injunctive relief in large
urban police departments, these cases are not typical. Lawsuits
seeking damages for misconduct in individual cases are more
common, where plaintiffs request monetary remedies. Individual actions seeking damages may also ask for Monell style liability. The section 1983 cases studied in this Article seek structural
150. See Alexandra D. Lahay et al., Government Class Actions After Jennings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://blog
.harvardlawreview.org/government-class-actions-after-jennings-v-rodriguez
[https://perma.cc/DB3S-B].
151. Marcus, supra note 132, at 830 (noting that after Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
“[s]ome courts continue to treat the Rule 23(b)(2) inquiry as a test for class ‘cohesion’”).
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relief from racial profiling using the class action tool, but request
injunctions (not damages) for a class of plaintiffs. These types of
cases are considered very difficult to pursue. What information
and evidence, then, allowed the plaintiffs to satisfy standing to
seek injunctions, municipal liability, and class certification? The
types of evidence used to overcome the doctrine—hard data and
statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors
and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of notice
and failure to remedy constitutional violation—often overlap to
meet the standards. The case studies also bring to light information gathering techniques outside of formal discovery through
other advocates in each local context.
II. FLOYD V. CITY OF NEW YORK: N.Y. STOP AND FRISK
In 2008, on behalf of a class of individuals routinely subjected to illegal stops between 2004 and 2012 (totaling 4.4 million over eight years), David Floyd, David Ourlicht, Lalit Clarkson, and Deon Dennis filed a section 1983 class action lawsuit
challenging the stop and frisk practices of the New York Police
Department (NYPD) as violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.152 Now-retired U.S. District Court Judge Shira
Scheindlin presided over a nine-week bench trial from March to
May 2012, and ordered the NYPD to engage in a process to develop reforms with plaintiffs and community organizations representative of the harmed class members.153 The court’s lengthy
decision was a watershed in police reform and criminal procedure because it found the NYPD had engaged in widespread racial profiling in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.154
This Part dissects and summarizes the evidence put forward
in this litigation to surmount the difficult doctrinal hurdles.
Floyd is an extension of a prior class action stop and frisk lawsuit, settled as Daniels v. City of New York. The case study devotes space to Daniels for several reasons. The City’s failure to
correct its unlawful stop and frisk practices following the Daniels
152. Complaint, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2012 WL
1031760 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 28, 2012). Over 4,400,000 stops were conducted in
this eight year time period. See Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd V), 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
153. Id. at 667.
154. See id. See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY E. FRADELLA, STOP
AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC (2016)
(chronicling the impact of N.Y. stop-and-frisk tactics and Floyd).
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order does much to lay a foundation for the plaintiffs’ deliberative indifference theory, and to overcome the Lyons’s speculative
harm and future injury requirements. Further, the context surrounding Daniels and broken windows policing shows the information-gathering that is necessary prior to filing in order to
overcome the barriers discussed in Part I.
A. DANIELS V. CITY OF NEW YORK
Floyd v. City of New York grew out of a broader movement
against the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy and the violence that
often ensued from the encounters.155 With corruption and brutality pervading its history, the NYPD has long used the tactic
of stopping and frisking people without suspicion.156 The practice, which refers to brief police investigative stops and subsequent pat downs if the police suspect that the individual is
armed, had been deployed by the NYPD since the 1970s and witnessed a resurgence beginning with the 1994 election of Rudolph
Giuliani.157 Giuliani, who ran on a campaign promise of law and
order, directed his police commissioner William Bratton to deploy the nearly all-white and male Street Crimes Unit (SCU) officers in so-called “high crime” areas populated overwhelmingly
by Black and Latinx158 communities.159 The officers, called “commandos” patrolled the streets of New York, often at night, in unmarked cars and in plain clothes.160 Their mission was to

155. Joo-Hyun Kang, Fighting Broken Windows Policing in New York City
in the ’90s and ’00s: A Recent History with Joo-Hyun Kang, VERSO (May 24,
2016), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2655-fighting-broken-windows
-policing-in-new-york-city-in-the-90s-and-00s-a-recent-history-with-joo-hyun
-kang [https://perma.cc/JC9J-V8Z4].
156. See MARILYNN S. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 297–300 (2003); JAMES LARDNER & THOMAS REPPETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE 331–34 (2000); RIMA VESELY-FLAD, Policing Dark Bodies in Polluted Spaces: Stop and Frisk in New York City, 1993–
2013, in RACIAL PURITY AND DANGEROUS BODIES: MORAL POLLUTION, BLACK
LIVES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 119–39 (2017) (ebook); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 377–80 (1998).
157. JOHNSON, supra note 156, at 297–300.
158. When referring to the community in a general sense, Latinx will be used
as an identifier. At other points in the Article, the terms Hispanic or Latino/a
reflect the language used by courts or other official records.
159. LARDNER & REPPETTO, supra note 156, at 331–32.
160. Id.
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“interdict violent street crime” and remove illegal firearms from
the streets of New York.161
Under the guise of “Broken Windows” theory,162 which suggests that neighborhoods with a greater concentration of physical and social disorder should evince higher stop and frisk activity, SCU targeted Black and Latinx communities to “maintain
order.”163 Aggressive policing strategies hailed by Giuliani and
Bratton, and the violence that ensued from their implementation, spurred mobilization. In the mid-1990s, the late Richie Perez—co-founder of the National Congress for Puerto Rican
Rights’ Justice Committee—led much of New York’s organizing
against the Giuliani administration’s violent police practices. He
convened the Coalition Against Police Brutality (CAPB) to combat the “daily abuses” faced by those on the receiving end of broken windows and routine police violence in 1998.164 Composed of
a diverse coalition of New York City grassroots organizations,
including Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) representatives, the CAPB pursued an ensemble of varied and malleable
strategies, including lawsuits, direct action, and policy campaigns.165 Their organizing effort was invigorated by widespread
media coverage of the tragic killing of Amadou Diallo in 1999 by

161. Id.; Damaso Reyes, NYC Street Crimes Unit Out of Control, PHILA.
TRIB., Mar. 16, 1999, at 7A.
162. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 [https://perma.cc/
TVJ8-FBTS] (using the analogy of a broken window to describe the relationship
between disorder and crime).
163. Id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, POLICY
STRATEGY NO. 19: GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS (1994) (linking disorder to
violence and rationalizing the concentration of order-maintenance policing
(OMP) strategies in the city’s neighborhoods with the highest crime rates);
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996); ELIOT
SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 89 (1999) (showing through empirical analysis
OMP was not implemented in a race-neutral manner by the NYPD).
164. Kang, supra note 155. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of
Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing,
101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2429–40 (2017) (discussing patterns of routine police
violence).
165. Kang, supra note 155.
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NYPD officers.166 I provide these details to situate the filing of
the Daniels litigation.
Shortly after Mr. Diallo’s killing, the NYPD released numerical data it maintained: in 1997 and 1998, 35,000 of the 45,000
stop and frisks reported by the SCU did not result in arrests.167
Advocates interpreted the numbers to mean the police officers’
suspicions that criminal activity was afoot were wrong in a vast
majority of cases.
On March 8, 1999, plaintiffs National Congress for Puerto
Rican Rights, Kelvin Daniels, Poseidon Baskin, Djibril Toure,
Hector Rivera, Victor Rodriguez, and Kahil Shkymba, represented by CCR attorneys Arthur Kinoy and Bill Goodman and a
private plaintiff-side attorney, Jonathan Moore, filed Daniels v.
City of New York,168 a class action lawsuit in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs challenged the
NYPD’s stop and frisk policy on two grounds: (1) NYPD officers
violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting stop and frisks
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and (2) NYPD
officers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by conducting stop and frisks solely on the basis of
their race and national origin.169 The plaintiffs primarily sought
a judgment and injunction declaring that the NYPD SCU’s stop
and frisk practices were without reasonable suspicion and based
on race and/or national origin; to prevent the police from using
formal or informal productivity standards (de facto quotas) in
stop decisions; to improve training, monitoring, and supervision
of SCU stop and frisk policies; to implement psychological testing for SCU officers; and to require documentation for the basis
of every stop and frisk.170
Importantly for this Article’s illustration of how litigants
navigate procedural hurdles, the Daniels defendants initially
moved to dismiss the case on the basis that plaintiffs lacked
standing under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, arguing plaintiffs
166. Telephone Interview with Kamau Franklin, Staff Attorney, Ctr. for
Const. Rts. (Aug. 13, 2018).
167. Daniels et al. v. the City of New York, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/daniels
-et-al-v-city-new-york [https://perma.cc/U43B-JA22].
168. Class Action Complaint, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99-CV-1695
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1999); see also Daniels et al. v. the City of New York, supra
note 167.
169. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
170. Id. at 422 n.2.
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faced no realistic threat of future injury from their stop and frisk
practices.171 The court denied the motion to dismiss and distinguished Lyons.172 As she did later in Floyd, Judge Scheindlin
looked at the number of alleged constitutional violations (tens of
thousands) and found the number materially different than the
roughly ten incidents cited by the Lyons Court.173 She also relied
upon the repeated stops alleged by three of the named plaintiffs.174 Finally, she noted that plaintiffs were engaging in “innocent” behavior when stopped, which she distinguished from the
characterization of Mr. Lyons’s actions leading to the LAPD officers’ illegal chokehold in his case.175 The court’s treatment of
Lyons is rarely mentioned in legal scholarship from that time.176
I point to it here to acknowledge the need for more systematic
examination of district court treatment of Lyons.
The NYPD disbanded the SCU due to the combination of
public pressure and the Daniels settlement. While the case was
in progress, large anti-police brutality mobilizations took place
after the Diallo killing and organizers used the Daniels litigation
as an opportunity to focus attention on the NYPD’s violence.177
The court granted plaintiffs’ request for class certification in
January 2001.178 The class consisted of all persons who had been
or will be subjected to the SCU’s policy and/or practices of stop
and frisk in violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments.179 Under the more relaxed interpretation of Rule 23 of
the pre-Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. era, Judge Scheindlin found commonality under the Second Circuit’s theory of certification where
putative class members were harmed under a unitary course of
conduct:180 “[t]he fact that the claims of the proposed class ‘stem

171. Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d
154, 159–62 (1999).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 161.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1384, 1396–99 (2000).
177. Telephone Interview with Kamau Franklin, supra note 166.
178. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 416 (quoting German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F.
Supp. 537, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
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from the same alleged unconstitutional conduct of the defendants’ proves the existence of common questions of law or fact.”181
Defendants appealed and, in June 2001, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, and the mandate was returned
in July.182 A pretrial conference was held in August 2001.183
A month later, September 11th occurred. For two years, the
parties engaged in discovery disputes, settlement conferences,
and requests to adjourn the trial date.184 In the shadow of the
tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the City’s outpouring of support for the NYPD eclipsed the strong outcry over
police abuse only months before. Activists were silenced and lost
the will for reform. Thus, the City Law Department, with more
public good-will on their side than six months earlier, likely entered negotiations and pre-trial discussions with the Daniels attorneys emboldened.
The case settled.185 Defendants did not admit any wrongdoing in the settlement order. No monitor was put in place.186
Nonetheless, the City agreed in the settlement terms to collect
extensive race and crime data, which plaintiffs’ counsel could access; improve documentation of reasonable suspicion supporting
stops and the basis for frisks; develop and conduct periodic audits of stop-and-frisk practices; and maintain its anti-racial profiling policy.187 Judge Scheindlin approved the settlement in December 2003.188
Any momentum for reform or gains from the Daniels settlement, however, faded in the post-9/11 era. The NYPD enjoyed a
181. Id. at 417.
182. Id.
183. See Civil Docket, Daniels v. City of New York, No. No. 99-CV-1695
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1999).
184. Daniels v. City of New York, 2007 WL 2077150, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“The parties settled this class action in September 2003, after vigorously negotiating the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement over several months.”).
185. See generally Stipulation of Settlement, Daniels v. City of New York,
No. 99-CV-1695(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003), https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PN-NY-0010-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA6T-C55S].
186. The NYPD was also required to engage in public education efforts, including joint public meetings with class members and representatives on its racial profiling policy, provide workshops at approximately fifty city high schools
on the legal rights of those subjected to stops and frisks and develop handouts
on these issues for distribution at these and other events. Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 185, at 10.
187. Id. at 5–9.
188. Id. at 18.
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renewed hero status. The expansion of war on terror policies at
the federal level led to a pipeline of resources for police to expand
surveillance technologies.189 It gained unprecedented financial
support to expand surveillance under the guise of national security, and the mayor increased the numbers of officers and specialty units.190 The NYPD also expanded the stops and frisks,
monitoring, and surveillance of activists.191 Police shootings continued.192 The post-9/11 policies also hampered advocates’ ability
to protect the terms of the Daniels settlement. In response to the
War on Terror, progressive foundations began shifting their priorities and portfolios away from police reform toward protecting
civil liberties and combatting war on terror policies.193 CCR,
busy litigating to stem the tide against the most egregious of
these policies, expended few personnel resources to monitor the
Daniels consent decree.194 Similarly, some police reform advocates shifted focus areas, joining efforts to prevent civil rights
violations under the REAL ID Act of 2005 and to draw attention
to abuses stemming from other national security measures.195
The police reform movement that had coalesced for Daniels became fragmented and struggled to draw attention to police violence in the immediate years following September 11.
The landscape changed again in late 2006, following the killing of Sean Bell in November of that year.196 A student at the
189. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91
WASH. L. REV. 1595 (2016).
190. See, e.g., Craig Roush, Comment, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Limits
on Widespread Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering by Local Law Enforcement After 9/11, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 315, 330–34 (2012); Editorial, The NYPD’s
Spies, NATION (N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2012, at 4–5.
191. Patrick F. Gillham et al., Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of
Occupy Wall Street Protests in New York City, 2011, 23 POLICING & SOC’Y 81
(2013); Donna Lieberman, Infringement on Civil Liberties After 9/11, 56 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 1121, 1124–26 (2011/12).
192. See e.g., Stephen Rex Brown, NYPD ‘Executed’ My Son and Then Covered Its Tracks Charge ‘Outlandish, Inflammatory’: City Mentally Ill Harlem
Man’s Mother Had Called 911, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2016, at 8; Molly
Jackson, Trial Begins for New York Cop in Shooting of Unarmed Black Man,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Bos.), Jan. 19, 2016; Zolan Kanno-Youngs, State to
Probe NYPD Shooting: Video, 911 Calls Depict Man Who Was Shot Waving Object in Hand in Crown Heights, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Apr. 6, 2018, at A9A.
193. Telephone Interview with Marc Krupanski, Legal Worker, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights (Aug. 15, 2018).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Telephone Interview with Kamau Franklin, supra note 166.
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time, Mr. Bell was shot over fifty times outside of a nightclub on
the eve of his wedding.197 Groups again convened in a coalition.
Given the facts of the Bell shooting, and the temporal distance
from September 11, mobilization ensued.198 CCR also resurfaced. CCR analyzed the hard data provided by the NYPD under
the terms of the Daniels settlement, which showed an increased
racial disparity in stop and frisk encounters.199 The annual number of stops conducted by the NYPD had increased by about
200% during those years, approximately 88% of which did not
lead to evidence of a crime.200 More importantly, approximately
85% of those stopped were Black or Latino, while only 10% were
white.201 The information was presented to the city council as
part of a larger hearing for transparency with the NYPD spearheaded by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU).202
While campaigning, then-mayoral candidate Michael
Bloomberg had pledged to continue the Guiliani administration’s
aggressive police practices. He was elected in 2002, ushering in
the possibility of further injury to the Daniels class members.

197. For background on the case and responses from local officials, community activists, and N.Y. State, see N.Y. STATE TRI-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE TASK
FORCE, IMPROVING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008) https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/
articles/attachments/Senator%20Smith_%20Improving%20Public%20
Confidence%20in%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Criminal%20Justice%
20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GBK-PM94]. Three of the five officers involved
in the shooting were indicted. The NYPD’s counter-narrative and response to
Sean Bell’s shooting and resulting mobilization relied upon crime data. Heather
Mac Donald, No the Cops Didn’t Murder Sean Bell: And Here’s What Decent
Black Advocates Would Say, CITY J. MAG., Winter 2007, https://www.city
-journal.org/html/no-cops-didn%E2%80%99t-murder-sean-bell-12990.html
[https://perma.cc/8M2C-8GDB].
198. Telephone Interview with Marc Krupanski, supra note 193.
199. Id.
200. Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Individual Damages at 26–29, Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
201. Id. at 26.
202. See NYCLU Analysis of NYPD Reports Reveals Troubling Patterns in
Police Shootings, Lack of Diversity in NYPD Leadership, N.Y. CIV. L. UNION
(May 5, 2008) [hereinafter Testimony of Chris Dunn], https://www.nyclu.org/en/
publications/nyclu-analysis-nypd-reports-reveals-troubling-patterns-police
-shootings-lack-diversity [https://perma.cc/QU45-PRBC].
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B. ORIGINS OF FLOYD: CONTINUED RACIAL DISPARITIES AND
PRE-LITIGATION INFORMATION GATHERING
The NYPD’s noncompliance with the Daniels settlement
and increasingly racially disparate practices galvanized New
York City’s police reform advocacy community and triggered the
Floyd litigation. The principal plaintiffs’ attorneys from Daniels,
in consultation with local police accountability groups, decided
to file a new suit. Attorneys filed the class action lawsuit Floyd
v. City of New York in 2008, alleging that the NYPD deliberately
targeted Black and Latinx persons for stops and frisks, without
objective reasons to suspect them of criminal behavior.203
The actors in Floyd are nearly identical to those in Daniels.
Named plaintiffs again included members of the Malcolm X
Grassroots Movement, Lalit Clarkson, and David Floyd.204 At
the time of filing, plaintiffs’ counsel included the same plaintiffside police attorney Jonathan Moore, with the Center for Constitutional Rights.205 Heidi Grossman and others from the City Law
Department were again assigned as defense counsel. The litigants and Judge Scheindlin all entered the litigation understanding that the case continued Daniels.
The discovery process in cases alleging municipal liability
for constitutional injuries uncovers and exposes information on
the political and cultural forces that give rise to police misbehavior.206 Allegations of municipal liability and class-wide relief permit wider discovery, and in particular facilitate the development of systemic evidence of deliberate indifference, repeatoffender officers, functioning internal monitoring systems, and
attitudes of police towards disciplinary and supervisory concerns.
Discovery is not only essential to overcome the hurdles discussed in Part I, but also to further informal information gathering. Of the hard data turned over to plaintiffs, their attorneys
203. Case Study: Floyd v. City of New York, CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORAhttps://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender
-sexuality/racial-justice-lit-wkshp/case_study_-_floyd_v._city_of_ny.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AV8J-JRPS].
204. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
205. Demand for Jury Trial, Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd IV), 283 F.R.D.
153 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-01034), ECF No. 11.
206. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 30 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–61 (2001); G.
Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
TION,
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provided the New York Times portions that were not subject to a
protective order. The newspaper ran a series of articles that dramatically influenced public opinion on stop and frisk.207 With
this backdrop, several videos of aggressive stops went viral.208
The increased attention from the information generated through
formal discovery and informal fact gathering, resulted in city
council hearings. Local legislative advocacy, sometimes led by a
city-wide coalition of police advocates, followed sporadic revelations from discovery material. The NYCLU led efforts to reform
and expand authority for the Civilian Complaint Review
Board.209
Public attention can foment gains for litigation—for example, by encouraging witnesses to come forward to support structural reform litigation.210 This is precisely what happened in
New York. In part due to the media attention around racial disparities in stop and frisk tactics, two officers came forward as
whistleblowers.211 NYPD officer Adrian Schoolcraft wore a recording device during weekly roll-calls in the infamous BedfordStuyvesant 81st precinct.212 Officer Adhyl Polanco, a member of
the NYPD’s Black police officer organization, also recorded his
supervisors instructing him to increase his numbers of UF-250s
(code for increasing stops and frisks or summonses), the assumption being not to worry about individualized, articulable suspicion, as required by the Constitution. Local newspapers also exposed supervisors demanding beat cops to “clean up corners” and
“take back the streets”—a prescient phrase connected to the
Street Crimes Unit and the 1990s era of extreme police violence.
207. Ray Rivera conducted an in-depth analysis of stop and frisk data and
ran a series of articles in the fall of 2012. E.g., Ray Rivera, Pockets of City See
Higher Use of Force During Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/nyregion/in-police-stop-data-pockets-where-force
-is-used-more-often.html [https://perma.cc/V6GA-NRD3].
208. Nicholas K. Peart, Why Is the NYPD After Me? N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and
-frisked-by-the-nypd.html [https://perma.cc/A7Z7-4AXX].
209. E.g., Testimony of Chris Dunn, supra note 202.
210. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1151 (“[L]awsuits can create nonfinancial pressures by generating publicity about allegations of misconduct and by
revealing previously unknown information about the details of that misconduct.”).
211. Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct,
VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.) (May 4, 2010), https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/05/04/
the-nypd-tapes-inside-bed-stuys-81st-precinct [https://perma.cc/ZD2T-R7AQ].
212. Id.
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Both police officers believed the pressure they were under to increase police activity was wrong, and the public outcry against
overzealous policing gave them the courage to report the abuse
of authority to the media.213 The recordings were entered into
evidence during the Floyd trial and were important to the plaintiffs’ theory of quota-driven (rather than constitutionally based)
stop and frisk practices.
Plaintiffs gathered evidence from multiple sources. Formal
discovery tools were essential, as were advocates and organizers
who provided information before discovery became available. In
addition, the public profile of the case made it possible for plaintiffs to discover critical information informally and through media revelations.
C. ADDRESSING DOCTRINAL HURDLES IN FLOYD
This section divides Floyd’s pre-remedies litigation into the
doctrinal hurdles discussed in Part I: standing (Lyons), police
practice claims (Monell and its progeny), and class certification
(Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.). The City of New York followed the Supreme Court’s pro-defendant playbook on how to dismiss structural reform cases against police departments; and the plaintiffs,
at each stage, mustered the evidence necessary to overcome the
procedural and evidentiary hurdles.214 The close examination
that follows brings to light possibilities and challenges for future
structural police reform litigants.
1. Standing To Obtain an Injunction: Lyons
As in other structural reform police actions, particularly
those where plaintiffs challenge an unwritten policy, the City of
New York argued plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief.215 The issue arose as part of defendants’ re-

213. Id.; Graham Rayman, NYPD Tapes 5: The Corroboration, VILLAGE
VOICE (Aug. 25, 2010), https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/08/25/nypd-tapes-5
-the-corroboration [https://perma.cc/J6WB-FJUD]; Nathan Tempey, Whistleblower Cop Adrian Schoolcraft Settles Lawsuit Against City For $600K, GOTHAMIST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://gothamist.com/2015/09/30/whistleblower_cop_
adrian_schoolcraf.php [https://perma.cc/G9Y5-P9AJ].
214. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:08-cv01034), ECF No. 135; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, ECF No. 166.
215. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 19–23, Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:08-cv-
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sponse to plaintiffs’ class certification request. Similar to the defense’s motion in Daniels, defendants argued that three of the
four named plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have
a present real or immediate injury and could not show a risk of
future harm.216 Defendants did not, however, contest the standing of the fourth named plaintiff, David Ourlicht.217
The district court determined that Mr. Ourlicht overcame
the repeated harm, speculative harm, and innocence barriers,
thereby satisfying Article III standing on behalf of the plaintiffs’
class.218 First, unlike Mr. Lyons, “who alleged only one past instance of unconstitutional police behavior,” Mr. Ourlicht had
been stopped three times in 2008 and once after the lawsuit was
filed in 2010.219 As the court noted, “[t]he possibility of recurring
injury ceases to be speculative when actual repeated incidents
are documented.”220 Moreover, the court found that “the frequency of alleged injuries inflicted by the practices at issue here
create[d] a likelihood of future injury sufficient to address any
standing concerns.”221 The court distinguished the ten deaths attributed to the LAPD’s chokehold policy from the NYPD’s 2.8
million stops over six years, of which at least 60,000 were unconstitutional (thirty facially unconstitutional stops a day).222 Judge
Scheindlin determined the repeated nature of the harm provided
an additional basis to overcome the speculative harm barrier.223
Mr. Ourlicht’s risk of future injury was “real and immediate,”
and “not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”224
01034), ECF No. 176 [hereinafter Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176] (arguing
plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives for three reasons: (1) their failure to meet the standing requirement; (2) several officers remained unidentified
John Doe defendants; and (3) none of the named class representatives were Latino).
216. Id. at 19–21.
217. Defendants reserved the ability to raise Mr. Ourlicht’s standing later.
Id.
218. See Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The presence of
one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement.” (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547
U.S. 47, 53 n.2 (2006)).
219. See id.
220. Id. at 169 (citing Nicacio v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 768 F. 2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1985)).
221. Id. at 170.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 169 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
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Finally, the innocence barrier was satisfied. Unlike Mr. Lyons’s situation, where a burned out tail light led to a stop and an
officer’s alleged provocation, Mr. Ourlicht’s encounters did not
depend on arrests for unlawful conduct.225 The court observed
that Mr. Ourlicht was stopped while engaging in everyday life—
walking down the sidewalk, sitting on a bench outside a friend’s
home, and getting into a car.226 His inability to avoid future
harm by “following the law” distinguished the case from Lyons.227 He satisfied Article III standing for the class.
2. Municipal Liability: Monell
Municipal liability was litigated twice, first at summary
judgment and again at trial. Defendants requested summary
judgment for the plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims against the
City of New York—failure to train, supervise, monitor or discipline police officers.228 As in Daniels, the Floyd plaintiffs alleged,
first, that the NYPD had conducted stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and,
second, that the NYPD had conducted stops and frisks on the
basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; defendant was liable as a municipality under Monell and its progeny.229
However, the court ultimately denied summary judgment for
plaintiffs’ Monell claims based on a number of disputed factual
issues, including those presented within each party’s statistical
expert’s report, discussed later in the case study, and the specific
written and unwritten policies related to training and supervision.230
In considering the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court reviewed voluminous submissions from
the parties, required the parties to enter mediation, and ordered
subsequent briefing to narrow the disputed material issues of
fact. The City of New York had followed the Supreme Court’s

225. Id. at 169–70.
226. Id. at 170.
227. Id.
228. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Defendants also requested summary judgment for the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and sought to dismiss the individual stops on the basis of qualified
immunity. Id. at 444; see also Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 813 F. Supp.
2d 457, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reinstating Floyd’s claims arising out of 2008 stop).
229. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
230. Id. at 446–49, 453, 456.
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roadmap in seeking to dismiss plaintiffs’ municipal liability (Monell) claims. For each of the “failure to” counts, defendants presented their written protocols and procedures and submitted
declarations from high level officials as evidence of adequate
training, supervision, discipline, and monitoring. In response,
plaintiffs pointed to the practices on the ground to show disputed
issues of fact.231
Judge Scheindlin thus oversaw a somewhat dizzying backand-forth between the parties at the summary judgment stage.
Each party attacked and parried with contradictory documentary and testimonial support about the NYPD’s practices of
training, supervising, monitoring, and disciplining its officers for
stops and frisks conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.232 The court aptly summarized the evidentiary battle:
For every officer whose testimony defendants cite in support of the existence of such policies, plaintiffs respond with testimony from another
officer who testified that he has never heard of, seen, or been instructed
with regard to those policies. While defendants have submitted extensive written and audiovisual training materials as evidence that NYPD
training is sufficient, plaintiffs have submitted written and audio evidence that there is significant pressure on commands and officers to
produce stops, summonses, and arrests, whether or not they are constitutionally justified, in contravention of those training materials.
Defendants describe numerous forms and layers of disciplinary procedure, while plaintiffs present evidence that little discipline is actually
meted out.233

Take as an example the NYPD’s monitoring practices under
its Quality Assurance Division (QAD). In support of their motion
for summary judgment against plaintiffs’ failure to monitor
claim, defendants put forward three existing audit protocols;
plaintiffs countered by showing the insufficiency of the monitoring protocols to actually prevent unconstitutional stops and
frisks. First, defendants argued the NYPD conducted audits on
a random department-wide basis.234 But plaintiffs responded
that the NYPD did not actually use the audit to determine
231. Id. at 429 n.94 (“Defendants rely primarily on their formal written policies, and do not in any meaningful way dispute Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding
the practices of NYPD supervisors and officers with respect to training, supervision, monitoring and discipline.” (quoting Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Floyd I, 813 F.
Supp. 2d 417)).
232. The evidence submitted at summary judgment is too voluminous to
summarize in this Article.
233. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
234. Id. at 431.
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whether stops were based on reasonable suspicion.235 The stated
purpose of the audits was determining the constitutionality of
stops and frisks, but the NYPD commanders responsible for
QAD testified at depositions that the audit only tested whether
officers completed the stop and frisk forms (UF-250s).236 As
Judge Scheindlin ultimately found after trial, completing the
form does not correlate to following the Fourth Amendment requirements for a stop and frisk.237
Finally, to review the constitutionality of police activity, the
QAD required its inspectors to review the memobooks police officers used to document their activity.238 Inspectors should crosscheck the reported activity with the UF-250 forms.239 By policy,
however, an officer is only required to document the same information in the memobook that is reported on the UF-250 form,
thereby providing auditors with little additional information to
test the legal sufficiency of a stop, frisk, or use of force documented on the UF-250 form.240 Defendants maintained that
“[b]ecause the information indicated by the checkmarks on the
UF250 represents substantive justification for a stop, the audit
confirms that a UF250 with the required checkmarks indicates
a valid stop, absent indicia to the contrary on the remainder of
the form.”241 Thus, and once again, QAD’s review only ensured
completion of the UF-250 form, rather than determining the legality of an officer’s stops and frisks.
Ultimately, Judge Scheindlin held that the plaintiffs had
successfully demonstrated numerous issues of fact and denied
summary judgment.242 The lessons for other cases are generalizable. Plaintiffs must use the discovery process with vigor, determine if the policies on paper match the practices of police officers on the beat, and analyze any available hard data on police
interactions with potential class members. When litigating with
a department as large as the NYPD, shoring up proof that un-

235. Id. at 432.
236. See id. at 432.
237. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 582–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
238. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11 n.23, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (No.
1:08-cv-01034), ECF No. 141.
242. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d. at 456.
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constitutional practices are pervasive throughout the department is also critical to overcoming the “widespread practice” barrier to municipal liability.
On the Fourteenth Amendment question of racial disparity
in stops and frisks, defendants pointed to McKleskey v. Kemp to
suggest that discretionary judgments (such as the exercise of
stop authority) within the criminal justice system “demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion
had been abused.”243 Defendants essentially suggested plaintiffs
must prove all stops were discriminatory in order to substantiate
an Equal Protection claim. They cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot to argue that the racial disparities between stops and frisks of whites, on the one hand, and Blacks
and Latinos/as, on the other hand, were insufficient to prove discriminatory purpose.244
Defendants further argued, and Judge Scheindlin agreed,
that Professor Jeffrey Fagan’s statistical analysis, representing
an essential piece of evidence for the plaintiffs, was insufficient
on its own to prove discrimination.245 However, Judge Scheindlin
found that other evidence, beyond the expert’s analysis, strongly
supported plaintiffs’ contentions that the NYPD knew of its officers’ discriminatory practices.246 The plaintiffs’ evidence included the prior, nearly identical, Daniels litigation, a labor complaint filed by officers alleging they were being compelled to stop
and frisk based on a quota to avoid negative performance reviews, the New York Attorney General’s 1999 report demonstrating racial disparities in stops and frisks, and the NYPD’s
own commissioned study from the RAND Corporation.247 Altogether they supported the theory that the NYPD had sufficient
notice of a problem and had failed to correct it.248
In sum, Judge Scheindlin’s August 17, 2011 summary judgment opinion and order determined that plaintiffs had established triable issues of fact as to whether: (i) the NYPD engaged

243. Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No. 135, supra note 214, at 23 (quoting
McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987)).
244. See id. at 24 (arguing that the case did not amount to the same level of
disparity as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
245. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 449, 451.
248. See id. at 449, 453.
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in a widespread practice of suspicionless stops and frisks;249 (ii)
NYPD supervisors had a widespread custom or practice of imposing quotas on enforcement activity, and such quotas were a
“moving force” behind the widespread suspicionless stops;250 (iii)
the NYPD had intentionally engaged in a widespread pattern
and practice of race-based stops targeting primarily Black and
Latino/a pedestrians;251 and (iv) the NYPD’s internal stop and
frisk audits were so inadequate as to demonstrate a deliberate
indifference to the need to monitor officers adequately to prevent
a widespread pattern of suspicionless stops.252
At trial, the court revisited whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements to establish municipal liability. The Floyd
plaintiffs demonstrated—through data, official policy, and testimony elicited during cross-examination of high-level NYPD officials—that the “customs” or “practices” of unlawful stops and
frisks were “sufficiently widespread that they had the force of
law.”253 The evidence was voluminous. I provide here a few key
points, including the statistical evidence presented through the
testimony of Professor Jeffrey Fagan, to show the type of evidence plaintiffs marshaled to prove their claims:
• On the issue of indifference, plaintiffs chronicled a timeline of notice beginning in 1999 with the N.Y. Attorney
General’s scathing report uncovering racial disparities in
stops and frisks and use of force.254 For example, the
NYPD failed to collect accurate data, or use data in its
possession, to prevent unconstitutional stops.255 This
same failure was raised in the 2007 report by the RAND
Corporation, which the New York Police Foundation had
commissioned to study and make recommendations to
improve its racial disparity in stops and frisks.256
• High-level officials were found to have deliberately maintained, and even ratcheted up, widespread Fourth
Amendment violations.257 The pressure to perform was
evident from “numerous, mutually reinforcing sources of
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 446–48.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 451–53.
Id. at 456.
See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 658–59.
See id.
Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 434–35.
Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 591–92.
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evidence at trial including live testimony, depositions,
roll call recordings, internal NYPD documents, and survey results.”258
• Senior NYPD officials conceded to knowing of failures in
training, discipline, supervision and monitoring, but did
nothing to improve them to protect class members
against unconstitutional stops.259
Professor Fagan’s expert testimony was central to proving a
widespread practice of deliberate indifference to Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations at trial. To
evaluate how often the NYPD’s stops lacked reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, he analyzed a database of
the NYPD’s UF-250 forms.260 The UF-250 form utilizes check
boxes where officers may check off the basis for stops performed,
and in a different portion of the form, the bases for frisks and
searches. He categorized each stop as “apparently justified”
(based on reasonable suspicion),261 “apparently unjustified”
(lacking reasonable suspicion),262 or “ungeneralizable” (insufficient information to make a determination).263
According to Fagan’s analysis, six percent of stops were legally unjustified.264 While the City maintained that even if this
were true, this would not “necessarily” constitute a widespread
pattern requiring a remedy,265 the court pointed out that this

258. Id. at 592.
259. See id. at 589–90, 604.
260. Id. at 579.
261. Id. For this determination, he relied on any of the following Side One
boxes alone: (1) Actions Indicative Of “Casing” Victims Or Location, (2) Actions
Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction (“Drug Transaction”), and (3) Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Violent Crimes (“Violent Crime”). The remainder of Side One boxes (except the “Other” box) were categorized as conditionally
justified: (4) Carrying Objects In Plain View Used In Commission Of Crime e.g.,
Slim Jim/Pry Bar, etc., (5) Suspicious Bulge/Object (Describe), (6) Actions Indicative Of Acting As A Lookout; (7) Fits Description; (8) Furtive Movements; and
(9) Wearing Clothes/Disguises Commonly Used In Commission Of Crime. If
“Other” is the only box checked, Fagan categorized the stop as ungeneralizable.
Id.
262. Id. For this determination, Fagan looked for: (a) no Side One stop category warranting “apparently justified” treatment indicated and only one Side
Two additional circumstance checked, or (b) only one Side One stop indicated
and no Side Two circumstance checked. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 580.
265. Id. at 659.
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figure represents 200,000 stops.266 “Even this number of wrongful stops produces a significant human toll.”267 The figure was
conservative according to Professor Fagan, and the court further
reviewed combinations of justifications he did not categorize as
apparently unjustified (e.g., suspicious bulge and furtive movement).268
For several reasons, the court agreed with his determination
that the two most frequently checked stop factors on the form
used to document stops and frisks—furtive movements and high
crime area—were unreliable bases for suspecting criminality.269
First, despite the frequency with which these boxes were
checked and the low number of arrests following stops (only six
percent), stops were more likely to result in arrest when neither
stop factor was checked.270 Coupled with deposition testimony,
this conclusion supported the view that officers overused the
subjective factors and were not trained on the meaning of such
factors or the Fourth Amendment standard.271 It was further
used to show a failure to supervise officers in stop and frisk practices.272 Second, the court noted—though not with any heavy reliance—psychological research indicating that unconscious racial bias may play a role in police officers’ overuse of the furtive
movement stop factor.273 For all stops analyzed, “Furtive Movements,” was checked as a basis for the stop 48% of the time for
Black suspects, and 45% of the time for Hispanic suspects,
whereas only 40% of the time for white suspects.274 Third, “High
Crime Area” had been interpreted so broadly by some officers
that it did very little to justify a stop.275 Fagan’s analysis showed
that regardless of the amount of crime in a precinct or census
tract as measured by crime complaints, officers checked this stop
basis roughly 55% of the time.276 When questioned at trial, one
266. Id. at 582.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 559, 578–79.
269. Id. at 580–82. This is significant because similar subjective justifications are likely used in other jurisdictions and his analysis may support corollary studies elsewhere.
270. Id. at 582.
271. Id. at 582, 613–14.
272. See id. at 613, 617.
273. See id. at 580–81.
274. Id. at 581.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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officer explained that when checking “High Crime Area” to justify the stop of a class member witness, the area he referred to
was the entire borough of Queens.277
In addition, Professor Fagan’s expert testimony supported
the plaintiffs’ theory that officers develop “scripts” for checking
off stop factors.278 Officer Gonzalez engaged in a high number of
stops and checked the same four boxes on 99% of his UF-250
forms.279 And Officer Dang, among the highest stoppers in the
third quarter of 2009, checked “area has high incidence of reported offense of type under investigation” in 75% of stops, even
though the stop locations were widely dispersed throughout a
racially and socioeconomically heterogeneous precinct.280 Further support for the “script” theory came from testifying officers.281
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim asserted that
Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more frequently than they
would be if officers did not discriminate on the basis of race.282
The question for the statistical experts was: “[I]s there statistical
evidence of racial discrimination in the NYPD’s stop practices?”283 The court compared the rates of Blacks and Hispanics
stopped to a standard point of reference, known as a “benchmark.”284 The court adopted Professor Fagan’s benchmark analysis.285 He used population and reported crime as benchmarks
for understanding the racial distribution of police-citizen contacts.286
Based on Professor Fagan’s benchmark analysis, the court
found the NYPD carried out more stops in predominantly Black
and Hispanic areas, even when controlling for other variables.287
The strongest predictor for stops in a geographical area (precinct
or census tract) was the racial make-up of that area, not the
277. See id. at 581 n.161.
278. See id. at 581.
279. See id. at 582.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 583.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 584. Defendants’ expert relied on crime suspect data—the rates
at which various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime victims—
which the court found unreliable for a number of reasons. See id. at 584–86.
286. Id. at 583.
287. Id. at 584.
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known crime rate.288 This same finding applied across precincts
and census tracts and over time.289 Moreover, regardless of unit
of measurement, Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than
whites to be stopped, even after controlling for racial make-up,
crime rate, patrol strength, and socioeconomic characteristics.290
This was true even in white areas and areas with low crime
rates.291 Blacks were 30% more likely than whites to be arrested
after a stop for the same suspected crime, even after controlling
for other variables.292 Blacks were 14% more likely, and Hispanics 9% more likely, than whites to be subjected to use of force.293
The court further found stops and frisks were significantly more
frequent for Black and Hispanic residents than for whites, even
after adjusting for local crime rates, race, number of officers in a
particular geographic area, and other socioeconomic factors.294
Thus, relying on statistical evidence as well as testimony from
dozens of witnesses, the court held the NYPD did conduct stops
and frisks in a racially discriminatory manner.
In brief, the court found that the municipality was liable under section 1983 through its indifference to unconstitutional
stops, frisks, and searches. The plaintiffs presented evidence,
and the court agreed, that the City was on notice of widespread
racial disparities in stops since at least 1999.295 The ongoing nature of the violations, testimony of officers up the chain of command, the history of recalcitrance despite study after study reinforcing the fact of discriminatory policing, and the settlement
agreement in Daniels all supported a finding of deliberate indifference and a longstanding, widespread deprivation of plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Only a few months after the Supreme Court decided WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Floyd plaintiffs requested, and were
ultimately granted, class certification.296 At the time, it was not
288. Id.
289. See id. at 588–89.
290. Id. at 560.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 166, supra note 214; see also Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274
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evident whether Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (a Title VII employment
matter for damages) would influence courts reviewing cases such
as Floyd (a Rule 23(b)(2) structural reform litigation without
class-wide damage claims).297
To obtain treatment as a class action, Rule 23(a) requires
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”298
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. determined that the
questions must be “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”299 The Court applied dicta from a footnote in General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon300 (another Title VII case), and decided
that when challenging the disparate impact of a policy or practice involving decentralized and subjective decision-making,
plaintiffs must show “[s]ignificant proof” of a general policy of
discrimination to meet the commonality requirement.301 Plaintiffs “must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” at the
pleading stage.302
The Floyd plaintiffs identified four common questions of law
and fact that would resolve all Monell claims against the City on
a class-wide basis:303
• Does the NYPD have a policy or practice of stops and
frisks without reasonable suspicion?304
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). The plaintiff class was defined as:
All persons who since January 31, 2005 have been, or in the future will
be, subjected to the New York Police Department’s policies and/or widespread customs or practices of stopping, or stopping and frisking, persons in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity has taken, is taking, or is about to take place in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, including persons stopped or stopped and frisked
on the basis of being Black or Latino in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification,
ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 1.
297. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
298. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
299. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda,
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132
(2009)).
300. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
301. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Falcon, 457 US.
at 159 n.15); supra Part I.C.
302. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original).
303. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 12–13.
304. Id. at 13.
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•

Does the NYPD have a policy or practice of stopping
Black and Latino persons on the basis of race without
reasonable suspicion?305
• Do the NYPD’s department-wide auditing and self-inspection protocols and procedures demonstrate a deliberate indifference to the need to monitor officers adequately to prevent widespread pattern of suspicionless
and race-based stops?306
• Is the NYPD’s policy and practice of imposing productivity standards and/or quotas on stops and frisks, summons, and other enforcement activity of officers a moving force behind widespread suspicionless stops by
NYPD officers?307
For these questions to resolve matters on a class basis at
trial, however, plaintiffs must demonstrate policies, practices, or
customs of suspicionless or racially discriminatory stops and
frisks. In their attempt to meet the “significant proof of a general
policy” standard, plaintiffs provided statistical and anecdotal evidence in the form of fourteen class member declarations, deposition testimony, expert statistical analysis, and police policies
and procedures.308
In response, the City of New York argued that, as in WalMart Stores, Inc., plaintiffs’ evidence failed to link various individual officer’s actions with the NYPD’s own policies.309 Just as
each Wal-Mart supervisor makes his or her own individual pay
and promotion decisions, each officer, defendants suggested,
made his or her own independent decision to stop a pedestrian.310 One officer’s bad decision had no bearing on other officers, especially for officers in different patrol units, precincts, or
boroughs.311 Thus, defendants urged, the statistical evidence
from Professor Fagan’s expert report submitted in support of
class certification, did not demonstrate “the glue” holding to-

305. Id. at 12–13.
306. Id. at 13.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 17–20.
309. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 7 (pointing to the
NYPD’s written policy against racial profiling and training regarding the
Fourth Amendment standard for reasonable suspicion).
310. Id. at 8.
311. Id.
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gether the millions of individual decisions to stop and frisk pedestrians, and failed to establish that the NYPD had a written
policy amounting to racial profiling.312
Plaintiffs, however, countered that the evidence was not as
disaggregated as defendants characterized it to be. In fact, Professor Fagan’s declaration “point[ed] to evidence that every precinct, regardless of racial composition or crime rate, has similar
rates of racial disparity in stop rates” and “show[ed] that racebased and otherwise suspicionless stops occur in every area of
the [c]ity.”313 The expert opinions thus indicated a centralized
“glue” holding together officers’ decisions in every precinct or
borough. This argument seemed like a strong one: Even the
Floyd defendants conceded that the NYPD employed a “hierarchical supervisory structure to effect and reinforce its department-wide policies” and adopted a “centralized source” for its
policies.314
The City, however, also argued that the existence of a centralized policy was not detrimental to their opposition to class
certification because the NYPD’s policy was one of exercising discretion rather than discrimination. Even though the stop and
frisk practices stem from a department-wide policy, “individual
officers’ decisions to make stops were analogous to the Wal-Mart
policy of allowing discretion to supervisors over employment
matters.”315 Floyd’s defendants urged the court to determine
that, just as in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the “invalidity of an individual officer’s judgment about conducting a stop will do nothing
to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s.”316 Indeed, defendants argued that the NYPD’s policy was “essentially a policy
against having a uniform practice” even though the same brief
acknowledged the “centralized source” for its stop and frisk policy.317
In a key portion of the Floyd class certification decision, applicable to other policing litigation, the court rejected this argument, finding Wal-Mart’s policy distinguishable.318 According to
Judge Scheindlin, “the exercise of judgment in implementing a
312. See id. at 5.
313. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 14.
314. See Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 8.
315. Id. at 8 n.9.
316. Id. at 8.
317. Id. at 8 & n.9.
318. See Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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centralized policy” is clearly different than “the exercise of discretion in formulating a local store policy or practice.”319 In WalMart Stores, Inc., “the putative class members were subjected to
an enormous array of different employment practices,” according
to the Supreme Court.320 In Floyd, the same practice—stop and
frisk—harmed all class members.321
The City’s most forceful argument challenged both plaintiffs’ proffer of statistical evidence and the evidence itself. On the
same day as their brief in opposition to class certification, defendants filed a motion to exclude the evidence of plaintiffs’ expert Professor Fagan.322 In both the Daubert challenge to Professor Fagan’s expertise and its class certification opposition,
defendants attacked the reliability of the statistical regressions
used—arguing that they failed to appropriately account for stops
based on suspect descriptions—and the expert’s categorization
of “justified,” “unjustified,” and “indeterminate” stops.323
Concurrent challenges to expert testimony and class certification will continue to be defining features of structural reform
litigation following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Interestingly, the Monell theories and class certification work hand-in-hand for police
litigation. After Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., class certification requires some proof of a central decision-maker, and municipal liability is permitted, at least under one theory, where a central
decision-maker enforces an illegal practice. Thus, if the plaintiffs’ expert report was excluded, defendants assumed the plaintiffs could not show centrality of decision-making to sustain class
action status.
The court, following the Supreme Court’s suggestion in WalMart Stores, Inc. to look to the merits at the class certification
stage,324 held a Daubert hearing to review Professor Fagan’s

319. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 8 & n.9.
320. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 172.
321. See id. at 173–75.
322. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Expert Reports, Opinions and Testimony of Jeffrey Fagan,
Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:08-cv-01034), ECF No.
179. The court held a Daubert hearing and issued an order granting, in part,
defendants’ motion, prior to deciding plaintiffs’ request for class certification.
See Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 278–79.
323. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Expert Reports, Opinions and Testimony of Jeffrey Fagan
at 2–4, Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (No. 1:08-cv-01034), ECF No. 187.
324. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 160–61.
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qualifications and methodology.325 On the Fourth Amendment
analysis, Judge Scheindlin agreed with Professor Fagan that
NYPD officers engaged in at least 170,000 unlawful stops between 2004 and 2009, and 62,000 stops were facially unlawful
because police officers only provided “furtive movement” as a justification for the stop.326 She deemed Fagan’s methodology sound
for the Fourteenth Amendment subclass, which used precinct,
neighborhood, and census tracts.327
Defendants raised another challenge common in structural
litigation and class actions: they attacked the number of individual stops plaintiffs put forward (approximately 20 out of 2.8 million) as inadequate to warrant an inference of a common practice
of unlawful stops and frisks.328 Judge Scheindlin rejected defendants’ argument and agreed with plaintiffs that “a class wide
proceeding here [would] ‘generate common answers’ to these
questions that are ‘apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’”329 Her opinion noted that the NYPD had conceded the uniformity of its stop and frisk practices.330 Further, the court
pointed to the defendants’ own facts in their summary judgment
motion, which indicated that the NYPD’s policies were centralized and hierarchical.331 Therefore, the statistical evidence, coupled with the deposition testimony of NYPD officials and supervisors, demonstrated, unlike Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., that the stop
and frisk practices occurred in all areas of New York City.
In sum, based on the evidence presented, the court found
that a preponderance of the evidence showed the existence of a
Fourth Amendment class and a Fourteenth Amendment subclass, and therefore granted certification. Plaintiffs demonstrated all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). The hierarchical nature of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices, statistical
evidence, and anecdotal evidence allowed plaintiffs to jump the
certification hurdle.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 279–90.
Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 167
Id. at 167, 168.
Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 9.
Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 175.
Id. at 174.
Id.
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4. Jumping Hurdles at Trial and Remedy
After five years of pre-trial litigation and nine weeks of
trial,332 Judge Scheindlin determined the NYPD had violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through its “unwritten policy of targeting ‘the right people’ for stops” and its high-level senior officials’ deliberate indifference to the discriminatory use of
stop and frisk.333 The majority of stops were justified in police
paperwork through specious categories such as “high crime
area,” “furtive movement,” and “suspicious bulge”334—these
broad, vague, and subjective categories are the type Terry and
subsequent lower court decisions disfavor. Judge Scheindlin
granted the Floyd plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.335
The story of Floyd and New York’s stop and frisk practices
did not end, however, with the close of trial and a finding of liability. As with most structural reform litigation, the granting of
injunctive relief also marked the start of another battleground:
enforcement and implementation of remedies. Judge
Scheindlin’s order first recognized a number of reforms that required speedy implementation as part of an “Immediate Reform”
process.336 Second, the order also called for a pilot program using
body cameras to increase police accountability. Officers in at
least five precincts across the city would wear body cameras to
record street encounters.337 Third, the court appointed an independent monitor, Peter Zimroth, to oversee reform of the NYPD’s
practices and bring them into compliance with the law.338
In an interesting departure from remedial orders in civil
rights cases, Judge Scheindlin ordered the initiation of a “Joint
Remedial Process” between the parties and community members.339 A facilitator would solicit additional solutions from impacted New Yorkers on how the NYPD should further reform its

332. I have limited the discussion of the trial testimony and evidence when
compared to its significance. I made this decision because the focus of this Article is to show that police structural reform litigation can withstand the various
procedural hurdles.
333. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
334. Id. at 559, 575, 578, 580–83.
335. Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd VI), 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671–75
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
336. Id. at 678–84.
337. Id. at 684–86.
338. Id. at 688–89.
339. Id. at 686–88.
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practices. The process would involve the plaintiffs’ class, community stakeholders, local elected officials, law enforcement representatives, ethnic and religious organizations, academics, and
NYPD officials. Judge Scheindlin highlighted the importance of
community input, writing that “[n]o amount of legal or policing
expertise can replace a community’s understanding of the likely
practical consequences of reforms in terms of both liberty and
safety.”340 She then appointed the Executive Director of the Vera
Institute, a reputable criminal justice research and policy organization, as a “Facilitator” to guide the joint remedial process.341
The decision, and the remedial order including a community-oriented process for developing reforms, was considered a major victory for the broader campaign for police accountability and part
of a larger process to hold the NYPD accountable.342 Communities United for Police Reform and the Black, Latino, and Asian
Caucus of the city council were active in the pre-trial phase with
amicus briefs, and at trial by organizing constituent groups to
watch trial every day.343
The 2012 election of Bill de Blasio as the next mayor of New
York may have rescued the results of the litigation. De Blasio
ran on rejecting the strategies of the Bloomberg and Giuliani administrations and promising to address stop and frisk.344 Thus,
the de Blasio administration agreed to drop the City’s appeal of
Judge Scheindlin’s decisions and begin the reform and joint remedial processes immediately after he took office. The police unions, however, opposed Mayor de Blasio’s decision and attempted
340. Id. at 686. Judge Scheindlin enlisted academics from New York area
law schools to serve on an advisory committee to assist with the remedial process. Id. at 687.
341. Id. at 687–88.
342. See Joint Remedial Process in Floyd v. City of New York: What You
Need To Know, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (June 23, 2014), https://
ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/timeline
-floyd-v-city-new-york [https://perma.cc/4FRC-2KF9] (calling the ordered relief
a “landmark community input process”).
343. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Communities United for Police Reform
(CPR) at 1–2, Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-1034(SAS)),
ECF No. 377; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus of
the Council of the City of New York in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Request to
Include the Community in a Collaborative Process Towards Reform at 1–2,
Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08-1034(SAS)), ECF No. 378; see also HyunKang, supra note 155.
344. De Blasio Drops Appeal of ‘Stop and Frisk,’ NPR (Jan. 30, 2014), https://
www.npr.org/2014/01/30/268964572/de-blasio-drops-appeal-of-stop-and-frisk
[https://perma.cc/VA26-K448].

2316

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2257

to derail the process. In October 2014, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit at last allowed the City to officially withdraw its appeal,345 and the joint reform process officially began.
What unfolded after trial—withdrawal of the city’s appeal,
joint remedy process, resistance from city officials even under
the progressive de Blasio administration, and dissatisfaction
from plaintiffs and community groups—is its own story.346
III. ORTEGA-MELENDRES V. ARPAIO: MCSO CRIME
SUPPRESSION SWEEPS
The next case study, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, examines
how systemic police reform litigation, largely involving vehicle
stops, succeeded in the immigration context. This Part shows
how plaintiffs successfully jumped the standing, municipal liability, and class action hurdles to obtain injunctive relief against
a notoriously anti-immigrant sheriff in a hostile jurisdiction. To
understand the relationship between information gathering
prior to discovery and overcoming doctrinal barriers, this Part
begins by describing anti-immigrant events and policies in Maricopa County, Arizona and nationwide that led community members to initiate litigation. The case study then closely examines
how litigants overcame the specific doctrinal hurdles imposed by
Lyons, Monell, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
A. ARIZONA IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES AND
CONTEXT
For nearly a quarter of a century, former Sheriff Joe Arpaio
of Maricopa County, Arizona, was known for hard-nosed, toughon-crime tactics.347 Largely in response to anti-immigrant sentiment among Arizona residents in the last decade—and the
broader populist anti-immigrant movement—Arpaio prioritized
fighting alleged border-crossing “crime.”348
345. Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1054 (2d Cir. 2014).
346. This Article does not address what occurred in the remedial phase of
the case beyond the prior brief summary, but another project will.
347. In June of 2005, the Associated Press quoted Sheriff Arpaio as saying,
“I don’t expect to concentrate on some guy in a truck with six illegals. . . . I want
to go after the professional smugglers who do this for money, the top people.”
Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Gilbin, Reasonable Doubt: Joe Arpaio’s Evolution, EAST
VALLEY TRIB. (July 9, 2008), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/ryan-gabrielson
-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB].
348. This was not always the case. See Robert Anglen & Yvonne Wingett,
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Arpaio’s nativist turn was reflected in his actions shortly following the passage of S.B. 1372, also known as the “Coyote
Law.”349 The Coyote Law had established human smuggling as
a crime and penalized facilitating the transportation of migrants
by suspected sex traffickers and smugglers.350 Sheriff Arpaio decided to enforce the Coyote Law not only against drivers of vehicles engaged in human smuggling, but also against any of its
passengers, including trafficking victims themselves.351 To enforce the law, Arpaio established an “Illegal Immigration and Interdiction” unit, or the “Triple I Unit,” within the Maricopa
County Sherriff’s Office (MCSO) to focus on immigration enforcement activities.352 The Triple I Unit engaged in “saturation
patrols,” involving concentrated traffic stops in one area.353
Within Triple I, he formed the Human Smuggling Unit, whose
officers stopped cars for pretextual reasons, such as darkened
license plate lights or overly tinted windows, to inspect vehicle
drivers and passengers.354 If there was any evidence that passengers paid for the ride, both driver and passenger were prosecuted under S.B. 1372 for felony conspiracy to commit human
smuggling of themselves.355
Feds Question Freeing Reservist, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2005, at B1 (discussing motivations behind the release of a man involved in a car chase in an attempted arrest of several Latinx U.S. citizens); Alexander Provan, The Vigilante, GQ (Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.gq.com/story/joe-arpaio-sheriff-phoenix
-mexico-border-immigration [https://perma.cc/98QW-KKMY] (providing an indepth discussion of the events catalyzing Arpaio’s nativist turn).
349. Melissa Gira Grant & Debbie Nathan, Trump Has Turned the War on
Trafficking into a War on Immigrants, APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019), https://theappeal
.org/trump-has-turned-the-war-on-trafficking-into-a-war-on-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/Y3BR-8LR3] (explaining how the “Coyote Law” came about
and opining that it “launched the career of Joe Arpaio”). Former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano signed S.B. 1372 into law in March of 2005, and the law
went into effect in July. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEIR EXPERIENCE 126 (Anna Ochoa O’Leary ed. 2014).
350. Grant & Nathan, supra note 349.
351. First Amended Complaint at 17–18, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio (Ortega IV), 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS), ECF
No. 26.
352. Id. at 6–7.
353. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: Sweeps Break the
Rules, EAST VALLEY TRIB. (July 11, 2008), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/
ryan-gabrielson-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB].
354. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: At What Cost?, EAST
VALLEY TRIB. (July 9, 2009), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/ryan-gabrielson
-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB].
355. Id. The practice of charging individuals with conspiracy to smuggle
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Many of the officers within the Human Smuggling Unit
were certified under the controversial 287(g) agreement.356 Since
August 14, 2007, when Arpaio and the MCSO entered into an
agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigration Nationality Act,357 160 MCSO personnel were authorized to
perform certain federal immigration enforcement functions. The
scope of duties included stopping, arresting, and detaining individuals—based upon reasonable suspicion—for violations of federal immigration and anti-trafficking laws.358
Important to the later expert witness report in the OrtegaMelendres litigation, Arpaio also instituted a telephone “hotline”
to generate and pursue “tips” from the general public about suspected immigration violations.359 The MCSO relied on these telephone “tips” to conduct raids against homes, places of employment, churches, and beyond.360 The hotline invited racial
discrimination, as it encouraged individuals to equate race with
immigration status and allowed others to pursue personal grievances by way of hotline complaints. Some enforcement actions,
for example, took place after the MCSO received little more than
a barebones complaint that “described no criminal activity but
referred to people with ‘dark skin’ or Spanish speakers congregating in an area.”361 Taking immigration enforcement actions
based on such tips does not account for the general lack of training, knowledge, and experience among the public in the complex
area of immigration law.
themselves was later found unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine in
Somos America v. Maricopa County, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Ariz. 2011).
356. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 8–9.
357. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT C-50-07-058-2-00 (Feb. 24, 2007),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/maricopacounty.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z3W8-2MP8] [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT]; Letter from Joseph
Arpaio, Sheriff, Maricopa Cty. Sheriff ’s Office, to Julie L. Myers, Assistant
Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 14,
2007), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/maricopacounty.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Z3W8-2MP8]. See generally CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE, A PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(g) (2010) (providing background and history on section 287(g)).
358. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 357, at 3.
359. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 16.
360. Id. at 12.
361. Marc Lacey, U.S. Finds Pervasive Bias Against Latinos by Arizona
Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/us/
arizona-sheriffs-office-unfairly-targeted-latinos-justice-department-says.html
[https://perma.cc/GP2T-E87K].
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Local shop owners and business leaders initiated a number
of complaints. As a result, day laborers found themselves on the
receiving end of “saturation patrols” and other enforcement actions pursuant to the Coyote Law and Arizona’s Employer Sanction Law.362 Salvador Reza, a longtime organizer of day laborers
and one of the founders of the local human rights organization,
Tonatierra, began to mobilize the community in response.363 Mr.
Reza and members of Tonatierra began to sound the alarm in
the Latinx community, many of whom were day laborers, and to
protest Arpaio’s actions.364 Tonatierra included a constituency of
day laborers called Puente, which would eventually become its
own organization, Puente Arizona.365 Tonatierra and Puente engaged national networks to draw attention to Arpaio’s abusive
tactics, often through the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON).366
Instead of utilizing its authority under 287(g) to prosecute
serious crimes, such as narcotics smuggling, the MCSO focused
on minor crimes, such as speeding and using fraudulent documents.367 Indeed, only weeks after the ink was dry on 287(g), Arpaio and MCSO used the agreement as a mechanism to authorize and ramp up the saturation patrols. In early 2008, Arpaio
began a series of high-volume “crime suppression sweeps.”368 As
part of these larger-scale versions of saturation patrols, large
numbers of MCSO deputies and volunteer “posse” members
would overwhelm an area.369 They were instructed to make pretextual traffic stops to find evidence of any violations of the law

362. Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353.
363. See JEFF BIGGERS, STATE OUT OF THE UNION: ARIZONA AND THE FINAL
SHOWDOWN OVER THE AMERICAN DREAM 114 (2012) (noting the “Arrest Arpaio,
Not the People” activist campaign); Lawrence Downs, In Arpaio’s Arizona, They
Fought Back, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/
opinion/sunday/in-arpaios-arizona-they-fought-back.html [https://perma.cc/
JM4B-WDX6] (discussing Reza’s involvement in local organizing efforts).
364. Downs, supra note 363.
365. See Michelle Téllez, Arizona: A Reflection and Conversation on the Migrants Rights Movement, 2015, 42 SOC. JUST. 200, 205 (2015).
366. See, e.g., Puente Calls for Immediate Federal Action, Shut Off S-Comm
in State, as DOJ Arpaio Case Heads to Court, NDLON (May 10, 2012), https://
ndlon.org/doj-scomm-az/ [https://perma.cc/F86T-KK2N].
367. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353 (providing examples of individuals stopped for minor crimes, such as speeding).
368. Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 347.
369. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 3.
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they could.370 Supervisors instructed deputies in patrol cars to
look for vehicles with unauthorized immigrants, then detectives
in undercover cars would follow to establish probable cause for a
traffic stop.371 Records show broken tail lights, tires over yellow
lane lines, and tinted windows often formed the basis of stops.372
Mass arrests in the Latinx community were one standard outcome of the sweeps.
The MCSO called this practice “zero tolerance,” and it paralleled broken windows policing or stop and frisk in other contexts.373 Latinx drivers and passengers were subjected to timeconsuming and sometimes harassing stops, interrogations, and
arrests. This treatment was not limited to the time during which
the sweeps occurred, causing substantial fear in the Latinx and
Native American communities of Maricopa County.374 Stops
could result in an investigation of immigration status. Deputies
often asked for identification as a proxy for investigating immigration status, even when explicit questions about status were
not asked initially.375 Investigating immigration status sometimes formed the only reason for an arrest.376
As collaborations between ICE and local law enforcement
agencies across the country grew, and the momentum from
NDLON and others grew, Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO became
targets of national advocacy to prevent local police from engaging in federal immigration enforcement functions.377 Against

370. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353 (providing examples of pretextual stops for minor violations).
371. Id. (recounting how the head of the Human Smuggling Unit explained
the use of undercover cars to establish probable cause).
372. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 10–16.
373. See Andrew Cohen, Federal Judge Chronicles Lawlessness of Joe Arpaio-Led Sheriff’s Office, ATLANTIC (May 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic
.com/national/archive/2013/05/federal-judge-chronicles-lawlessness-of-joe
-arpaio-led-sheriffs-office/276150/ [https://perma.cc/TJR2-S26X].
374. Evelyn H. Cruz & Robert J. McWhirter, G-Men Run Amuck: The 287(g)
Men and Immigration Law, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July/Aug. 2009, at 34–36.
375. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 18.
376. Id. at 18–20.
377. See Nicholas D. Michaud, From 287(g) to SB 1070: The Decline of the
Federal Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level Immigration Enforcement, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1083 (2010); Letter from Marielena Hincapie, Exec.
Dir. of the Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., to President Barack Obama (Aug. 25,
2009), http://media.phoenixnewtimes.com/3790253.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4MPW-PVBS]; Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Mar. 10, 2009), http://media
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this backdrop, the local Arizona American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) office decided to bring a class action lawsuit in collaboration with local advocates and organizers.378 Dan Pochoda, a
New York civil rights attorney, had joined the ACLU of Arizona
as its legal director in 2006. In his early months in the position,
he met with local community leaders about the MCSO’s practices. It became clear to him that litigation would be the only
mechanism to “force a response” from the sheriff.379 Moreover,
even if “[l]itigation may do little to prevent the saturation patrols, [] community leaders were clear that something must be
done.”380
An opportunity for structural reform litigation arose in late
2007, when Mr. Ortega-Melendres filed a lawsuit against Sheriff
Arpaio following a stop during a saturation patrol in late 2007.381
He sought damages and an injunction against the sweep based
on the Fourth Amendment.382 The Somos America coalition, of
which he was a member, included the ACLU of Arizona, Tonatierra, and Puente. The coalition decided to sue Sheriff Arpaio
and the MCSO for their implementation of the 287(g) program
and their immigration enforcement practices.383

.phoenixnewtimes.com/3140100.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7NX-MRSS] (regarding investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff ’s Office); see also Daniel Gonzalez, Arpaio To Be Investigated over Alleged Violations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar.
11, 2009), https://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/03/11/
20090311investigation0311.html [https://perma.cc/RP9M-67D3]; Aarti Shahani
& Judith Greene, Local Democracy on ICE: Why State and Local Governments
Have No Business in Federal Immigration Law Enforcement, JUST. STRATEGIES
(Feb. 27, 2009), https://justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/JS
-Democracy-On-Ice-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB2S-2TM6]; Jessica Weisberg,
ICE Program Under Fire, THE NATION (Oct. 14, 2009), https://www.thenation
.com/article/ice-program-under-fire/ [https://perma.cc/V5DW-SGVL].
378. Telephone Interview with Dan Pochoda, Senior Lit. Counsel, ACLU of
Ariz. (Aug. 15, 2018) (notes on file with author).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See Complaint, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz.
2011) (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Initial Complaint, ECF
No. 1].
382. Id. at 19–21.
383. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 1
(amending the Initial Complaint to include Somos and ACLU).
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B. JUMPING HURDLES IN THE ORTEGA-MELENDRES LITIGATION
In July 2008, three individuals and the Somos America coalition384 filed an amended complaint alleging violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments before Judge G. Murray
Snow in the District Court of Arizona.385 The ACLU of Arizona,
ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project (IRP), Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and the law firm
of Steptoe and Johnson also joined the case.386 The complaint
was filed as a class action on behalf of all Latinx drivers and
passengers stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO
officers.387 Plaintiffs alleged the MCSO used the 287(g) agreement to racially profile the Latinx community.388 Plaintiffs also
alleged that the MCSO engaged in practices of targeting persons
who appeared Latinx for stops, interrogation, and arrests without reasonable suspicion, citing Sheriff Arpaio’s own statement
that the sweeps were aimed to “go after illegals . . . . You go after
them, and you lock them up.”389
The amended complaint described saturation patrols and
crime suppression sweeps that targeted Latino neighborhoods
and day laborer sites as affecting U.S. citizens, Permanent Residents, and Native Americans.390 For example, in one instance,
a brother and sister, both U.S. citizens, were followed by MCSO
officers during a sweep solely because they had pulled into a gas
station while listening to a Spanish-language radio station.391
384. Somos America is composed of organizations and individuals whose
work involves issues affecting migrant and immigrant communities. Somos
America was formed in 2006 with a broad immigration reform agenda. It diverted time and resources in response to anti-immigration legislation and Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s raids on businesses and the Latinx community. This formed a
basis for its organizational standing. See generally SOMOS AMERICA, https://
somosamerica.org/ [https://perma.cc/DB95-BARP].
385. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 17–18. Mr.
Ortega-Melendres first filed suit in December of 2007 in a complaint for damages and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated
individuals. See Initial Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 381, at 19–21.
386. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 1–2.
387. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 420.
388. Id. at 7.
389. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 11.
390. Id. at 14.
391. MALDEF Sues Maricopa County Sheriff for Racial Profiling and Civil
Rights Violations, MALDEF (July 25, 2008), https://mexicanexpulsions.blogspot
.com/2008/07/maldef-sues-maricopa-county-sheriff-for.html [https://perma.cc/
DZ8F-G4DT].
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The deputies arrived at their family’s business after following
the pair, and shoved the brother against one of the police cars,
handcuffing him while they checked his identification.392 Their
practices and use of racial profiling thus harmed Latinx individuals, regardless of immigration or citizenship status, and compromised the public safety of the broader community.
As the parties litigated the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations of unconstitutional police practices and their certifiability
as a class, relationships between community advocates and the
attorneys, such as Pochoda and a law fellow Annie Lai, were important for several reasons, including to locate the appropriate
class representatives in a climate where non-citizens feared reprisals from the sheriff’s office. Prior to formal discovery, the relationships with community residents and organizers supported
information gathering for facts showing policy and practice allegations and class-wide relief.
Defendants attempted to dismiss the litigation for failure to
sufficiently plead discriminatory intent on multiple occasions.393
They challenged plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims and contested the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment allegations related to Terry stops, which require individualized, articulable, reasonable suspicion for stopping and questioning;
seizures without probable cause; and investigations and prolonged investigatory stops for immigration purposes.394 Surpris-

392. Id.
393. Defendants raised this same argument, with some variation, at least
four times. See Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
To Dismiss at 2–4, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv02513-GMS), ECF No. 12 [hereinafter Motion To Dismiss Initial Complaint,
ECF No. 12]; Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County’s Response in Opposition
to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Leave To Amend Complaint at 11 n.2, Ortega-Melendres
IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 19 (basing argument
on the futility exception to the liberal standard permitting plaintiffs to amend
initial pleadings); Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint at 8 n.2, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No.
2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Motion To Dismiss First
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32]; Defendants Arpaio and MCSO’s Rule 12(c)
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 5–6, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F.
Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 90 [hereinafter Defendants’
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90].
394. The district court denied defendants’ claims that Sheriff Arpaio and the
MCSO were entitled to qualified immunity when addressing defendants’ motion
to dismiss. The determination fell squarely on well-established precedent that
“qualified immunity is only an immunity from a suit for damages, and does not
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ingly, in the initial stages of litigation, though the MCSO challenged plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate their constitutional
claims, they did not challenge plaintiffs’ discriminatory police
practice allegations as insufficient under Monell’s municipal liability theory.395
1. Standing To Seek an Injunction: Lyons
The court considered plaintiffs’ standing based on Lyons in
three rounds of motion practice and eventually determined
MCSO engaged in an official policy of race and/or national origin
discrimination.396 During the next round of Lyons motion practice, the district court considered defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings based on lack of standing for equitable
relief, as well as plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.397 The

provide immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief.” Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio (Ortega-Melendres II) 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 n.1 (D. Ariz.
2009) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007)). As with
other structural reform litigation, because plaintiffs were only seeking injunctive relief, and not damages, qualified immunity was not available as a defense.
Id.
395. Instead, they argued plaintiffs had incorrectly named Sheriff Joe Arpaio and the MCSO as the defendants because the MCSO was not a jural entity.
Rather, Maricopa County, defendants argued, was the proper entity. See Motion
To Dismiss First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32, supra note 393, at 6–12;
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra note 393,
at 6–7. The court, however, permitted plaintiffs to continue against MCSO and
decided that the Sherriff could be sued in his official capacity as the final decision-maker on county law enforcement matters. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio
(Ortega-Melendres V), 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 890 (D. Ariz. 2013) (connecting Arpaio to MSCO through Arpaio’s “final decisionmaking [sic] authority” on
MSCO’s policies).
396. Defendants initially raised standing in their motion to dismiss the first
complaint. In response, plaintiffs requested, and the court permitted, amendment of the pleadings to add class claims and additional named plaintiffs. Defendants’ motion was dismissed as moot. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio (Ortega-Melendres I), No. CV07-2513-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4174918, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 5, 2008); Motion To Dismiss Initial Complaint, ECF No. 12, supra note
393, at 6–8.
397. See Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification at 6–7, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07cv-02513-PHX-MHM), ECF No. 100 (responding to plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification, which mentioned the “preliminary matter” that the class had
standing to pursue equitable relief); Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14–17, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513GMS), ECF No. 413; Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF
No. 90, supra note 393, at 8.
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MCSO argued that plaintiffs had failed to show standing for either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims and that it
deserved judgment on the pleadings as a result.398 First, defendants raised the speculative harm barrier: they disagreed that
plaintiffs had a “‘credible’ and ‘genuine’ threat” of defendants
stopping, questioning, searching or arresting them again, and
because plaintiffs relied on contingent future events, they did
not suffer ongoing harms.399 The prior stops were insufficient to
support an injunction for prospective future harm.400 Second, relying on Lyons’s discussion of innocence, defendants argued that
plaintiffs’ unlawful actions, based on potential violations of state
law due to immigration status, shielded defendants from liability.401 Just as Mr. Lyons could choose to drive without a tail light,
the MCSO suggested plaintiffs could avoid future harm by complying with state immigration law and driving with persons who
do the same.402
Without a developed factual record, the court adopted a Rule
12(b)(6) standard.403 It viewed plaintiffs’ allegations as true and
construed them in their favor.404 The complaint provided concrete and sufficient allegations of a pattern, practice, or custom
of unlawful police practices. Based on the complaint, the threat
of future harm was not predicated on future illegal conduct by
plaintiffs, so the court determined that plaintiffs had standing
to pursue their equitable claims.405 The court found plaintiffs
had sufficiently alleged a real and immediate threat of future

398. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra
note 393, at 4–9.
399. Id. at 5; Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Class Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 4–5.
400. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra
note 393, at 6–7 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974); Farm
Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 723,
729–30 (N.D. Ohio 2000)).
401. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra
note 393, at 6–7.
402. Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 7.
403. Ortega-Melendres v. Maricopa County (Ortega-Melendres III), No. CV07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009) (“In the
absence of such a record, the Court must look to the Complaint, take its allegations as true, and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.”).
404. Id.
405. See id. at *5–6.
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injury, even though the plaintiffs only pled one stop each.406 The
court explained, however, that it would require an evidentiary
record to determine whether a practice in fact existed to overcome the Lyons standing hurdle.407 In the same motion, the court
denied class certification without prejudice, relying on the approach that standing should be resolved prior to granting class
certification.408
To review the information gathered by parties, the district
court revisited standing two years later, following discovery,
when deciding plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification
and each parties’ motions for summary judgment.409 Plaintiffs
overcame the standing barriers by demonstrating an official policy.410 Even so, the court analyzed the case through the lens of
the speculative harm, repeated harm, and innocence requirements.411 First, plaintiffs responded to the defendants’ argument
regarding speculative, future harm. Because there was nothing
plaintiffs could do to avoid injury, they were likely—if not certain—to endure the MCSO’s unconstitutional conduct again in
the future.412 Each individual plaintiff was subjected to unreasonable, racially motivated traffic stops. Because the MCSO took
enforcement actions against both vehicle drivers and passengers, plaintiffs’ only option to avoid unlawful traffic stops would
be to forgo any motor vehicle travel.
Second, distinguishing the speculative harm barrier of Lyons specifically, plaintiffs argued there was no series of contingent events that would have to occur for plaintiffs to be subject
406. See id. at *1–2.
407. Id. at *4 (citing Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699
(9th Cir. 1999)).
408. Id. at *6 (citing Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004),
and distinguishing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). Courts apply
different approaches to the standing and class certification question. See generally ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 76–86
(William B. Rubenstein ed., 5th ed. 2011) (discussing the various ways courts
have approached standing in class actions).
409. The arguments and discussion that follows is based on the 2009 and
2011 motion practice and court orders. See, e.g., Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL
2707241, at *7–8.
410. Id. at *1.
411. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 978–92 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(analyzing Plaintiffs’ claims and granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims); Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL
2707241, at *2–5.
412. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *3 (discussing Plaintiffs’ alleged future harms).
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to racial profiling (as either drivers or passengers).413 Plaintiffs
had pled specific statements and policies of racially motivated
sweeps in Latinx areas of Maricopa County. This policy and
practice allegation, they argued, created the future likelihood
that plaintiffs would be subjected to traffic stops based on race,
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.414 The Supreme
Court in Lyons had determined the Los Angeles chokehold policy
was not reasonably pled nor demonstrated through the record.415
With regard to the innocence barrier of Lyons, the court disagreed with defendants’ contentions that plaintiffs had engaged
in illegal behavior predicating their stops. In particular, defendants argued that two individual named plaintiffs were not innocent because they had been cited for ignoring a “road closed”
sign.416 In fact, no named plaintiffs were issued citations. The
court found the facts alleged in the complaint “could plausibly be
read to allege that Plaintiffs did nothing illegal to warrant the
actions of MCSO officers.”417
In both decisions where Lyons was substantively considered,
the court found instructive a series of Ninth Circuit cases distinguishing Lyons, including Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina.418 In
Hodgers-Durgin, plaintiffs, who had been stopped by border
agents on a “roving patrol,”419 challenged this practice under the
Fourth Amendment and requested injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
argued they had a sufficient likelihood of future injury because
they drove every day through a region in which INS agents patrolled “all over the place.”420
On the Lyons question, the Hodgers-Durgin court found
plaintiffs overcame the innocence hurdle because there was “no
string of contingencies necessary to produce an injury.”421 The
Hodgers plaintiffs “engaged in entirely innocent conduct,” and
413. Id. at *2.
414. Id. at *4–5.
415. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7 (1983); see also
supra Part I.A.
416. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *1.
417. Id. at *3.
418. Id. at *3–4.
419. Id. at *3. “Roving patrols” reference border agent operations in the interior of the United States, rather than at the U.S.-Mexico border. During these
roving patrols, border agents stop, and sometimes detain, individuals for immigration- or smuggling-related violations.
420. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1039, 1044 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
421. Id. at 1041–42.
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they were also powerless to prevent further interaction with police officers.422 Plaintiffs “would not have to take any action, such
as offering resistance, to reproduce the injury.”423 Thus, plaintiffs established that the same chain of events would likely reproduce the plaintiffs’ injuries in the future and satisfied Lyons’s
first prong.
But ultimately, the Ninth Circuit determined the facts of the
case could not overcome the speculative harm or future injury
barriers.424 In ten years, the Hodgers named plaintiffs had experienced only one roving border patrol encounter, despite regularly driving hundreds of miles a week in close proximity to the
Border Patrol.425
The district court in Ortega-Melendres distinguished
Hodgers-Durgin and Lyons. First, unlike Hodgers-Durgin, the
plaintiffs had alleged that the MCSO’s practices involved more
than a single stop.426 Though plaintiffs had, as with the plaintiffs
in Hodgers-Durgin, only endured one stop during the course of
the litigation, the court held that the plaintiffs had “presented
sufficient evidence aside from the stops themselves” of the
MCSO’s repeated unconstitutional behavior.427
Relatedly, and most importantly, the court held that plaintiffs sufficiently pled that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s deputies had stopped plaintiffs pursuant to an officially sanctioned
policy, practice, or pattern of stopping, questioning, searching,
and sometimes arresting Latinx persons without probable cause

422. Id. at 1041.
423. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *3 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983)).
424. See Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1044. (“We hold that Mr. Lopez and
Ms. Hodgers-Durgin have not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of injury to
warrant equitable relief.”).
425. Id. In Ortega-Melendres, the court noted that without a developed factual record, it could not test plaintiffs’ allegations. Other district courts had
pointed out that after summary judgment, or at another stage after a fully developed factual record, was a more appropriate time to raise the arguments defendants had presented. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (citing
Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Bassette v. City of Oakland, No. C-00-1645 JCS, 2000 WL 33376593, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2000)).
426. See Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (“The Complaint alleges that the challenged conduct occurs not only as a general practice, but also
through widespread and ongoing ‘crime suppression sweeps.’”).
427. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 987 (D. Ariz. 2011).
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or reasonable suspicion.428 The Lyons Court had stated that victims of police misconduct could satisfy standing if department
officials “ordered or authorized police officers to act” in an unlawful manner.429 Ortega-Melendres presented such a case. The
MCSO itself had argued “its officers [were] authorized to stop
individuals based only on reasonable suspicion or probable cause
that a person is not authorized to be in the United States.”430
This assertion not only demonstrated an official policy, but was
“wrong as a matter of law.”431 Moreover, other Ninth Circuit
cases further made clear that allegations of a widespread, ongoing, and sanctioned policy or practice “lends special weight to the
likelihood of future harm.”432 Therefore, the court determined
that the plaintiffs satisfied Lyons’s standing requirement for injunctive relief, and demonstrated a “sufficient likelihood” that
their rights would be violated in the future.433
Importantly, the department-wide practices claim grounded
in Monell helped the plaintiffs overcome a common and challenging issue in police injunctive suits—the single stop problem. As
Lyons and Hodgers-Durgin show, courts often find that a single
police encounter resulting in “injury and death unconstitutionally inflicted on the victim”—while “unfortunate”—does not
demonstrate a likely future injury and thus does not confer
standing for injunctive relief.434 Yet, Judge Snow explained that
the fact that individual plaintiffs were only subject to a single
stop did not preclude standing to seek injunctive relief in their
428. Id. at 989.
429. Id. at 979 (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 106 (1983)).
430. Id. Moreover, as an incorrect assertion of law, the court determined
plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment for their Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 980.
431. Id.
432. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009)
(explanatory parentheticals in original) (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d
849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that one of the ways in which plaintiffs can
“demonstrate that [an] injury is likely to recur” is to “demonstrate that the harm
is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior”); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway
Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs who
were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged racial profiling survived a motion to dismiss and relying on the fact that, unlike Lyons, the plaintiffs “allege[d] a pattern and practice of illegal law enforcement activity”); cf.
Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1990); LaDuke v. Nelson,
762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985)).
433. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 985 (D. Ariz. 2011).
434. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983).
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Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims.435 Rather, the
MCSO’s official policy to illegally detain people based on their
race and/or national origin necessarily exposed the named plaintiffs to an ongoing harm and evidenced that there is “sufficient
likelihood” that plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights will be violated again.436
Concurrent events also affected the litigation. Following
considerable local and national activism, in October 2009 the
federal government withdrew an aspect of its 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement with MCSO.437 Deputies lost the authority to
investigate and make arrests during street encounters based on
suspected unlawful presence alone.438 Although MCSO deputies
no longer had the federal government’s approval to engage in
street-based sweeps, they could continue to enforce immigration
law following pretextual stops, and had the authority to verify
immigration status.439 In 2010, Arizona became ground zero for
the immigration debate when Governor Jan Brewer signed a law
purporting to require all law enforcement agencies in the state
to enforce immigration laws, among other provisions.440 Locally,
in Phoenix, demonstrations against Arpaio’s Tent City and continued crime suppression sweeps mounted.441 The Department
of Justice’s criminal division opened an investigation into abuse
of power by the MCSO’s public corruption squad, and the DOJ

435. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
436. Id. at 979 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111).
437. Ray Stern, Feds Pull 287(g) Authority from Maricopa County Jails Because of Civil Rights Violations, PHX. NEW TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www
.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/feds-pull-287-g-authority-from-maricopa-county
-jails-because-of-civil-rights-violations-6631025 [https://perma.cc/YGN4
-XCGC].
438. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (“MCSO officers no
longer had authority to enforce federal civil immigration violations in the field,
but could continue to do so in the jails.”).
439. See id. (noting instances when officers could continue to enforce immigration law following loss of 287(g) authority).
440. See Ted Hesson, 3 Reasons Arizona Is Ground Zero for Immigration
Policy, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013, 2:16 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_
Univision/Politics/reasons-arizona-ground-immigration-policy/story?id=
19885446 [https://perma.cc/7LUR-P5KJ].
441. See Sadie Jo Smokey, Dancers, Students, Families Protest Arpaio, NE.
PHX. REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 2010, at 4 (describing the protests against Sheriff Arpaio’s unjust treatment of Hispanics).
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Civil Rights Division issued a report in December 2011 finding
MCSO had engaged in unconstitutional policing.442
2. Municipal Liability: Monell
The plaintiffs presented remarkable evidence of an official
policy to racially profile Latinx persons to support their request
for summary judgment. Consequently, the court determined
plaintiffs’ evidence overcame the widespread practices and factual parallel barriers associated with practice or custom allegations.443 The evidence included Sheriff Arpaio’s public statements endorsing racial profiling and the detention of people
based on “their speech, what they look like, if they look like they
came from another country.”444 Emails associated with the special raids that were circulated among MCSO officers compared
Mexicans to dogs and portrayed them as “drunks.”445 In addition,
the court found significant the MCSO’s equating of day laborers
with unlawful status, and that this motivated where officers conducted saturation patrols.446
Plaintiffs also relied upon statistical evidence demonstrating Hispanics were stopped at significantly higher rates during
the saturation patrols. Dr. Ralph Taylor, a professor of criminology at Temple University and plaintiffs’ statistical expert, presented findings from his study analyzing computer-aided dispatch (CAD) reports that documented vehicle stops by MCSO
officers on patrol.447 Dr. Taylor conducted a study of CAD records
during large-scale saturation patrols to determine whether the
patrols focused on cars with Hispanic occupants.448 He compared
the names of individuals whom MCSO officers stopped and
called into central dispatch during saturation patrols to the
442. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGAMARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 2 (2011), https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/mcso_findletter_12-15-11
.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4S2-WTED].
443. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
444. Id. at 986.
445. Id. at 987.
446. Id.; see also Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 850 (D. Ariz.
2013) (“The MCSO almost always scheduled its day labor and small-scale saturation patrols where Latino day laborers congregated; the same is true for a
considerable number of its large-scale saturation patrols.”).
447. Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 872. Each time an MCSO deputy asks for dispatch to run a name, the CAD database records the name of the
individual and records the type of stop. Id.
448. Id.
TION OF THE
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names called in by officers during non-saturation patrol days.449
He also compared all names called in on saturation patrol days,
regardless of whether the report was from a saturation patrol or
not.450 He concluded, among other findings, that officers were
forty-six to fifty-four percent more likely to stop an individual
with a Hispanic surname during saturation patrols.451 Though
defendants challenged Dr. Taylor’s conclusions with their own
statistical expert’s testimony at trial, the court found Dr. Taylor
more credible.452 Moreover, the court found Dr. Taylor’s study
“probative” of plaintiffs’ claim that the MCSO officers used race
as a discriminatory factor in their saturation patrols despite instructions not to racially profile.453 The plaintiffs presented evidence that anywhere from fifty-seven to ninety-seven percent of
those arrested during saturation patrols were persons with Hispanic names.454 The percentage of passengers with Hispanic surnames was even higher, ranging from eighty-one to ninety-five
percent.455
Plaintiffs next presented evidence to show that the sheriff’s
office was liable for its officers’ actions under a “failure to” train
and supervise theory.456 Plaintiffs pointed to the MCSO’s lack of
safeguards to prevent racial profiling.457 The MCSO did not have
an agency-wide anti-racial profiling policy, nor had the agency
provided an adequate definition to officers.458 The only training

449. Id. at 873.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 874 (“As between Dr. Taylor and Dr. Camarota in this respect,
the Court credits the opinion of Dr. Taylor.”).
453. Id. at 875–76.
454. Id. at 868. Dr. Taylor used U.S. census data to correlate whether the
owners of a given surname identified as Hispanic. Id. at 873.
455. Id. at 869. The court decided to give more weight to Dr. Taylor than the
defendants’ expert, Dr. Steven Camarota. Id. at 874. Dr. Camarota did not take
issue with Dr. Taylor’s analysis or methodology. Id. Instead, he offered the alternative explanation that poverty rates could explain the disparate rates of
stops, because “people with low incomes are going to have more difficulty . . . meeting the equipment standards.” Id. He presented no analysis of the
stop rates when corrected for income to support this view. Id. Ultimately, the
court determined these statements were mere “speculation.” Id.
456. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 28, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS), ECF
No. 421.
457. Id.
458. Id.
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material produced in the litigation—from an Arizona law enforcement board—incorrectly prohibited profiling only when conducted solely on the basis of race.459 Indeed, officers and supervisors had testified at depositions that “apparent Mexican
ancestry,” “speak[ing] only Spanish,” and presence in “illegal alien locale” were bases for investigatory action.460 No in-house
training was required nor provided.461 ICE’s 287(g) training had
little material relevance to racial profiling.462 No documentation
on the race, ethnicity, or basis of the stop was required, let alone
checked by supervisors to ensure reasonable suspicion or probable cause formed the bases for the stop, interrogation, or seizure.463
Furthermore, plaintiffs demonstrated that the MCSO habitually turned a blind eye to reports of discriminatory policing.464
Plaintiffs characterized the attitudes of MCSO supervisors as
“cavalier” because they “trust[ed]” their subordinates not to racially profile.465 Moreover, the supervisors themselves initiated
or spread racial bias, such as when a sergeant circulated an
email about a “Mexican Yoga” or did nothing when officers distributed “Mexican Word of the Day” or derogatory jokes about
Mexicans or Mexican culture.466
The court found that if the policy plaintiffs claimed existed
was in fact a policy, then it presented “a ‘sufficient likelihood’
that the named Plaintiffs will suffer ongoing harm.”467 Ultimately, the court granted a preliminary injunction, finding
“[i]njunctive relief is appropriate when plaintiffs show that police misconduct ‘is purposefully aimed at minorities and that
such misconduct was condoned and tacitly authorized by department policy makers.’”468
Importantly, the court noted that consideration of race need
not be the “dominant or primary” purpose of a policy for it to be

459. Id.
460. Id. at 28–29 (alteration in original).
461. Id. at 29.
462. See id.
463. Id. at 29–30.
464. Id. at 29.
465. Id. at 29–30.
466. Id. at 30–31.
467. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
468. Id. at 985 (quoting Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508
(9th Cir. 1992)).
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discriminatory.469 Instead, a fact finder must decide whether discriminatory purpose was “a motivating factor” in the policy.470
This could be shown if the policy was “based in part on reports
that referred to explicit racial characteristics.”471
Ultimately, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment based on the Fourteenth Amendment, but it did grant
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim and injunctive relief “to the extent that Defendants are detaining persons
without reasonable suspicion that the state human smuggling
statute has been violated,” and instead solely on the basis of suspected immigration status.472 Defendants did not claim Mr. Ortega-Melendres matched a particular description of a crime suspect,473 which is a permissible basis for a stop under the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, his stop arose because he was dressed as a
member of a work crew.474 A deputy stopped him for driving
thirty-four miles per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone,
but called another deputy to investigate the passengers’ immigration status.475 The officers had no reasonable suspicion to believe that the church from which Mr. Ortega-Melendres had
been driving was engaged in any criminal activity.476 Based on
deposition testimony, the court found the deputy relied on an
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” that did not
provide objectively reasonable suspicion of smuggling.477
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
The Ortega-Melendres plaintiffs sought to certify a class,
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), composed of “[a]ll Latino persons who,
since January 2007, [had] been or [would] be in the future,
stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents

469. Id. at 986.
470. Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
471. Id. (quoting Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1980)).
472. Id. at 980. Plaintiffs Nieto and Meraz were ordered to leave the convenience store and back-up officers were called. Id. at 984. The back-up officers
followed them into the parking lot of an auto repair shop owned by Nieto’s father. Id. at 985. Nieto was removed forcibly from the car and handcuffed while
the police checked his ID. Id. They were released without being charged. Id.
473. Id. at 981–92.
474. Id. at 982.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
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while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.”478 The initial motion for
class certification filed in 2009 was denied without prejudice.479
The court determined it required a developed factual record prior
to determining whether plaintiffs satisfied standing to pursue
equitable relief.480 Plaintiffs renewed their motion in 2011 and
defendants made several arguments, including that plaintiffs
had not satisfied commonality.481
To satisfy commonality (and typicality), plaintiffs’ renewed
motion for class certification relied upon statistical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that the representative plaintiffs and
class members were likely to be stopped again.482 Anecdotal evidence included the defendants’ actions based upon “constituent
letters explicitly calling for racial profiling,” and that Sheriff Arpaio, “endorsed such letters and passed them on to his subordinates for use in the planning and implementation of enforcement
operations, including saturation patrols.”483 The plaintiffs also
argued that Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO officers had “distributed
offensive materials about Hispanics” within the department,
478. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420, supra
note 387, at 1.
479. Ortega-Melendres III, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at
*7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009).
480. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 403–08. The court did not
resolve the issue at that stage, quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
831 (1999) for the position that standing should be resolved prior to class certification because “any [ ] Article III court must be sure of its own jurisdiction
before getting to the merits.” Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *6.
The Fibreboard case announced an exception to when class certification is a
prerequisite to standing. Id. (citing Fibreboard, 527 U.S. at 831). The OrtegaMelendres court did not find this principle at odds with the rule that courts
should determine whether to certify a suit as a class action “[a]t an early practicable time.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A)).
Additionally, the court concluded that some determinations of standing cannot
be squarely resolved without the benefit of discovery. Id. (citing Doninger v. Pac.
Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court denied the motion
without prejudice. Id. at *7.
481. Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 2–9.
482. See Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420,
supra note 387, at 2–8 (detailing “how Defendants [were] engaged in a pattern
and practice of discrimination against Hispanics in traffic stops” resulting in
the plaintiffs being unable to do anything “to avoid a repeat of the injury”).
483. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs first sought class certification at an earlier stage of
the case, but the court denied the motion without prejudice. See supra notes
479–80 and accompanying text.
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which showed “that negative stereotypes about Hispanics [were]
deeply and widely felt within the agency.”484 The plaintiffs also
pointed to public statements by Sheriff Arpaio “equat[ing] Hispanics with illegal immigrants.”485 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that “Sheriff Arpaio has repeatedly stated that his enforcement operations are intended to ‘go after illegals,’ and that they
can be spotted based on ‘what they look like’”; they asserted that
those statements illustrate that the department used race as a
motivating force to enforce immigration laws.486
The court found that plaintiffs had satisfied commonality
and all other requirements for an injunctive class action under
Rule 23(b)(2).487 Of note, this decision occurred on plaintiffs’ second request for certification, two years after the first, and following extensive expert discovery.
4. Trial and Remedy
The months preceding trial coincided with growing national
attention on Sheriff Arpaio’s unconstitutional practices and Arizona’s anti-immigrant climate. On May 10, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed suit against Maricopa County.488
Judge Snow presided over a three-week bench trial primarily addressing plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.489 The
court’s conclusions of law and fact pointed to an extensive evidentiary record, including Dr. Taylor’s statistical findings that
drivers and passengers with Hispanic names were more likely to
be stopped, and stopped for longer, from which it could conclude
MCSO engages in racial profiling of Latinx people.490 The court
484. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420, supra
note 387, at 3.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 993 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(“Plaintiffs have met their burden for class certification under Rule 23.”).
488. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Department
of Justice Files Lawsuit in Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County
Sheriff ’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (May 10, 2012), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-lawsuit-arizona-against-maricopa
-county-maricopa-county-sheriff-s [https://perma.cc/H5D7-WEDV].
489. See Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013).
490. Id. at 872–74 (crediting Dr. Taylor’s findings that on saturation patrol
days, those stopped “were between 26% to 39% more likely to be Hispanic” than
those on non-saturation patrol days, and that stops of Hispanics “lasted between
two and three minutes longer than comparable stops” of non-Hispanics).
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reviewed Arpaio’s public statements, orders to his officers, and
files of letters and clippings, all of which openly espoused racial
profiling.491 The fact that his policies were in part a response to
citizens’ requests to target immigrants also suggested that the
MCSO’s special operations were conducted based on race versus
evidence of a crime.492
Moreover, the court concluded these actions were pursuant
to an official policy. The court determined that the MCSO’s Law
Enforcement Agency Response (LEAR) policy, which
require[d] a deputy (1) to detain persons she or he believes only to be
in the country without authorization, (2) to contact MCSO supervisors,
and then (3) to await contact with ICE pending a determination how to
proceed, result[ed] in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution.493

This trial evidence substantiated that the defendants were already violating the court’s December 2011 Fourth Amendment
injunction.494 Because ICE had revoked the MCSO’s 287(g) authority, the court stated that the MCSO could not have a policy
of “enforcing” immigration law pursuant to the 287(g) agreement.495 The court, therefore, granted plaintiffs’ permanent injunction.496

491. Id. at 830–31 (quoting Sheriff Arpaio during a press conference as stating, “Actually, . . . ours is an operation, whether it’s the state law or the federal,
to go after illegals, not the crime first, that they happen to be illegals. My program, my philosophy is a pure program. You go after illegals. I’m not afraid to
say that. And you go after them and you lock them up.”); see also Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 986–87 (discussing additional statements made by
Sheriff Arpaio and other files of Sheriff Arpaio showing racial profiling).
492. See Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (noting that several of
the large-scale saturation patrols “occurred in locations for which the Sheriff
had received previous complaints about the presence of Mexicans or day laborers or both”).
493. Id. at 826–27. In the absence of additional facts that would provide reasonable suspicion that a person committed a federal criminal offense either in
entering or staying in this country, it is not a violation of federal criminal law
to be in this country without authorization in and of itself. See id. at 886 (describing the “erroneous premise that being an unauthorized alien in this country in and of itself established a criminal violation of federal immigration law”).
494. See id. at 887–90 (concluding that “essentially, nothing ha[d] changed”
following the injunction, and that the MCSO “continue[d] to arrest those it believe[d] to be unauthorized aliens”).
495. See id.
496. Id. at 910. The parties engaged in extensive discussions and the court
ultimately issued a broad injunction. See Melendres v. Arpaio (Ortega-Melendres VI), No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2,
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The fallout from the court’s decision—when combined with
on-the-ground advocacy—led to big changes in Maricopa County.
Four months after the Ortega-Melendres trial, Sheriff Arpaio
faced a tough re-election fight. Latinxs organized, using the trial
to increase voter registration and drum up opposition to his candidacy.497 Though he was re-elected as a six-time incumbent, it
was only by six percentage points—his narrowest victory.498 The
case against the MCSO for racial profiling and stops, detentions,
and arrests without reasonable suspicion or probable cause is
ongoing. An independent monitor, Chief Robert Warsaw, was appointed499 and the community was permitted to have direct involvement in monitoring the remedial order.500 Yet, even under
the new sheriff, Paul Penzone, racial disparities persist and the
community has decried and protested his continued cooperation
with ICE.501
IV. BAILEY V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA: PHILADELPHIA
STOP AND FRISK
The case study in this Part provides in-depth consideration
of Philadelphia’s stop and frisk practices. The case study begins
with a review of years of litigation, attempts to prevent discriminatory policing in Philadelphia, and ends with the settlement of
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia. The story here is distinct from
2013) (“Parties desired to negotiate the terms of a consent decree to ensure Defendants’ compliance with the injunctions.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part
by Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).
497. Daniel González, Latino Voters Surge in Ariz., ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 3,
2012, at A1; E.J. Montini, Arpaio Victory Good for Latinos?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Nov. 16, 2012, at B1.
498. Ross D. Franklin, Arizona Sheriff Arpaio Charged with Contempt, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 18, 2016, at 8.
499. See Ortega-Melendres VI, 2013 WL 5498218, at *30 (“The Court shall
appoint an Independent Monitor to assist with implementation of, and assess
compliance with, this order.”). The MCSO monitoring team has a website where
all monitoring reports and other updates are located. Changing the Maricopa
County Sheriff’s Office, ACLU ARIZ., http://www.changingmcso.org/resources/
monitoring-reports/ [https://perma.cc/G3MW-T3WQ].
500. Community involvement has been in the form of a Community Outreach Plan, the creation of a Community Advisory Board (CAB), and even allowing community member participation in the training of police. See Ortega
-Melendres VI, 2013 WL 5498218, at *29–30.
501. Jack Lechich, Protesters Call on Sheriff Paul Penzone to Stop Cooperating with ICE, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/local/phoenix-breaking/2018/08/22/protesters-urge-sheriff-paul-penzone
-stop-cooperating-ice/1069547002/ [https://perma.cc/48DP-L2WP].
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that of New York and Maricopa County because it ended in settlement between the parties and did not require a trial to obtain
a court order. The backdrop of negative publicity against the
NYPD and the election of a reform-minded mayor were important to overcoming the hurdles in this instance.
A. BAILEY’S ORIGINS: A LONG HISTORY OF RACIALLY
MOTIVATED POLICE PRACTICES
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia arose out of a decades-long
struggle to address stop and frisk policing in Philadelphia. In the
1980s, the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) engaged in
high-profile and aggressive police operations that sparked a series of court injunctions and community organizing campaigns.502 On March 27, 1985, the Philadelphia Police
Commissioner initiated Operation Cold Turkey.503 Using computerized police equipment, he located the fifty street corners
with the most drug arrests and sent massive police “strike
teams” to detain and search anyone in the area.504 Officers were
instructed to “clear” corners and surrounding areas to cut off the
drug trade “cold turkey.”505 The local ACLU, working with the
local progressive firm Kairys & Rudovsky, filed a class action a
week later on behalf of 1200—primarily Black—individuals.506
Within two weeks, the media attention and public pressure led
to a consent decree to avoid violations of the Fourth Amendment
rights of persons living in “high-crime” areas.507

502. I start this version of the story in the 1980s, but the tradition of community organizing on police issues carries back many decades. The Coalition of
Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility and the
Coalition Against Police Abuse operated in the 1970s. They were strong enough
to pressure Ed Rendell, after winning the District Attorney race in 1977, to create a separate unit to prosecute police. This promise arose during the campaign,
and both he and his Republican opponent pledged to create such a unit. See
DAVID KAIRYS, PHILADELPHIA FREEDOM 332 (2008). For a good review of the
history of police accountability efforts, including early litigation to achieve police-citizen oversight, see Richard J. Terrill, Police Accountability in Philadelphia: Retrospects and Prospects, 7 AM. J. POLICE 79, 81–84 (1988).
503. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 318.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 319.
507. Id. at 320. The terms of the injunction stated the police “shall not stop,
frisk, question, search, interrogate, detain, or arrest any person” based on “a
person’s presence in a high-crime location” or with less basis or cause than permitted under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
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A few months later, the Puerto Rican residents of Spring
Garden were subjected to rampant illegal searches and arrests
following the death of a police officer who was found shot in his
patrol car.508 One elderly man was cooking for his invalid wife
when police demanded he come to the station for questioning.509
He was not even permitted to turn off the stove or notify family
to care for his wife until his return.510 Spring Garden United
Neighbors (SGUN) called the ACLU and the same Kairys & Rudovsky lawyers to its meeting to hear from residents and discuss
possible action.511 As an organization, SGUN has many priorities, including preventing gentrification from pushing out its
low-income Puerto Rican membership.512 Police sweeps were
viewed as part of the city’s plan to displace the community, making the events central to the group’s mission and membership.513
Following a hearing, a federal judge granted a preliminary
injunction on behalf of a class of Spring Garden residents in
SGUN v. City of Philadelphia.514 All those questioned were of
Puerto Rican origin, none were charged with crimes, and none
had information related to the officer’s death.515 The court found
it important that the police engaged in such sweeps shortly after
the Operation Cold Turkey injunction.516 In his oral opinion, the
judge noted,
This . . . makes it clear to me that the defendants would conduct a
‘sweep’ again if they believed they could escape unscathed. To permit
that would make a mockery of our constitutional right to be free from
undue restraint in our daily lives, on the street, in front of our homes
and inside our homes.517

The City settled following the court’s pronouncements.518 The
temporary injunction became permanent; attorneys’ fees and
minimal damages were awarded.519

508. Id.
509. Id. at 330.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 320–21.
512. Id. at 321.
513. Id.
514. Spring Garden United Neighbors, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 614 F.
Supp. 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
515. Id. at 1351.
516. Id. at 1353.
517. Id.
518. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 332.
519. Id.

2020]

JUMPING HURDLES

2341

Following this activity and other operations, including the
PPD’s controversial bombing of MOVE activists’ homes,520 advocates convened the first Coalition of Police Accountability (CPA)
in Philadelphia.521 The coalition consisted of a range of community, civil rights, religious, and advocacy groups, including an organization of minority police officers, Tenant Action Group, Philadelphia Prison Project, and the American Friends Service
Committee.522 The coalition’s formation was assisted by David
Kairys, of Kairys & Rudovsky, and the ACLU.523 As chair of the
coalition, David Kairys researched and drafted a report to explain and document the state of police concerns.524 The report
included thirteen specific recommendations and was released in
1986 with much public fanfare.525 It traced well-documented reports of police abuse from the Department of Justice and U.S.
Civil Rights Commission back to the 1960s, but pointed to the
current state of affairs as reaching the violence of the “Rizzo
years”—a time marked with complete impunity.526 Some of the
recommendations were adopted over time, following sustained
pressure.527

520. See generally Emma Eisenberg, Three Decades After Philly Dropped a
Bomb on Its Home, MOVE Org Survives, VICE NEWS (May 19, 2017), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbqkb4/three-decades-after-philly-dropped
-a-bomb-on-its-home-move-org-survives [https://perma.cc/P4T7-JCQW]; Timeline of the MOVE Organization Leading to May 13, 1985, PHILA. TRIB. (May 9,
2015), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/timeline-of-the-move-organization
-leading-to-may/article_91170189-7446-5a6b-97cc-db04660d69a6.html [https://
perma.cc/FQP7-Y35E].
521. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 332.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 333; see also Christopher Hepp, Coalition Submits Reforms to Reduce Police Misconduct, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 1986, at B6.
525. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 333–34.
526. Id.; see also id. at 140–42.
527. See Jeff Gammage, Hearings Begin on Police Review Panel, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 1992, at B3 (discussing city council hearings on the establishment of a Police Advisory Board to independently investigate police misconduct); Christopher Hepp, Coalition Says Police Report Lenient on Misconduct,
Hiring, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 1987, at B1 (discussing remedies proposed
by the coalition in response to the shortcomings of a Philadelphia Police Study
Task Force Report); Edward Moran, Coalition: Police Brutality on the Rise,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 1986, at 4 (detailing the coalition’s activities in
response to little reduction of police brutality cases).
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The CPA disbanded by the late 1980s, yet police department
statistics showed complaints of physical abuse by officers increased by thirty-seven percent from 1989 to 1991.528 In the early
1990s, officers in the 39th Police District in Philadelphia arrested, searched, and prosecuted hundreds of persons on false
drug charges.529 Nearly all were African-American or Latinx. A
joint federal and city investigation into corruption and misconduct in the 39th District resulted in the conviction of six officers
and the overturning of 150 convictions.530
In 1996, the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP and North
Philadelphia’s Police-Barrio Relations Project filed a class action
lawsuit as organizational plaintiffs against the PPD in NAACP
v. City of Philadelphia.531 The ACLU of Pennsylvania, Earl W.
Trent of the NAACP, private counsel Alan Ytvin, David Rudovsky (of Kairys & Rudovsky), and Professor Seth Kreimer were
also part of the suit.532 The federal action chronicled the PPD’s
history of racism, corruption, and abuse of civil liberties, “coupled with the collapse of internal discipline.”533 It raised municipal liability claims for illegal searches and arrests under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.534 Due to enormous public
pressure leading up to the lawsuit, the parties quickly settled;
the district attorney’s office eventually agreed to vacate hundreds of convictions and paid over six million dollars in compensation.535

528. BRURIA TAL, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
FIRST 50 YEARS 8–9 (Nov. 2003), https://www.phila.gov/pac/PDF/
HistoryofOversight.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20190608034326/http://
www.phila.gov/pac/PDF/HistoryofOversight.pdf].
529. See id. at 10; see also JACK R. GREENE ET AL., POLICE INTEGRITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PHILADELPHIA: PREDICTING AND ASSESSING POLICE MISCONDUCT 12–13 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/207823.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QB6-SVXE] (discussing “charges of brutality, robbery, and
various procedural violations” committed by officers in the 39th District).
530. JACK R. GREENE ET AL., supra note 529, at 13.
531. Complaint, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4, 1996), ECF No. 1.
532. Id. at 6.
533. Mark Fazlollah & Richard Jones, Suit to Seek U.S. Takeover of Police
Reform, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 7, 1995, at A1.
534. See Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 531, at 3–4.
535. See Complaint at 19, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 (follow-up case to NAACP v. City of Philadelphia) (noting that as a result of the settlement in NAACP v. City of Philadel-
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As part of the 1996 NAACP settlement, defendants agreed
to appoint an Integrity and Accountability Officer (IAO) to monitor compliance with the agreement.536 The parties also agreed
plaintiffs’ attorneys would continue monitoring defendants’ compliance with the agreement.537 The IAO and plaintiffs’ counsel
received “reviews of” police incident reports (PPD Form 75-48a)
that documented stops, frisks, and detentions by the PPD and
the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion.538 Plaintiffs’
counsel reviewed the stop and arrest data and periodically submitted reports to the federal court.539 The agreement was terminated in 2005, despite continued racial disparity in stops, frisks,
and arrests.540
B. CONTINUED RACIAL DISPARITIES IN STOP AND FRISK AND
INFORMATION GATHERING TO JUMP THE HURDLES
Once the settlement terminated, stop and frisk resumed
with vigor. Responding to a 2006–07 spike in homicides in Philadelphia, Black city councilman and mayoral candidate Michael
Nutter ran on an aggressive anti-crime platform centered on increasing the use of stop and frisk.541 When Mayor Nutter was
elected in 2008, he ordered the police department to increase
stop and frisk activity.542 Mayor Nutter’s order had an immediate and alarming impact. Kairys & Rudovsky, the law firm responsible for monitoring the settlement in NAACP, saw a large

phia, “the District Attorney of Philadelphia agreed to vacate hundreds of convictions, and the City of Philadelphia agreed to pay compensation to those
wrongfully accused in a total amount of over $6 million”).
536. Settlement & Monitoring Agreement & Stipulations of the Parties at 4–
5, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996), ECF No.
2 (“[The City] will create a new position of Integrity and Accountability Officer
to be responsible for assessing, auditing, and/or reviewing Departmental policies . . . .”).
537. Id. at 2.
538. See id.
539. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ First Monitoring Report: Complaints Against Police,
NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1997), ECF No.
7.
540. See Order, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. July
21, 2005), ECF No. 53 (ordering the parties shall file their views on “whether
the monitoring agreement should continue” by Sept. 30, 2005, with no more entries following).
541. Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, Partner, Kairys, Rudovsky,
Messing & Feinberg (Aug. 17, 2018).
542. Id.
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increase in the raw numbers of stops and frisks, and began receiving calls from Black and Latinx residents.543 Several individual actions were filed.544 During discovery for these individual
cases, officers admitted to being told to “stop Black kids hanging
around corners,” apparently without needing any suspicion of
criminal conduct.545 Several media stories exposed the extent of
the problem, and local organizers viewed ongoing litigation as
useful to broader reform efforts.546
When a statistical analysis of the monitoring data showed
that the increase in stops surpassed police stops in New York on
a per capita basis, the same individuals and organizations that
were involved with the NAACP case—the ACLU of Pennsylvania, with Kairys & Rudovsky, and University of Pennsylvania
School of Law Professor Seth Friedman—drafted a class action
complaint on behalf of Karys Bailey, seeking injunctive relief.547
In early 2011, they shared the drafted complaint with the law
department of the City of Philadelphia, and after the department
confirmed the allegations, the City was ready to discuss terms of
settlement.548 Following discussions between the parties, on November 4, 2010, the class action suit Bailey v. City of Philadelphia was filed against the City of Philadelphia by a group of
eight African American and Latinx individuals, requesting injunctive and compensatory relief.549
The Bailey plaintiffs alleged that PPD implemented a policy
and practice of unconstitutional stops, frisks, searches, detentions, and uses of unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.550 They additionally alleged that
the PPD conducted stops on the basis of race and/or national
origin—primarily upon Black and Latino men—and that the
PPD and its commissioner, Charles Ramsey, acted with deliberate indifference in failing to address the attendant harms.551 For
the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all of the people in Philadelphia who had been or
would in the future be “subjected to defendants’ policy, practice
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.D.
Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, supra note 541.
Id.
Complaint, ECF. No. 1, supra note 535.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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and/or custom of stopping, seizing, frisking, searching and detaining persons in the absence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, or on the basis of race and/or national origin, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”552
With regard to its Monell claims, the complaint directly related to the prior NAACP litigation. It included specific allegations of racial disparities in stops and arrests, increased use of
force and abuse complaints, and evidence of failure to discipline
and monitor PPD officer activity.553 The allegations were based
on the plaintiffs’ personal experiences with the PPD, hard data
acquired following the litigation in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia,554 and internal data collected by the PPD for the years 2005
through 2009.555 The data showed that in 2005 the PPD stopped
approximately 102,000 persons.556 Only four years later, that
number increased by more than 148% to 253,000. Of the 253,333
stops conducted in Philadelphia in 2009, 72.2% (183,000) of
those stops were conducted on African Americans, despite the
fact that African Americans make up only 44% of the city’s population.557 In a city of 1.52 million,558 this corresponds to a stop
ratio of 1 in 6. By comparison, in the same year in New York

552. Id. at 5.
553. Id. at 19–21.
554. No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
555. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF No. 16. In
1996, in the matter of NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa.
1996), the parties had entered a settlement agreement that compelled a mandatory review of PPD policies to ensure that the PPD was compliant according
to the demands of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Agreement
required appointment of an “Integrity and Accountability Officer” (IAO) who
would monitor the City’s compliance. Settlement & Monitoring Agreement &
Stipulations of the Parties, supra note 536, at 4–5. The IAO released its “report
on the Philadelphia Police Department’s disciplinary system,” finding that the
disciplinary system was “fundamentally ineffective, inadequate, and unpredictable.” ELLEN GREEN-CEISLER, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT INTEGRITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE: DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM (2003), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0002-0010.pdf [https://perma.cc/F76P
-XU44].
556. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 19–21.
557. Id.
558. Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www
.census.gov/quickfacts/philadelphiacountypennsylvania [https://perma.cc/
6HLG-9MMG] (reporting the population of Philadelphia based on the 2010 Census).
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City, police made 575,000 stops in a city of 8.2 million—a ratio
of 1 in 14.559
The complaint also cited district court decisions denying defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Monell municipal
liability claims to demonstrate that the City was on notice of a
potential practice or custom of illegal stops and frisks.560
The broader Philadelphia police-reform community
mounted pressure, which led to additional information that unintentionally assisted the litigants. Institutional reports and investigations also evidenced the PPD’s failure to address abuses.
Following community pressure from advocates, in December
2003 the IAO issued a report on the PPD’s disciplinary System,
which concluded that the “disciplinary system in the Philadelphia Police Department remains fundamentally ineffective, inadequate, and unpredictable.”561 The Mayor’s Task Force had
also issued a report the previous year.562 Both reports cited serious training, discipline, and monitoring problems.563 From 2001
to 2010, the number of physical abuse complaints had doubled.564
A police practices expert’s review of 1000 Internal Affairs
Division (IAD) investigations further confirmed the inadequacies of the police department’s disciplinary process. According to
Dr. Paul McCauley, a professor of criminology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, deficiencies the IAD had reported in
2003 continued.565 He determined that the PPD’s internal investigation process had fallen below accepted practices and was “arbitrary and inconsistent”; progressive discipline was not implemented, meaning repeat violators were not penalized in
559. See Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk
.html [https://perma.cc/VSB9-8BAZ]; New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [https://
perma.cc/PZY3-S4FP] (reporting the population of New York City based on the
2010 Census).
560. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 23 (citing Tindley v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 09-CV-0169 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Lyons v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 06-CV-5195, 2007 WL 3018945, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007); Henderson v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-532 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).
561. GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 555.
562. JOANNE EPPS ET AL., MAYOR’S TASK FORCE ON POLICE DISCIPLINE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2001).
563. Id.; GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 555.
564. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 22.
565. Id. at 23.
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proportion to the number of violations; IAD investigators were
inadequately trained and supervised when conducting investigations; a “Code of Silence” prevailed; and IAD lacked an effective early warning system.566
In a remarkably short timeline, on June 21, 2011, Judge
Stewart Dalzell entered three orders, effectively moving the case
to a remedial phase. That same date, Judge Dalzell approved the
parties’ Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree (Settlement
Agreement).567 Furthermore, the court granted class certification568 and appointed JoAnne A. Epps, Dean of Temple School of
Law, to serve as the court monitor.569 The monitor was granted
the authority to make recommendations to the court and the parties concerning measures necessary to ensure compliance with
the court’s order.570 Although the City of Philadelphia denied
any practice of unconstitutional searches and seizures, the city
agreed to establish “appropriate measures that should be implemented as a matter of City policy and practice to ensure that
stops and frisks by the PPD are conducted consistent with constitutional mandates.”571
The case is an example of how a city may make a cost-benefit
analysis to determine if it would be politically and financially
costly to go to trial; the City of Philadelphia chose not to dispute
the high numbers of stops and frisks since Mayor Nutter came
into office.572 Neither the mayor nor the police chief wanted the
negative press and community pressure that occurred in New
York.573 They agreed to a settlement to avoid litigation and headlines.
The Settlement Agreement included numerous terms,
which I provide in detail to demonstrate the type of information
566. Id. at 22–23.
567. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555. Neither the parties nor the court discussed the plaintiff ’s standing to seek injunctive relief under Lyons, Monell liability, or qualified
immunity in the pretrial briefings.
568. Order Approving Consent Decree and Granting Class Certification,
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF
No. 14.
569. Order Appointing Monitor, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv05952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF No. 15.
570. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555, at 5.
571. Id. at 2.
572. See supra Part II.D.
573. See supra Part II.
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police may collect, or be required to collect, for oversight of remediating racial profiling. First, defendants agreed to provide
plaintiffs with data and other information as remedial discovery.574 This included, for the class period: activity forms (75-48a
Forms) for two week periods; training materials governing stop
and frisk practices, including codes for the 75-48a Form; audits,
reports, and internal activity data analysis prepared by and for
the PPD; PPD Compstat and research and planning numbers regarding arrests, reported crime, seizures of contraband (guns
and/or drugs) pursuant to stops and frisks; and hard data related
to PPD deployment.575 Second, the parties agreed to discuss further disclosures necessary to monitor stop and frisk practices.576
Third, defendants agreed to begin entering all 75-48a Forms into
an electronic database with digitized information sufficient to
analyze the legality of stops and frisks.577 Fourth, the Settlement
Agreement allowed plaintiffs to review current and propose additional training, supervision, and disciplinary policies to determine necessary changes to ensure constitutional stops and
frisks.578
The court order also included Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment declaratory relief.579 With respect to the Fourth
Amendment, the court order declared that stops and frisks
shall not be permissible, without limitation, where the officer has only
anonymous information of criminal conduct, or because the person is
only “loitering” or engaged in “furtive movements,” or is acting “suspiciously,” or for the purpose of “investigation of person,” or on the basis
of non-articulated “flash information,” or only because the person is in
a “high crime” or “high drug” area. These restrictions are not exclusive
and the parties agree that stops and frisks shall not be made without
the requisite reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and
Pennsylvania Constitution.580

On the Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court order declared
that defendant

574. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555, at 3.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 4.
577. Id. at 3.
578. Id. at 4. In addition, seven of the named plaintiffs in the case were each
paid $115,000 as part of the agreement. Larry Miller, Nutter Enacts ‘Stop and
Frisk’ Reforms, PHILA. TRIB., June 24, 2011, at 2B.
579. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555, at 6.
580. Id. at 4.
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agrees to implement policies and practices to ensure that stops and
frisks are not conducted on the basis of the race or ethnic origin of the
suspect, except where the law permits race or ethnic origin to be considered in determining whether a person shall be stopped or frisked
(e.g., where a suspect has been described by his race).581

For the purposes of this Article, however, it is important to note
executive orders issued in direct response to the Bailey settlement. These executive orders represented the triangulation of
three factors: new reformist Philadelphia Mayor James Kinney’s
platform to change policing; experimentation with civilian oversight supported by the DOJ; and the influence of statistical analysis of numerical data. The executive orders updated the procedures for citizen complaints against police officers and
established new procedures to track and audit arrestees held in
temporary investigative detention.
Multiple orders were signed.582 The first order established a
searchable electronic database of pedestrian stops.583 This database would support increased monitoring and audits of investigative detentions, frisks, and searches.584 The city also committed to public reporting for the annual internal audits.585 The
second order addressed internal processing of alleged police misconduct, including the investigation, review, and disposition of
complaints.586 Mayor Kenney reestablished a civilian oversight
board through a third executive order.587 The civilian oversight
board continues to review the implementation of recommendations provided by the Final Report of the President’s Task Force
581. Id. Additional provisions governed monitoring and compliance and the
creation of audits and periodic reviews. Id. at 5–7.
582. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 5-17, Processing of Civilian Complaints Alleging Police Misconduct (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/
Executive%20Orders/eo6517.pdf [https://perma.cc/48Z9-DKHJ]; Exec. Order
No. 2-17, Police Advisory Commission (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.phila.gov/
ExecutiveOrders/Executive%20Orders/eo3217%20Police%20Advisory%20
Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC46-Z3TF]; Exec. Order No. 6-11, Establishing a Procedure to Track and Audit Investigative Detentions Conducted by Police Officers (June 21, 2011), https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/
Executive%20Orders/2011_EO06-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN9H-EER7].
583. Exec. Order No. 6-11, supra note 582.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 2.
586. Exec. Order No. 5-17, supra note 582; Miller, supra note 578.
587. Exec. Order No. 2-17, supra note 582; Patricia Madej, Kenney Reestablishes Police Advisory Commission, Emphasizes Goal to Strengthen Community
Relations, PHILLY VOICE (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.phillyvoice.com/kenney
-reestablishes-police-advisory-commission-emphasizes-goal-to-strengthen
-community-relations/ [https://perma.cc/2VEV-VCGY].
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on 21st Century Policing, and retained its ability to subpoena
and investigate within a police district.588 The Commission also
releases an annual report on its accomplishments and recommendations from the preceding year.589
The Bailey resolution, following nothing more than the filing
of a complaint and discussions with the city, contrasts sharply
with Ortega-Melendres and Floyd, which involved years of contested, costly discovery and federal court trials. There are some
benefits to this strategy—the costs shifted to the defendants immediately and all parties moved to begin fixing the problem, rather than contesting whether the police department engaged in
an unconstitutional practice.590 In addition, Philadelphia officials avoided the negative political fallout faced by Sheriff Arpaio
and former Mayor Bloomberg. The Chief of PPD, Charles Ramsey, and Mayor Nutter were rewarded nationally—Ramsey became chair of President Obama’s 21st Century Policing Task
Force,591 and Nutter was appointed to several prestigious chair
positions with political prospects in the Democratic party.592
588. Exec. Order No. 2-17, supra note 582.
589. Id.
590. See Gilles, supra note 206, at 858–67 (describing the “informational”
and “fault-fixing” functions of constitutional damages actions); Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1681 (2003) (describing
how negative publicity regarding lawsuits “can trigger embarrassing political
inquiry and even firings, resignations, or election losses”). However, another
consequence of avoiding contested adversarial litigation may be decreased opportunity for community engagement or community organizers role in the litigation or remedial process. Instead, Charles Ramsey worked with the DOJ
Community Oriented Police Services to start an advisory board that had no
teeth and eventually stopped meeting. See Sean Carlin, Mayor Michael Nutter
Implements Oversight Committee on Police-Involved Shootings, NBC PHILA.
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/philadelphia
-police-deadly-force-nutter/132448/ [https://perma.cc/8XPP-ZTLY]; Christopher
Norris, Philadelphia Police Oversight Board in Transition Amidst Dormancy,
GOOD MEN PROJECT (Aug. 16, 2016), https://goodmenproject.com/good-feed
-blog/philadelphia-police-oversight-board-in-transition-amidst-dormancy
-cnorris/ [https://perma.cc/2ZKG-Y3SU] (noting members of the board had apparently become disillusioned by the process and opted to withdraw participation).
591. David Gambacorta, Obama Taps Ramsey for Policing Task Force,
MORNING CALL (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc
-philly-obama-ramsey-ferguson-20141202-story.html [https://perma.cc/M3BF
-XF53].
592. Emily Babay, Could Former Philly Mayor Michael Nutter Be the Busiest
Part Timer in America?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www
.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/real-time/All-of-former-Philadelphia-Mayor-Michael
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In summary, Parts II, III, and IV present three examples of
legal mobilization with class action challenges against municipal
law enforcement departments. The in-depth consideration of litigation strategy shows how procedural hurdles act to shape the
litigation process, the choices litigators make, and ultimately affect the outcome of lower court opinions. This Article does not
provide a playbook for plaintiffs’ success in police structural reform litigation, nor does it provide a naïvely optimistic view of
obtaining merits review. Though the litigants here took doctrine
seriously and satisfied the standards for structural reform injunctions, nothing is meant to suggest an overly formalistic approach. Many factors in addition to law determine the outcome
of such cases. Moreover, the case examples demonstrate how Lyons, Monell, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. were overcome through
innovative information gathering strategies, as opposed to offering what some may consider bolder suggestions to expand the
the doctrine of standing to obtain injunctions against police departments or new theories to prove municipal-level culpability
for harms to class members. Despite the likelihood that the Supreme Court may view the evidence provided to the district
courts in Part II, III, and IV differently, these litigants won and,
as with a vast number of cases at the district court level, avoided
appellate review. Even if only a few cases manage to succeed and
avoid the Court’s review, they have assisted thousands to avoid
racial profiling, the accompanying attacks on human dignity,
and the potential for further harm through use of force.

-Nutters-new-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/8YWG-AL34] (noting former Mayor
Nutter’s numerous prestigious appointments and speculating political ambition); Brooke DiGia, Former Phila. Mayor Michael Nutter Is Joining the School
of Social Policy and Practice, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Feb. 16, 2017), https://
www.thedp.com/article/2017/02/michael-nutter-returning-to-penn [https://
perma.cc/539C-P8V5]. Most recently, the former mayor was tapped as campaign
chairman of Bloomberg’s campaign for the presidential nomination in 2020. Alicia V. Lozano, Former Philly Mayor Nutter Joins Bloomberg Campaign, NBC
PHILA. (Dec. 20, 2019) https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/former
-philly-mayor-nutter-joins-bloomberg-campaign/2264143/ [https://perma.cc/
TYS2-XDXF]; Julia Terruso, Michael Bloomberg Just Landed His First Pa. Endorsement: Former Philly Mayor Michael Nutter, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/mayor-michael-nutter-endorses-michael
-bloomberg-campaign-chair-2020-democrats-20191220.html [https://perma.cc/
JXA4-DRD5].
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V. OVERCOMING DOCTRINAL HURDLES IN POLICE
STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION
Even as one must acknowledge the limits of case studies as
exemplars, the cases examined in Parts II, III, and IV reveal
common themes discussed in this Part, and opportunities for further study. The case studies show that certain types of claims—
those challenging racial-profiling practices, such as unlawful use
of stops and frisks—have been able to match the high evidentiary standards required to establish standing, municipal liability, and class certification. In this Part, I use the case studies to
examine: What evidence allowed legal advocates to overcome
pre-trial barriers and achieve class-wide injunctive relief against
police departments’ racial profiling practices? How did the categories of evidence used to challenge unconstitutional and racially
discriminatory stop practices—the claim in all three case studies—operate to satisfy the Supreme Court doctrines? And I analyze the extent to which racial profiling structural reform litigation such as Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey is replicable,
as well as how the examples affirm what is difficult with structural reform litigation as a tool for correcting unconstitutional
police-department practices.
Section A begins by layering the doctrinal barriers discussed
in Part I onto the evidence presented by the parties in the three
case studies. Synthesizing the evidence used in each case shows
a potential evidentiary convergence, where the same information and data overcomes multiple doctrinal barriers. Section
B examines how certain types of evidence helped plaintiffs overcome the standing, municipal liability, and class certification
barriers: namely, statistical evidence, statements by decisionmakers, and proof of a history of failure to correct a known unconstitutional practice. Section C identifies mechanisms outside
the traditional discovery process to obtain evidence in police
structural reform litigation: relationships with advocates and
grassroots organizers; publicity that leads to exposure of more
information; and court orders requiring data tracking and disclosures following prior litigation. It mentions other methods of
gathering hard data besides court orders.
A. JUMPING HURDLES IN FLOYD, ORTEGA-MELENDRES, AND
BAILEY
This Section synthesizes the arguments and types of evidence plaintiffs used to overcome standing, municipal liability,
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and class certification hurdles in the case examples. The synthesis shows a potential doctrinal and evidentiary convergence—an
overlap in the evidence needed to overcome each doctrine and an
overlap in some aspects of the doctrinal requirements, the common thread being strong numerical data. The convergence claim
is a soft one because it requires further consideration beyond the
cases in this Article in order to understand its operation among
the trial courts.
1. Standing: Lyons
As discussed in Section I.A, Lyons established three barriers
to police structural reform litigation: the repeated harm, speculative harm, and innocence requirements.593 Moreover, Lyons
specifically distinguished claims for damages and injunctive relief against unlawful police policy or practice claims.
In Floyd, plaintiffs met the high repeated harm requirement
in part by showing the sheer volume of potentially unlawful
stops by the NYPD, using the NYPD’s own documentation.594 In
addition, the named plaintiffs and trial witnesses had been subjected to multiple unlawful stops, including during the pendency
of the litigation, concretizing the high likelihood of future injury.595 Judge Scheindlin compared the NYPD’s thousands of facially unjustified stops and frisks to the approximately ten
deaths following the LAPD’s chokehold policy cited by the Supreme Court’s majority in Lyons.596 Given the much greater volume of unjustified actions and repeated unlawful stops by class
member witnesses at trial, she found plaintiffs would be unable
to avoid a future injury while simply engaging in their everyday
life activities, meeting the Lyons burden.597
Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office (MCSO) utilized crime
suppression sweeps for the purpose of finding Latino “illegals” to
target for deportation.598 Although the named plaintiffs were not

593. See supra Part I.A.
594. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. The defendants appealed the court’s order instituting a preliminary injunction against detaining persons based only on a suspicion that they are present in the U.S. without authorization in the absence of other facts. See OrtegaMelendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 986 (D. Ariz. 2011). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction and reiterated that unauthorized presence in the United
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themselves stopped multiple times, the sheriff’s own proclamations and his deputies’ admissions revealed that they were targeting Latino areas for law enforcement operations. The MCSO’s
stated policy and practice, as revealed by testimony presented in
depositions and trial, was to detain persons believed to be unauthorized even when they could not be arrested for state criminal
charges.599
The speculative harm barrier requires plaintiffs to establish
a likelihood of immediate injury. In Floyd and Ortega-Melendres,
this requirement was overcome through evidence of repeated
harms. In Floyd, the evidence was similar to that used to overcome the repeated harm requirement, such as multiple unlawful
stops of named plaintiffs. The Maricopa sheriff’s proclamations
and his deputies’ admissions that they target Latinos for arrest
demonstrated a “real threat” of repeated and immediate injury.
Because the department explicitly relied on race rather than reasonable suspicion to engage in Terry stops, and the policies and
practices were pervasive, ongoing, and repetitive, the district
courts determined plaintiffs had overcome the speculative harm
requirement.600
The innocence obstacle was also overcome in the case studies. The Lyons majority found Mr. Lyons’s harm speculative because events leading to the police officer’s application of an illegal chokehold required Mr. Lyons to break the law—namely, a
burned-out tail light and provocation of the police that precipitated the injurious chokehold.601 By contrast, for the Floyd and
Bailey plaintiffs, unlawful Terry stops occurred without any alleged misconduct on the plaintiffs’ parts.602
The district courts treated the investigatory practices at issue—car or pedestrian stops, frisks, or detentions—differently
States is not a crime. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2012).
599. Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 892 (D. Ariz. 2013).
600. Id. at 890–91 (citing LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 (9th Cir.
1985) (explanatory parenthetical in original) (“holding that plaintiffs ‘do not
have to induce a police encounter before the possibility of injury can occur’ because stops are the result of an ‘unconstitutional pattern of conduct’”) and
Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (explanatory
parenthetical in original) (“stating that injunctive relief is appropriate when
plaintiffs show that police misconduct ‘is purposefully aimed at minorities and
that such misconduct was condoned and tacitly authorized by department policy
makers’”)).
601. See supra Part I.A.
602. See supra Parts II.B & IV.B.
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from the chokehold policy challenged in Lyons because they involved police interactions with innocent plaintiffs that often
went without arrest or even documentation.603 Mr. Floyd and his
fellow plaintiffs were stopped during “everyday activities,” such
as going to school or work;604 and the Ortega-Melendres class
members were targeted in such a way that merely leaving their
homes made them subject to unconstitutional sweeps.605 Prefatory language in the Bailey court orders specifically cited the
lack of any basis for the stops conducted by Philadelphia Police
Department officers, let alone reasonable suspicion.606 When
there is no basis for stops, class members overcome the innocence barrier.607
As we have seen, these cases met the Lyons repeat harm,
speculative harm, and innocence hurdles. In some respects,
these kinds of successes are replicable, and in others multiple
factors are at play, making the success attenuated. Showing the
probability of repeated harm could be more likely because police
data is increasingly available, and the innocence hurdle may be
jumped if litigants can show police actions systematically have
no basis or amount to an official unwritten policy. However,
some evidence is very particular to the case, such as Sheriff Arpaio’s blatant admissions608 or Mayor Bloomberg’s statement
suggesting a targeting based on race.609 Again, with social media
and the electronic discovery requirements, such statements are
likely more available than in prior decades.610
This Article has shown that plaintiffs may succeed in structural litigation over certain unconstitutional police practices.
However, in use of force matters, there may be challenges to
reaching substantive review from the Lyons hurdle. But all is
not lost. First, use of force is viewed on a spectrum, and need not
only include practices such as chokeholds or lethal force. Data
603. See supra Part I.A.
604. See supra Part II.A.
605. See supra Part III.A.
606. See supra Part IV.A.
607. I note that while I observe these distinctions in the court opinions, I do
not align myself with the factual account of the majority in Lyons. The alleged
provocation is in doubt based on the complete factual record and the district
court decision. Nor do I agree with the premise that innocence should be required for a court to prevent harm against individuals.
608. See supra Part III.B.
609. See supra Part II.B.
610. See discussion infra Part V.B.2 and note 672.
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and evidence that provide context to police stops is more readily
available. For example, in New York City, the form officers use
to document stops and frisks includes boxes for force (e.g., drawing a gun or putting a suspect against a wall).611 Second, with
advancements in recording police interactions digitally and electronically, the data and proof necessary to overcome standing in
contexts other than stops are more readily available than when
Lyons was decided.612 Nonetheless, plaintiffs must address
whether they have engaged in any activity to “provoke or resist”
the police.613 Police officers’ control over whether an arrestee is
labeled as “resisting” raises concerns for the replicability of the
police racial profiling wins.
2. Municipal Liability: Monell
Monell and its progeny established that to overcome the municipal liability hurdle, plaintiffs must demonstrate a widespread practice or deliberate indifference to changing it, as well
as factual parallel between the examples used to establish an
unlawful policy, practice, or custom. Plaintiffs in Floyd and Ortega-Melendres succeeded in establishing municipal liability for
police practices in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
To overcome the widespread practices and factual parallel
requirements, these cases relied on evidence of discriminatory
statements, expert analysis of hard data, and, in Floyd and Bailey, failure to reform unconstitutional practices following a settlement in a nearly identical matter. In Floyd, plaintiffs presented recordings obtained by two whistleblower officers
demonstrating that the “brass” (command staff executives) were
pressuring mid-level supervisors to obtain more stops and summons.614 Other evidence showed the command staff as centralized and coordinated. The judge also heard unrefuted testimony
that Mayor Bloomberg viewed stop and frisk as a tactic focused
on Black and Latino youth.615 Plaintiffs satisfied the widespread
practice requirement by showing strong statistical evidence that
race was the best predictor of stops in any precinct, and that the
racial disparity of stops crossed all five boroughs.616 In Ortega611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.

See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See infra Part V.B.1.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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Melendres, the statements and documents authorized or published by Sheriff Arpaio, down the chain of command, directing
that Maricopa County Sherriff’s officers to stop any car with Hispanic-looking individuals, certainly assisted the plaintiffs in
proving the stop practices were implemented “with the force of
law.”617 Dr. Taylor’s expert statistical report also demonstrated
the practice of stopping passengers, and the high rate of stops in
predominately Hispanic areas.
The district courts in Parts II, III, and IV found that the
structural reform litigation satisfied Monell and its progeny, and
granted structural reform injunctions to reform stop, frisk and
detention practices. In two cases, Floyd and Bailey, the prior systemic litigation failed; and in all three examples, internal investigations, external media exposure, and other civil rights investigations put police departments on notice for inadequate
training, supervision, and/or oversight. The court in Floyd specifically looked to when defendants were given notice (at least as
far back as the Attorney General’s 1999 report), lack of implementation of corrective measures following the Daniels settlement, and the lengthy history of poor relationships between
Black and Latinx communities and the NYPD. In the OrtegaMelendres case study, although the court had no prior litigation
to rely upon, the strength of officer and supervisor statements,
coupled with Dr. Taylor’s statistical analysis, proved enough to
demonstrate a practice of stopping and arresting Latinx-appearing drivers and passengers. The Bailey complaint featured the
Philadelphia Police Department’s history of failed attempts at
reform, dating back to the 1990s. Although a product of settlement negotiations, and not trial evidence, the final court orders
in Bailey reference the history and long-term challenge to stem
racial disparity within the stop and frisk practices of the Philadelphia Police Department.
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In the three case studies, plaintiffs overcame the commonality hurdle along with what I have characterized as the early
merits inquiry obstacle. Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)
was ultimately granted in all three case studies, and the majority of concerns raised in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., relevant to Rule
23(b)(3), are inapplicable in these examples.

617. See supra Part III.
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As some commentators have noted, following Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., district and circuit courts have distinguished WalMart Stores, Inc. in two general contexts: (a) cases where supervisors exercise their discretion pursuant to an explicit nationwide company policy and (b) cases where a plaintiff class challenges upper management’s discretionary decision-making as
discriminatory.618 The racial profiling actions in this Article fall
under the first: each officer and mid-level supervisor exercised
some discretion, at the behest of the chief decision maker in each
department—Commissioner Kelly in New York, Sheriff Arpaio
in Maricopa County, and Chief Ramsey in Philadelphia—along
with other high level department decision-makers.
The case studies affirm the general view that a court need
not adjudicate each individual class member’s claim prior to certification under Rule 23(b)(2) where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. Even before Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., defendants argued (b)(2)
class definitions were overly broad or that class members are unascertainable.619 For example, the City of New York believed
“mini-trial” determinations were required under Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.620 As the district courts in this Article affirmed, neither precedent nor the text or history of Rule 23 requires adjudication of hundreds of thousands of individual stops in a Rule
23(b)(2) class action.621 Judge Sheindlin did not take up the defendants’ request to decide whether each class member’s stop
was unconstitutional prior to certifying the Rule 23(b)(2) class
action.622

618. See Malveaux, supra note 127, at 371–75. Malveaux delineates these
two categories of cases persuasively. She uses McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) as a prototype for the
first category and Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 114, 119 (4th
Cir. 2013) as demonstrative of the second. In McReynolds, although those who
made the adverse discretionary decisions were local, low-level managers, their
actions were tightly connected to centralized, nationwide policies created at the
corporate level. 672 F.3d at 489–91. In Scott, those who made the adverse discretionary decisions were high-level managers, who exercised such centralized
power and control that their actions were equivalent to corporate policy. 733
F.3d at 114, 119.
619. See supra Part I.A. (discussion of class certification in Daniels); cf. Carroll, supra note 132, at 893.
620. See Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2007).
621. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013).
622. See Marcus, supra note 132, at 830–32; cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138
S. Ct. 830 (2018).
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Nonetheless, the class certification process, a once routine
and standard motion practice early in the life of litigation,623 now
creates delays as federal district courts contend with defendants’
arguments regarding the applicability of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
to class certification decisions. The Ortega-Melendres plaintiffs
requested certification twice before it was granted, and the court
required a developed factual record to decide whether the case
should proceed as a class action. Given the Court’s view that “significant proof” of commonality is necessary to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2), statistical expert analysis became central to class certification in Floyd and Ortega-Melendres.624 The Bailey class certification order was established without a court review of evidence, yet the parties relied on statistical reports from the
Mayor’s Task Force, as well as Dr. McCauley’s analysis of disciplinary reports in their negotiations.625
In some ways, the early merits barrier raises challenges for
replicability, but for some types of litigation, advancement in
data collection and transparency may assist future litigants.
With such a merits inquiry occurring earlier, courts may increasingly need to resolve Daubert disputes in conjunction with class
certification, even in the (b)(2) context.626 Relatedly, moving
class certification to a later stage in the litigation can affect the
plaintiffs’ right to discovery and the parties’ settlement postures.
Early merits inquiry involving expensive statistical experts potentially drive up litigation costs prior to trial, which in turn potentially changes the opportunity for settlements.
Another limitation for the replicability of the wins analyzed
in this Article may arise for class actions that seek damages,
where the necessity rule, notice and opt-out provisions, and ascertainability will be required. Litigation for Rule 23(b)(2) classwide injunctions are not loaded with many of the Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. hurdles that accompany claims for Rule 23(b)(3)
623. See Marcus, supra note 132, at 785–89 (describing “old era” and “new
era” class action features, including the regularity of granting (b)(2) class actions where plaintiffs merely put forward an injunctive claim).
624. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ortega-Melendres II,
598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).
625. Order Approving Consent Decree and Granting Class Certification,
ECF No. 14, supra note 568; Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, supra
note 541.
626. In dicta, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. suggested Daubert
may be applicable at the certification stage. It “doubted” as “true” the district
court’s determination that Daubert did not apply at the class certification stage.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011).
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class-wide damages for an unnamed class. First, for Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, courts have adopted a “necessity” requirement.627 However, the overarching treatment under Rule 23(b)
allowed defendants in the case examples to make an argument
that (b)(2) class certification is unnecessary because injunctive
relief against state officials “is the archetype of [a case] where
class designation is largely a formality.”628 A successful necessity
argument focuses the litigation and remedy on individuals and
potentially evades structural reform.629 Second, Rule 23(b)(3) involves requirements that courts provide notice and permit individual class members to opt out of the class action.630 Courts
sometimes cite the unwieldy or costly nature of the opt-out requirement of (b)(3) litigation as a basis to deny class certification.631 However, Rule 23(b)(2) requires no notice or opt-out provision. Finally, in many circuits, an implicit requirement of an
“ascertainable class” is read into Rule 23.632 Ascertainability offers an administratively feasible way for the court to determine
class membership when individuals are entitled to a monetary
payout,633 and it is typically reserved for class actions in the Rule
23(b)(3) context.634 While the courts involved with the case studies presented in Parts II, III, and IV determined these (b)(3)
rules to be inapplicable to the (b)(2) cases, the rules are important to understand if attempting to replicate strategies discussed in this Article for class-wide damages actions against police departments.

627. See Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir.
1978). But see Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1355 (1st Cir. 1985).
628. Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973).
629. The necessity principal nullifies the class action tool where a defendant
is willing to stipulate that an order applied to an individual plaintiff will apply
writ-large. See, e.g., id.
630. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 363 (“In the context of a class
action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice
and opt-out violates due process.”).
631. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th Cir. 2010).
632. See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015).
633. See generally JD Moore, The Heightened Standard of Ascertainability:
An Unnecessary Hurdle to Class Action Certification, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 247
(2017) (explaining the purpose of the “heightened” certification standard
adopted by five circuits).
634. Id.
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4. The Doctrinal and Evidentiary Interaction Between
Hurdles
The information gathered and evidence presented in police
structural reform litigation work together to achieve a type of
convergence, utilizing overlapping—and sometimes identical—
evidentiary proof to overcome the doctrinal hurdles.635 Aspects
of the doctrine overlap as well. This is significant because where
the same set of evidence provides support to overcome multiple
procedural obstacles, litigants can strategically balance costs
and other choices in protracted discovery disputes. It may further affect the claims development process where litigators decide whether to allege municipal liability or seek class-wide relief. The convergence described here is a preliminary and soft
claim without the benefit of a broader review of trial court outcomes.
The overlap of evidence to satisfy multiple aspects of doctrinal hurdles is clearly evident with standing and municipal liability. The Lyons Court specified that victims of police misconduct could satisfy standing if department officials “ordered or
authorized police officers to act” in an unlawful manner.636 Evidence at the individual level may not prove officially authorized
action.637 But evidence of municipal violations against classes of
plaintiffs should. Claims on behalf of a group, through the class
certification tool, and challenges to municipal practices using the
Monell doctrine, create one method of overcoming the Lyons

635. The idea of convergence builds on the work of others. See Leah Litman,
Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477 (2018) (discussing
Monell doctrine in terms of convergence with qualified immunity and the lack
of alternative remedies); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011)
(examining the influence constitutional tort doctrines have had on Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence).
636. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983).
637. An individual who seeks an injunction against a departmental practice
may have an interest in raising structural claims on their own and without a
class action. In this scenario, the evidence needed is not individual, but typically
includes multiple instances of harm. Where there is no policy or practice, establishing municipal liability through a single incident has proven very difficult.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff ’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that an inmate died after not receiving medical care despite many attempts
by other inmates to get him medical help).
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standing barrier. Evidence of the official policy in Ortega-Melendres and “policy or custom” in Floyd assisted litigants to satisfy
Lyons and commonality for class certification.638
Next, the case studies highlight that the evidence necessary
to show municipal liability was similar, if not exactly the same,
as that required by Rule 23(a)(3) to show commonality after WalMart Stores, Inc.639 Class claims facilitate gathering evidence
through discovery, which assists plaintiffs in overcoming the exacting Lyons and Monell standards. Moreover, the evidence
gathered for multiple parties can operate together, rather than
on an individualized basis. When parties establish a policy, practice, or custom through Monell liability, the most difficult class
action requirement for police litigants (commonality) is practically established. And as a class action, standing for an injunction (Lyons) is largely satisfied. As examples, in Ortega-Melendres and Floyd, much of the same evidence used to support class
certification was also used to show a widespread practice of discriminatory conduct.640 Likewise, showing municipal liability
through either the central decision-maker or the widespread
practices theory necessarily requires evidence of a centralized
policy. The “glue” holding together individual decisions by officers (and sergeants, lieutenants, etc.) should be satisfied whenever plaintiffs can muster the evidence to support the practices
or central decision-maker theory of municipal liability.
A similar overlap exists between standing and class certification. In the case studies, the Lyons repeated harm requirement looked similar to Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity. The defendants
asked the courts to determine how many specific instances of unlawful conduct are necessary to grant an individual plaintiff
standing to pursue an injunction against a police practice.641 The
operation of an injunctive class action mitigates this question
because, where a class is certified, the plaintiffs have necessarily
shown that a large enough number of individuals are likely to be
subjected to a police practice to warrant certification. This, in
turn, maps onto standing to avoid the Lyons repeated harm and
speculative harm requirements. In Ortega-Melendres, the likelihood of future harm warranting an injunction was proven

638. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
639. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011).
640. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).
641. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8.
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through Dr. Taylor’s statistical analysis and by evidence of orders by central decision-makers, down the chain of command, to
target Latino drivers and passengers in Maricopa County for
stop and possible arrest.642 In Bailey, the parties did not litigate
the issue; however, the court issued an order granting class certification.643
The three case studies successfully challenged stops violative of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to Terry or Whren, and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The type
of evidence used to overcome the innocence and repeated harm
hurdles may be more available in stop contexts because of the
sheer volume of these practices.644 Even the Court in Terry
acknowledged stops can be a problem in minority communities
where stops are deployed to harass and discriminate, rather
than to investigate crime.645 This Article does not present a
naïve view of how criminal courts deploy Terry and Whren to entrench the authority of police. It simply acknowledges that district courts may be able and willing to act in certain, albeit limited, circumstances.
The success of litigation against pedestrian and traffic stops
has implications for excessive force claims. On the ground level,
it encourages community groups to consider litigation as a tool
for reform in particular circumstances and encourages attorneys
to develop such claims. For example, in Campbell v. City of Chicago, a use of force class action against the Chicago Police Department was filed on behalf of Black Lives Matter–Chicago and
other groups.646 This Article has not addressed the different
questions, data, or anecdotal evidence necessary to overcome the
doctrinal barriers in use of force claims or litigation for classwide damages.

642. See supra Part III.
643. See supra Part IV.
644. See infra Part V.C.
645. See infra Part V.C.
646. See Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 4467, 2018 WL 4352614, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2018). Campbell reached a settlement agreement on
March 16, 2018. See also Memorandum of Agreement Between the Office of the
Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago and Campbell v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs and Communities United v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs, Campbell,
No. 17 C 4467, 2018 WL 4352614, ECF No. 154-1.
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B. EVIDENCE USED TO JUMP THE DOCTRINAL HURDLES
This Section discusses categories of evidence used to prove
the class-wide claims analyzed in Parts II, III, and IV: hard data
and statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of notice and failure to remedy a constitutional violation. This Part
should not be viewed as depicting a plaintiffs’ playbook for success, nor does it demonstrate unbridled optimism towards obtaining merits review with easily acquired information. Instead,
it shows that standing, municipal liability for unwritten policies
and practices, and class certification require rich data and evidence of the underlying claims. Plaintiffs must essentially
gather enough information through discovery (and other means)
to prove an unconstitutional practice prior to trial—and, at
times, prior to discovery.647
1. Hard Data and Statistical Evidence
Statistical evidence was critical for the plaintiffs in the case
studies to overcome the doctrinal hurdles and, in the case of Bailey, to convince an otherwise unfriendly mayor to settle and admit liability.648 This Section summarizes how the data was used
and obtained, addresses challenges with this form of evidence,
and briefly discusses other methods to obtain data.
As Parts II, III, and IV suggest, statistical analysis of stops,
frisks, or detentions were essential to proving deliberate indifference.649 Judge Scheindlin and Judge Snow used data to find
municipal liability was warranted and to determine that a central decision-maker authorized the targeting of individuals on
the basis of race or ethnic origin.650 Experts relied on police documentation that showed a lack of the requisite reasonable suspicion or probable cause in large numbers of individual police
interactions.651 This in turn established a policy or practice of
647. The creep of the merits into justiciability and procedural rules has been
recognized by others as a general concern. E.g., Fallon, supra note 42, at 663–
76; Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663–64 (1977) (“Decisions on questions of standing are
concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. . . . The
law of standing has thus become a surrogate for decisions on the merits . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
648. See Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
649. See supra Parts II–IV.
650. See supra Parts II–IV.
651. Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 185.
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unlawful Fourth Amendment activity in both Floyd and OrtegaMelendres. Moreover, data was also critical to establishing the
parties’ “failure to” theories of municipal liability that, in turn,
were important to establishing standing for injunctive relief and
class certification.652 Even though the data operated as more indirect proof of failure to train or supervise, the statistical evidence of facially invalid UF-250s and numerous failed Quality
Assurance Division audits were important evidence to demonstrate a practice or custom of unconstitutional stops and
frisks.653
The hard data was available as a result of defendants’ own
record keeping practices in the cases discussed in Parts II, III
and IV. The data used in Floyd and Bailey was created due to
the prior litigation filed by the same attorneys in Daniels and
NAACP respectively.654 Plaintiffs were able to show, in both
cases, the disparity in stops and frisks between Black and Latino
residents and White residents increased since the prior settlements. In Floyd, they were also able to show that this disparity
existed throughout the city in question, even when statisticians
controlled for factors such as crime rates or the volume of officers
in particular neighborhoods.655 Even without a formal requirement to create and maintain race or ethnicity data, the expert in
Ortega-Melendres used sheriff deputies’ vehicle stop reports to
analyze hard data on the number of Latino drivers stopped in
the county.656
One must acknowledge the concern with replicability of legal challenges relying upon statistical evidence due to the Supreme Court’s skeptical view of proving discrimination with
statistics.657 And the current Court seems even more hostile.658

652. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
653. See supra Part II.C.2.
654. See supra Parts II–IV.
655. See supra Parts II, IV.
656. See supra notes 447–51 and accompanying text.
657. As seen in McCleskey and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court
shows hostility towards sociological statistical evidence to prove discrimination.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987). The hostility towards data applies in other areas of civil
rights as well. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (curtailing disparate impact in Title VII litigation).
658. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for
You?: Addressing McCleskey v. Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the
Constitutionally Significant Risk of Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1301–
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The Court’s hostility towards social science evidence may be distinguishable in this Article’s group of cases.659 The type of causal
breakdown the Court found concerning with the statistical evidence put forward in McCleskey v. Kemp, and Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., relied on proving bias.660 Neither Floyd, Ortega-Melendres,
nor Bailey relied on stereotyping or the implicit bias of officers
or decision-makers in the same way. A difference is that the decisions of police officers and supervisors in New York, Philadelphia, and Maricopa County are documented, discoverable, or
publicly available, and were reviewed systematically without reliance on the same inferences as in other types of cases. Nonetheless, I acknowledge statistical analysis has its limits as a
mechanism of proving police misconduct. Though the district
courts in Parts II, III, and IV found data supported plaintiffs’
constitutional claims, certainly other courts have found that
data failed to support theories of unconstitutional police conduct.661 Further consideration is needed to make strong conclusions on this front.
Police departments may not be equipped or have the will to
utilize their own department’s information to monitor the constitutionality of officer actions.662 Floyd and Bailey demonstrate
02 (2018) (comparing Brown, McCleskey, and Gill in the Supreme Court’s recent
term).
659. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some
Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018) (focusing on the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts restriction on proof of discriminatory purposes in equal
protection claims); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1979).
660. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283–91 (reviewing the extensive data analysis showing racial disparities in prosecutors pursuing the death penalty).
661. See Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of
Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 205–11 (2017) (collecting examples where
courts found data insufficient to overcome procedural or evidentiary hurdles,
but noting that the district courts suggested better data may change the outcome of the cases); cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the
Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate
Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) (analyzing the impact
internal police collection data for predictive policing has on communities of
color).
662. See Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s
Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014) (pointing to cultural and political pressure to show a drop in crime rates and led to major urban areas removing rape complaints from crime databases). Moreover, journalists and criminal law scholars have exposed police departments “cooking the books” to show
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mere availability of raw data does little to promote internal
change or executive regulation without more incentives or pressure. New York and Philadelphia agreed to maintain extensive
numerical information on stops and frisks, but never used the
hard data to prevent or correct constitutional harms or racial
disparities until public pressure mounted.663 The RAND corporation had provided the NYPD with an analysis of its highest
stoppers, and other ways to improve internal controls, but the
department did very little to implement its recommendations.664
The Fagan Report identified numerous incomplete stop and frisk
forms, and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office failed to even
maintain records of the race or ethnicity of those subject to driver
checkpoints.665
Overcoming doctrinal barriers to police structural reform
litigation may ultimately rest on the availability and type of system-wide data. Section C includes a preliminary discussion of
recent improvements in police data collection and transparency
that can support systemic pattern and practice claims.
2. Discriminatory Statements
As part of their anecdotal evidence, the plaintiffs in OrtegaMelendres—and Floyd, to a lesser extent—relied on direct statements from supervisors, up the chain of command, to prove the
department-wide practices were motivated by race and/or national origin.666 The admission in Ortega-Melendres, that officers
were instructed to stop and arrest Latino residents, was hardly
refuted at trial.667 The Floyd plaintiffs relied on statements of
sergeants and lieutenants directing officers to engage in stops
and frisks without much regard to the legal requirements that
were gathered through secret recordings.668 And a New York
a reduction in crime. See, e.g., Ben Poston & Joel Rubin, Times Investigation:
LAPD Misclassified Nearly 1,200 Violent Crimes as Minor Offenses, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2014, 6:04 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-crimestats-lapd
-20140810-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZHD7-GG9R].
663. Yung, supra note 662.
664. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
665. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D, in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
Order on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-01034), ECF No. 156.
666. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).
667. See supra Parts III.B, V.A for extensive description of the statements
relevant to Ortega-Melendres.
668. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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Senator testified to Mayor Bloomberg’s statement that stop and
frisk practices were used to target young Black men.669
While this type of evidence is not necessary to meet the deliberate indifference requirement,670 it is notable that both cases
that succeeded at trial relied on statements to support the theory
that police target individuals for police activity without concern
for constitutional standards.671 With the advent of social media,
racially motivated police scandals have increasingly come to
light.672 At the same time, it may still be difficult to gather evidence that racial remarks (e.g., use of the “N” word) are sufficiently widespread to show a culture of race or national originbased targeting.
3. History of Discriminatory Policy or Practice and Failed
Reforms
Proof of a history of notice and failure to remedy the constitutional violation at issue was important to the results of the
litigation in Parts II, III, and IV to varying degrees. The New
York and Philadelphia case studies involve prior structural reform settlements that did not achieve much change in stop and
frisk practices, but which set the stage for subsequent injunctions requiring reform measures.673 Judge Scheindlin’s post-trial
order in Floyd relied upon the failures of the NYPD to remedy
its stop and frisk practices following the Daniels settlement.674
For example, plaintiffs relied on failed quality assurance reports
developed after the 2002 Daniels settlement.675 The long history
669. See supra Part II.
670. See supra Part I.B.
671. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d
1025.
672. See Michael Boren, Videos Show All What Some Have Endured for
Years; People of Color, Overlooked by Traditional Media, See It as a Way to Find
Others with Similar Experiences, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 2018, at B4; Joseph
Serna & Matt Hamilton, S.F. Police Chief Quits Amid Tumult; He Loses Confidence of Mayor After a Series of Scandals and Latest Shooting Involving an Officer Earlier in Day, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2016, at B1; Adrian Walker, A
Chilling, Familiar Tale, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2018, at B1; Bobby Allyn, 72
Philadelphia Police Officers Placed on Desk Duty over Offensive Social Media
Posts, NPR (June 19, 2019, 10:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/
734241210/72-philadelphia-police-officers-placed-on-desk-duty-over-offensive
-social-media [https://perma.cc/7H5V-KNQR].
673. See supra Parts II–IV.
674. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
675. Id.
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of the NYPD’s notice of discriminatory practices, dating back at
least to the 1999 Attorney General’s report, was important to the
court’s finding of deliberate indifference.676 Similarly, the Philadelphia litigants relied on data gathered as a result of the prior
NAACP settlement to pressure the mayor and the city to negotiate an agreement for a monitor and increased data collection requirements.677
In Phoenix, the public statements from Sherriff Arpaio and
mid-level supervisors demonstrated a history and unwillingness
to alter the department’s practice of targeting Hispanics for arrest and detention.678 The court specifically cited defendants’ history of being “aggressively responsive” to local anti-immigrant
sentiment when deciding the Fourteenth Amendment injunction.679 When reviewing the appropriateness of Judge Snow’s injunction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s conclusion
that the history supported the injunctive relief and monitoring
of the court’s orders.680
C. GATHERING INFORMATION TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL
HURDLES
This section provides a synthesis of how plaintiffs are able
to obtain information to overcome doctrinal hurdles prior to the
initiation of formal discovery: relationships with advocates and
community organizations; publicity that creates leads and opportunities for further fact gathering; and data from prior court
orders requiring data tracking and disclosures. It discusses
briefly other methods of gathering data to support structural reform police litigation.
Each case study illuminates the role of relationship building
between plaintiffs’ counsel and outside advocates to gather information beyond traditional discovery. The co-location of plaintiffs’ attorneys within police reform coalitions, such as Somos
America and Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), allowed attorneys to learn information crucial to plaintiffs’ success
in litigation and to reap gains from collateral attention garnered
by other advocates.

676. Id. at 451–53.
677. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555.
678. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 987 (D. Ariz. 2011).
679. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).
680. Id.
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In addition, the attention surrounding NYPD stop and frisk
practices, often mounted by advocates at NYCLU and grassroots
groups, coalesced in the coalition CPR, led to gains in the discovery process. Additional witnesses were discovered through media attention, whistleblower officers came forward, and more individual suits were filed (leading to further discovery).681 The
atmosphere led to more city-level scrutiny and produced more
advocacy and opportunities for information or transparency relevant to the Floyd litigation. For example, city council hearings
related to the weaknesses of the Civilian Complaint Review
Board led to reports and data disclosures, which led to discovery
requests related to plaintiffs’ failure to monitor and discipline
theories.682 The same is true in Bailey, where the use of data and
individual accounts of harm at the hands of Philadelphia’s police
officers created pressure for the City to consider a quick settlement.683 In Maricopa County, the Somos America coalition and
Puente, among other groups, continued to inform plaintiffs’ attorneys when on-the-ground enforcement operations took place,
which informed the discovery process.
Finally, the prior court orders in New York from the Daniels
litigation and Philadelphia from the NAACP settlement, required extensive and detailed collection and disclosure of stop
and frisk data.684 Understanding the real-time basis for each officer’s decision to stop, frisk, and search each person subject to a
Terry stop was foundational evidence critical to the subsequent
Floyd and Bailey litigation.685 The fact that the evidence was
maintained in a format conducive to analysis was also critical in
each case.686
Given the centrality of data in overcoming the doctrinal hurdles in the case studies, methods other than prior litigation to
obtain granular level data are worthy of consideration for future
plaintiffs. Alternative avenues for developing statistical information include open records requests or state laws mandating

681. See supra Part II.
682. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 617–20, n.394 (2013) (relying on reports on the CCRB to prove failure to discipline).
683. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF
No. 16, supra note 555, at 3.
684. Id.; Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 185.
685. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No.
2:10-CV-05952 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
686. See sources supra note 685.
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data collection; voluntary collection and disclosure by police departments; or analysis by institutions obtaining police data.
First, state law may expand access to police data. Courts may
induce data dissemination through open records litigation. The
Washington Post has filed open records requests for every police
shooting since 2014, and most police departments comply in
providing the requested information.687 The ACLU affiliates in
Boston688 and Washington D.C.,689 among others, have also successfully compelled the release of stop data. A new law in California permits the disclosure of police personnel records;690 and
a database established by the Legal Aid Society in New York visually maps individual police officer complaints.691
In addition, several states have begun requiring data collection related to individual police interactions, including deadly
force, and the race and ethnicity of the officer and suspect.692 At
least fifteen states collect demographic information for persons
whose vehicles are stopped by police.693 Missouri, for example,
requires every law enforcement agency to report, for every stop
of a motor vehicle, the age, gender, race or minority group of the
individual stopped, the reasons for the stop, and whether a

687. Fatal Force: 992 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in 2018,
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2019, 9:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2018/national/police-shootings-2018/?utm_term=.e6378fe9eaf8
[https://perma.cc/ZUB4-VBZS].
688. Boston Police Release More Stop-and-Frisk Data, ACLU MASS. (Jan. 29,
2016, 8:52 PM), https://aclum.org/uncategorized/boston-police-release-more
-stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/4344-3DJJ].
689. Near Act Stop & Frisk Data Collection, ACLU OF D.C. (Mar. 28, 2018,
10:15 AM), https://www.acludc.org/en/news/near-act-stop-frisk-data-collection
[https://perma.cc/64RZ-W6XE].
690. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(b) (West 2019).
691. Ali Winston, Looking for Details on Rogue N.Y. Police Officers? This
Database Might Help, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/06/nyregion/nypd-capstat-legal-aid-society.html [https://perma.cc/
FQ4T-CL4V].
692. Law Enforcement Overview (June 19, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx#3 [https://perma.cc/
RA3A-RD56]; see 1999 Conn. Acts 99-198 (Reg. Sess.); 2012 Conn. Acts 12-74
(Reg. Sess.); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212; MINN. STAT. § 13.871 (2019); MO.
REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2004), § 304.670 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-504 (2014);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 289.820 (2019); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ -21.2-6, -7, 21.1-4; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.410
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 17G-2-3 (2019).
693. Law Enforcement Overview, supra note 692.
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search was conducted as a result of the stop.694 Beginning in
2017, California requires every law enforcement agency to report
to the Department of Justice all instances when a peace officer
shoots or is shot by a civilian, or when an officer harms, kills, or
is harmed or killed by a civilian.695
Finally, some police departments began voluntarily disclosing police data. Minneapolis provides an example. In August
2017, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD)—responding to
calls for greater transparency in police practices from groups like
the ACLU and “as part of a broader department effort to improve
transparency in so-called Terry stops”—debuted a “Mobile Digital Computer” dashboard system by which MPD officers can easily enter information about both pedestrian and motor vehicle
stops.696 Additionally, the “data will be refreshed every morning
and can be exported via the city’s open data portal,” where it can
be accessed by the public.697 The automated input systems are
lauded for addressing one common concern police officials raise
with transparency and documentation—the time that completing forms takes away from fighting crime.698
These moves to require more information gathering and
analysis have the potential to support future systemic litigation.699 My view is not that data solves all evidentiary woes.700
694. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2004).
695. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12525.2 (West 2018).
696. See Libor Jany, Public Will be Able To Track Race, Other Data on People
Stopped by Minneapolis Police, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://www
.startribune.com/public-will-be-able-to-track-race-other-data-on-people
-stopped-by-minneapolis-police/439413293 [https://perma.cc/3YF9-92FD].
697. Id.
698. Id.
699. See David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 856, 871
(2013) (analyzing the survey results of fifty-six police departments inquiring
about data collection on stop and frisk practices). A September 2014 NAACP
special report about stop-and-frisk reported eighteen states requiring data collection for stops and searches and fifteen of the eighteen require analysis of the
data. CORNELL WILLIAM BROOKS ET AL., NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-ANDFRISK ABUSES & THE CONTINUED FIGHT TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA
(2014), https://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Born_Suspect_
Report_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/V23L-ACTG].
700. In fact, some are quite skeptical of police using big data in police operations. All data is not necessarily good data for police to collect or deploy. But
where information on police operations is available and used for accountability
to the public, and a department or city is unable to course correct, it could be
used for litigation purposes. Bias, unfair deployment, and discriminatory use of
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Rather, recent developments on the police data front can assist
plaintiffs in overcoming justiciability and procedural barriers.
This Part has discussed the procedural hurdles, and categories of evidence used by plaintiffs in the case studies—hard data
and statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of notice and failure to remedy constitutional violation. It reviews a
potential evidentiary convergence to overcome the standing, municipal liability, and class certification barriers to suing police
departments. It shows the limits of replicability and the importance of advocates and media exposure in locating information to satisfy the doctrinal standards outside the discovery
process.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents case studies of three significant district court police structural reform cases that overcame the difficult doctrinal barriers to standing, municipal liability, and
class certification. Acknowledging the limits to case studies, the
Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey examples nevertheless illuminate ways to jump these doctrinal and procedural hurdles.
They suggest that certain types of information and legal analysis
satisfy exacting evidentiary standards: hard data and statistical
evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors and central
decision-makers; and proof of a history of notice and failure to
remedy constitutional violations. The cases show the significance of information gathering methods beyond traditional discovery, including relationships with advocates and community
organizations; publicity that creates leads and opportunities for
further fact gathering; and court orders requiring data tracking
and disclosures following prior litigation. This Article should not
be taken as presenting an easy way forward for future police
structural reform litigation. The litigation accounts also affirm
some of the potential boundaries surrounding Lyons, Monell and
its progeny, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Further study is needed
information collected through data driven police programs are particularly
worth scrutiny. Sarah Brayne, The Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Implications of Big Data, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 293 (2018); see also Elizabeth
E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016) (examining the discretion police
use to make surveillance choices through big data and pointing to potential bias
and feedback loops); Selbst, supra note 661 (analyzing the impact internal police
collection data for predictive policing has on communities of color).
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to understand district courts as sites of resistance as police structural reform litigation progresses in this era following the
Obama Administration.701 The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has changed course on police reform yet
Black-led movements demand reform within law.
These cases have been able to proceed, even with some significant trouble, in their respective remedies processes. The
cases have uniquely managed to avoid Supreme Court review, in
part due to changes in local leadership. It may be that these examples represent the worst of the worst where doctrinal barriers
operate as the Supreme Court has suggested.

701. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994–PRESENT (2017).

